Frost v. Catholic University of AmericaFrost v. Catholic University of America
John Timothy Bergin, Shapiro, Lifschitz & Schram, P.C., Washington, DC, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, District Judge.
Pro se plaintiff, James A. Frost seeks damages for alleged wrongs committed by Catholic University, John H. Garvey, Veryl V. Miles, Donald Wuerl, Allen H. Vigneron, Barry C. Knestout, Thomasine N. Johnson and Vernon H. Ennels, Sr. The defendants now move to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; the plaintiff opрoses the motion. Defendant Vigneron also moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction; Frost opposes the motion. Upon consideration of the filings and the relevant law, defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Frost‘s allegations stem from two different incidents at the Catholic University Columbus School of Law on July 20, 2011 аnd September 7, 2011 respectively. Frost often used the law school for legal research. Am. Compl. ¶ 126. On July 20, 2011, Frost entered the law school where security officers employed by Catholic University detained him for ten minutes while they photocopied his Maryland State Bar Association (MSBA) ID. Am. Compl. ¶ 133. Frost alleges those actions were tortious and violated his constitutional rights. Am. Compl. ¶ 129.
On September 7, 2011, the plaintiff entered the law school and an unidentified individual stopped and showed him a “Campus Information Alert.” Am. Compl. ¶ 154. The alert also had a copy of Frost‘s MSBA ID. Am. Compl. ¶ 156. The individual told Frost that the paper said that he was “banned” from the law library. Am. Comрl. ¶ 159. Several unidentified individuals and defendant Ennels restrained Frost and prohibited him from
Frost brings several claims against the defendants. The defendants include: Donald Wuerl, the archbishop of Washington and chancellor of The Catholic University of America; Allen Vigneron, the archbishop of Detroit and chairman of the board of trustees of The Catholic University; Berry Knestout auxiliary bishop of Washington and chief of staff for the archdiocese of Washington; John Garvey, President of The Catholic University; Veryl Miles, Dean of The Catholic University Law School; Thomasine Johnson, chief of the University‘s police force; and Vernon Ennels, a District of Columbia security officеr employed by Catholic University. The plaintiff‘s complaint is unclear as to whether all of the claims are for both the July 20th incident and the September 7th incident. Frost also does not clearly articulate against whom he brings each claim. As the Court understands Frost‘s complaint, he brings a
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
B. Pro se Standard
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, a pro se complaint “must present a claim on which the Court
C. Personal Jurisdiction Standard
On a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Fedеral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court‘s personal jurisdiction over a defendant. FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts., Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1092 (D.C.Cir.2008). To meet this burden, a plaintiff must allege “specific facts on which personal jurisdiction can be based; it cannot rely on conclusory allegations.” Moore v. Motz, 437 F.Supp.2d 88, 90-91 (D.D.C.2006). And unlike a motion to dismiss for failure to state а claim, the Court need not confine itself to only the allegations in the complaint, but “may consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.” Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C.Cir.2005). Nor must a court treat as true all of plaintiff‘s allegations when determining whether personal jurisdiction exists. Fuentes-Fernandez & Co. v. Caballero & Castellanos, PL, 770 F.Supp.2d 277, 279 (D.D.C.2011). At the same time, any factual discrepancies with regard to the evidence itself must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff, Dean v. Walker, 756 F.Supp.2d 100, 102 (D.D.C.2010), and in the absence of an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction. Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir.2005).
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Court Dismisses All Claims against Defendant Vigneron for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
To assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, service of process must be authorized by statute and must comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cohane v. Arpeja-California, Inc., 385 A.2d 153, 158 (D.C.1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 980, 99 S.Ct. 567, 58 L.Ed.2d 651 (1978). Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) the Court establishes personal jurisdiction through serving a summons to a defendant “who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.” Since the District of Columbia‘s long-arm statute has been held to extend as far as the Due Process Clause allows, Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988 (D.C.1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006, 102 S.Ct. 1643, 71 L.Ed.2d 875 (1982), personal jurisdiction exists when the defendant has purposely established minimum contacts with the forum state and when the еxercise of jurisdiction comports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs may discharge the requirements of purposeful availment by “showing that all the requirements of the Long Arm statute have been met,” but “[m]ere conclusory statements ... will not suffice.” Jones v. City of Buffalo, 901 F.Supp. 19, 21 (D.D.C.1995). The imposition of such a burden on plаintiffs exempts personal jurisdiction analysis from the general rule that all allegations must be taken as true for the purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss. See United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 116, 120 n. 4 (D.D.C.2000). Indeed, courts may consider extrinsic evidence in disposing of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See id.
The D.C. Long-Arm Statute provides in relevant part that
Defendant Vigneron is the archbishop of Detroit and chairman of the Board of Trustees of Thе Catholic University of America. Am. Compl. ¶ 10. Frost alleges that defendant Vigneron “has been at all times pertinent to this case ... chancellor of the university.” Am. Compl. ¶ 10. Furthermore, the plaintiff asserts that “[l]ast year and at other times relevant to this proceeding defendant Allen H. Vigneron transacted business of The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., not in his capacity as Roman Catholic archbishop of Detroit but in his capacity as chairman of the defendant university‘s trustees;” and the court gains its jurisdiction from that action (original emphasis omitted) Pl.‘s Opp‘n to Mot. On Def. Vigneron‘s Behalf Dismiss His Am. Compl.
However, when the allegations do not detail thаt nonresident defendant‘s contacts with the forum state are for the purpose of transacting business as an individual, as opposed to as an officer of a corporation, then “sections (a)(1) and (a)(4) of the Long-Arm Statute are not available to the plaintiff as a basis for jurisdiction.” Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F.Supp. 554, 558 (D.D.C.1981). And section (a)(3) does not apply because Frost has not alleged a single action by defendant Vigneron in the District of Columbia. Therefore, Frost‘s allegations against defendant Vigneron in his capacity as Chairman of The Catholic University‘s Board of Trustees do not establish personal jurisdiction over defendant Vigneron. The plaintiff‘s claims аgainst defendant Vigneron are DISMISSED.1
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Violation of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights
1. Action Under Color of State Law
To establish a claim under
Frost also alleges a
2. Fourth and Fifth Amendment Violations
The Fourth amendment‘s prohibition against unreasonable seizures includes “seizure” of the person. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). The amendment applies to “sеizures” that encompass a short detention where the individual‘s freedom to walk away is restrained, even without subsequent arrest. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969)). A seizure of a person occurs when a reasonable person would have perceived that he was not free to go under the circumstances. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (1991). The reasonableness of the seizure is determined through an objective test of either probable cause or reasonable suspicion. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). Probable cause to seize a person exists where “the facts and circumstances” within a law enforcement officer‘s knowledge “were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). Probable cause is a “common
Frost alleges that defendant Ennels violated his Fourth and Fifth amendment rights. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 191-92. Frost alleges that he was physically detained and did not believe that he was free to leave. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 169-73. Frost presents enough facts to survive a 12(b)(6) motion on the issue of whether he was seized under the fourth amеndment.
However, Frost also alleges that he had been informed on September 7, 2011 that there was a “Campus Information Alert” that consisted of a photocopy of his Maryland Bar Identification card and a statement that he was banned from law school premises. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 153-59. Defendant Ennels and other security officers detained Frost under the suspicion of trespassing. Am. Compl. ¶ 167. Although, Frost does allege that Ennels did not have probable cause to detain him under DC law for trespassing because he intended to leave the building. Frost states enough facts that a court could find that Ennels and the security officers that detained Frost had prоbable cause to do so. Am. Compl. ¶ 168. A reasonable person in those officers’ positions could conclude from the Campus Information Alert stating that Frost was banned that he was trespassing on University property. Further, an officer, such as Ennels, does not need to have enough information to convict Frost of trespassing; just enough to have probable cause that he was trespassing. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 149, 92 S.Ct. 1921. Therefore, the Court could conclude from Frost‘s facts that defendant Ennels did not violate Frost‘s Fourth amendment when Ennels seized him because Ennels had probable cause for Frost‘s detention.
The plaintiff also alleges violation оf his Fifth Amendment rights by defendant Ennels. Am. Compl. ¶ 192. However, the Fifth Amendment protects an individual from interference of his life, liberty or property without due process of law, the right to be free from detention from a state actor without probable cause is protected by the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). The plaintiff claims that Univеrsity agents detained him for 33 minutes.3 Am. Compl. ¶ 169. Therefore, the plaintiff has not shown deprivation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Defendant Ennel‘s motion to dismiss the plaintiff‘s
C. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction
Frost‘s remaining claims for both the July 20th and September 7th incidents presence in federal court rests on supplemental jurisdictiоn. Under
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the aforementioned reasoning, the Court shall GRANT the defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims against defendant Vigneron for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court shall also GRANT the defendants’ motion to dismiss the
A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall issue this date.