FRONT STREET BUILDING CO., LLC v. JAMES DAVIS, et al.
C.A. CASE NO. 27042
T.C. NO. 16CVG138
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
October 21, 2016
2016-Ohio-7412
DONOVAN, P.J.
Civil appeal from Municipal Court
JAMES DAVIS, 1036 Creighton Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45420 Defendant-Appellant
OPINION
DONOVAN, P.J.
{¶ 1} This matter is before the Court on the Notice of Appeal of James Davis, filed March 10, 2016. Davis appeals from the February 9, 2016 Magistrate‘s Decision and Judgment Entry of the Dayton Municipal Court that granted restitution of the commercial premises located at 36A Front Street, Dayton, Ohio, to Front Street Building Co., L.L.C. (“Front Street“).
{¶ 3} On February 2, 2016, Davis filed a pro se “Notice of Jurisdictional Defect and Demand to Dismiss,” arguing that the Dayton Municipal Court is “not a constitutional court.” Davis attached two printouts from the website “manta.com,” as well as his affidavit
{¶ 4} At trial before the court, the following exchange occurred:
THE PLAINTIFF: If it please the court your Honor. The Plaintiff is the owner of the premises as described in the complaint. The parties hereto entered into a written agreement (inaudible) attached to the (inaudible) which is a month to month lease. The Defendant has failed to pay rent on December, January, and now February. Statutory three days [sic] was also served. I‘m asking for restitution of the premises.
THE COURT: Very well. Sir, are you Mr. James Davis?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And it is correct that you are behind in your rent at this time? THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Ok do you have receipts for your rent to show that you are current sir?
THE DEFENDANT: I don‘t have any rent. The contract he‘s attached to his [sic] is an invalid and unenforceable contract. It does not obligate me to pay any rent.
THE COURT: Ok, so you don‘t have any receipts to show you‘ve been paying rent sir?
THE DEFENDANT: I don‘t owe any rent.
THE COURT: Ok very well, sir. The court is going to grant restitution of the premises.
THE DEFENDANT: I object your Honor.
THE COURT: Back to the Plaintiff of Front Street Building Company. The second cause will be continued. Just so the record is clear sir I did also get a filing. I believe it was time stamped in by [sic] our clerk‘s office on February 2, 2016 marked Notice of Jurisdictional Defect and Demand to Dismiss. I have reviewed that and gave it consideration. I have denied that as well sir.
THE DEFENDANT: Ok what‘s the basis for that denial?
THE COURT: You can petition the court sir but I don‘t have to reveal that to you sir. The Court has considered it and it has been denied.
THE DEFENDANT: I object and protest.
{¶ 5} The February 8, 2016 Writ of Restitution issued by the court provides that judgment in favor of Front Street was rendered on February 5, 2016. The February 9, 2016 Magistrate‘s Decision and Judgment Entry provides in part that the “The Court further finds that Plaintiff is the owner/landlord of the premises; that all statutory notices were served; that Defendant(s) have breached the written/oral agreement between the parties as described in the complaint; and that Plaintiff(s) should have restitution of the premises forthwith.” A “Dayton Municipal Court Notice of Eviction,” dated February 8, 2016, was served on February 9, 2016, setting an eviction date of February 16, 2016.
{¶ 6} On February 9, 2016, Davis filed a “Demand to Vacate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to Vacate any Order of Restitution that may be Entered in this Case, and to Maintain the Status Quo.” Therein he asserted that the municipal court, “a private company,” lacked jurisdiction. He asserted that even “if there was jurisdiction for said hearing, the proceedings held at that time were totally biased and prejudiced, and violated virtually all valid legal procedure.” Davis asserted that he “made sworn testimony that the alleged debt claimed by Plaintiff is invalid.” Davis asserted that he “filed counterclaims and third party claims in this case, but was given no opportunity by the alleged court to bring this fact to the alleged court‘s attention.” Davis argued that he “was not given the opportunity to introduce additional testimony that the necessary 30 day notice, required by Ohio law, was not served prior to filing Plaintiff‘s Complaint.”
{¶ 7} On February 12, 2016, Front Street filed a “Memorandum Contra.” Front Street asserted that Davis’ “claim that this Court has no jurisdiction is certainly invalid.” Front Street asserted that the statements made by its counsel “at the time of the hearing
{¶ 8} Also on February 12, 2016, Front Street filed a “Motion to Strike Defendant‘s Counterclaims and Cross Claims.” Front Street asserted as follows:
Argument – The issue is whether the forcible detainer action can be heard separately from the monetary issue raised by the Counterclaims.
Rule 13(J) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that an entire case must by certified to the Common Pleas Court when a counterclaim exceeds the monetary jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. However, Rule1(C) provides that forcible detainer actions are specifically exempt from the mandates of the Civil Rules. The issue, then is whether the matter of restitution of premises matter may be heard separately from Defendant‘s counterclaims, which are essentially, that Plaintiff has engaged in unfair and/or deceptive business practices by filing the instant lawsuit.Generally, restitution claims may be heard separately from a Defendant‘s counterclaims. * * * The issue is whether the counterclaims are so intertwined with the forcible detainer action that bifurcation would be
untenable. * * * In the instant case, such an intertwining is impossible. In the first place, the causes of action put forward by the Defendant are not causes of action at all. A cause of action does not exist until a point in time when the action may be commenced and enforced. In other words, the cause of action must have accrued. A cause of action cannot exist until a claim exists and may be resorted to. * * * Here, Defendant‘s counterclaims seek a recovery for things which have not yet occurred. Therefore, the counterclaims are invalid and not justiciable.
Moreover, it is not explained by the Defendant how an undisputed failure to pay rent can amount to an unfair or deceptive business practice. If this were the case, all forcible detainer actions would be subject to these counterclaims. In any event, there is no substantial intertwining of the causes in the Complaint and the Counterclaims.
As to Defendant‘s third party complaints, even if justiciable, they would have to be separated out and sent to the Common Pleas Court for hearing as they are over the Court‘s jurisdictional amount and have nothing to do with the forcible action. These Cross Claims and the Defendant‘s Counterclaims, if justiciable, should be heard by the Common Pleas Court.
Therefore, this Court should maintain the forcible detainer portion of this case, strike the counterclaims and cross claims and, if the Court deems it necessary, refer them to the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court.
{¶ 9} On February 16, 2016, the Magistrate issued an “Entry” that provides that
{¶ 10} On February 19, 2016, Davis filed a pro se “Response to the Alleged Entry and Decision filed on February 16, 2016.” Davis again asserted that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction. He asserted that the Magistrate “is obviously, totally biased and prejudiced, and violated virtually all valid legal procedure, because a magistrate, with jurisdiction, can only make findings of fact and conclusions of law and make a recommendation to a judge.” Davis asserted that the February 16, 2016 “Entry” “offers nothing in the way of findings of fact and conclusions of law,” and that it “is void on its face, in every respect.” Finally, Davis argues that his “document filed on February 9, 2016 was not a motion. A motion presumes jurisdiction of a court, and a question to be resolved by a judge, not a magistrate.” Also on February 19, 2016, Davis filed a second “Demand to Vacate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to Vacate any Order or Restitution that may be Entered in this Case, and to Maintain the Status Quo.” On February 23, 2016, Front Street filed a “Reply of Plaintiff to Defendant‘s Counterclaims,” asserting that Davis’ “counterclaims fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted.”
{¶ 11} On February 26, 2016, the municipal court issued an “Entry and Order Denying Defendant‘s Motion to Vacate Judgment.” On March 8, 2016, the court issued an “Entry and Order of Transfer,” which provides: “Defendant‘s counterclaims exceeding the monetary jurisdiction of this Court, Plaintiff‘s second cause of action and Defendant‘s counterclaims are transferred to the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas for all further action required.”
{¶ 13} Davis’ supporting memorandum provides as follows:
* * *
As a result of the illegal and improper judgment of the Dayton Municipal Court, the premises occupied by Appellant was locked up by the Bailiff of said court. At that point, approximately $40,000 of Appellant‘s property was held hostage by Appellee.
The only way that Appellee would allow me access to my property was if I agreed to have an auction of my property and for the auctioneer to agree to pay the sum of Three Thousand One Hundred twenty Five Dollars ($3,125) to Appellee.
Attorney for Appellee drew up a contract (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A) specifying that I have an auction of my property and for the
auctioneer to agree to pay the sum of Three Thousand One Hundred twenty Five Dollars ($3, 125) to Appellee. * * *
I signed the stated contract under duress and or coercion, which was made clear at the time of signing.
{¶ 14} The attached Agreement provides as follows:
This Agreement is made this 17th day of February, 2016, by and between Front Street Building Co. LLC, hereinafter referred to as “Front Street” and James Davis hereinafter referred to as “Davis.”
WHEREAS the parties in the past have been in a relationship of landlord and tenant of property owned by Front Street at 36A Front Street, Dayton, Ohio, and
WHEREAS the parties wish to agree as to a methodology for the removal of Davis’ personal property from the Front Street Building, now THEREFOR the parties hereto agree as follows:
1. On February 16, 2016, pursuant to a Court Order of the Dayton Municipal Court, Case No. 16CVG00138, Front Street shall be entitled to take possession of the unit known as 200-0100 at 36A Front Street, Dayton, Ohio. It is recognized that Davis has personal property in said premises which he needs two weeks to remove. Front Street grants to Davis though February 29, 2016, to remove his property from the premises. Any property owned by Davis that remains in Unit 200-0100 and Unit 100-1412 or in outside storage at 36A Front Street, Dayton, Ohio on March 1, 2016,
shall be deemed abandoned by Davis and shall become the property of Front Street. 2. Davis shall contract with an auction company to sell his personal property which is located at the premises owned by Front Street. Upon a sale of said property by the auction company, the sum of $3,125[.]60 which includes rent through February 29, 2016 and Front Street‘s court costs and legal fees shall be paid to Front Street by Davis. To insure said payment Davis hereby authorizes and directs the auction company to pay said amount directly to Front Street at PO Box 963, Dayton, Ohio 45401-0963. By these presents Davis hereby assigns said amount to Front Street from the proceeds of such sale.
* * *
Muncy and Associates (auction company) hereby acknowledges receipt of the assignment contained in paragraph 2 above and agrees to pay Front Street Building Co. LLC the sum of $3,125.60 from the proceeds of the sale of personal property belonging to James Davis.
The Agreement is signed by Krysten Smith, leasing manager, Davis and John Muncy.
{¶ 15} On May 2, 2016, Front Street filed a “Motion to Dismiss” Davis’ appeal, asserting that Davis “failed to file his brief in a timely manner,” and that the “issues, if any, in this appeal are moot.” Davis opposed the motion on May 16, 2016, asserting that his failure to file a brief was “excusable error,” since he did not receive “the 11(B) notice.” He further asserted his appeal is not moot, since there “are numerous errors to be raised in my appeal, any of which will render Appellee‘s eviction, and or the judgment of the Dayton
{¶ 16} On May 19, 2016, Davis filed a “Motion for Leave to File Appellant‘s Brief.” On May 25, 2016, this Court issued a “Decision and Entry” overruling Davis’ “Motion to Maintain the Status Quo.” On June 3, 2016, this Court overruled Front Street‘s motion to dismiss, noting as follows: “First, Davis’ brief is not yet due, as the clerk of courts has not yet issued the App.R. 11(B) notice indicating that the record is complete and starting the briefing schedule. Second, the question of mootness should be raised in the parties’ brief and will be decided after a full review of the record.” This Court ordered the parties “to address the issue of whether this matter is moot in their briefs.”
{¶ 17} In his brief1, Davis initially argues that “it is patently obvious that this appeal is not moot. I, James Robert Davis, have substantial right to repossess my tenancy and to damages caused by Appellee.”
{¶ 18} As this Court previously noted:
The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that actions in forcible entry and detainer determine the right to immediate possession of the property “and nothing else.” Seventh Urban, Inc. v. University Circle, 67 Ohio St. 2d 19, 25, 423 N.E.2d 1070 (1981). A forcible entry and detainer action is
intended to serve as an expedited mechanism by which an aggrieved landlord may recover possession of real property. Miele v. Ribovich, 90 Ohio St. 3d 439, 441, 2000-Ohio-193, 739 N.E.2d 333. Once a landlord has been restored to the property, the forcible entry and detainer action becomes moot because, having been restored to the premises, there is no further relief that can be granted. RLJ Management Co., Inc. v. Larry Baldwin, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-01-16, 2001-Ohio-2[3]37. The only method by which a defendant appealing a judgment of forcible entry and detainer may prevent the cause from becoming moot is stated in
R.C. 1923.14 . [Emphasis added.] Long v. MacDonald, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-02-10, 2002-Ohio-4693. The statute provides a means by which the defendant may maintain, or even recover, possession of the disputed premises during the course of his appeal by filing a timely notice of appeal, seeking a stay of execution, and posting a supersedeas bond. Colonial American Dev. Co. v. Griffith, 48 Ohio St. 3d 72, 549 N.E.2d 513 (1990). If the defendant fails to avail himself of this remedy, all issues relating to the action are rendered moot by his eviction from the premises. Long, supra. * * *.
Cherry v. Morgan, 2d Dist. Clark Nos. 2012 CA 11, 2012 CA 21, 2012-Ohio-3594, ¶ 4-5.
{¶ 19}
* * * If an appeal from the judgment of restitution is filed and if, following the filing of the appeal, a stay of execution is obtained and any
required bond is filed with the court of common pleas, municipal court, or county court, the judge of that court immediately shall issue an order to the sheriff, police officer, constable, or bailiff commanding the delay of all further proceedings upon the execution. * * *
{¶ 20} As noted in the concurring opinion in Gara v. Gara, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26671, 2015-Ohio-4401:
A moot issue may still be addressed if it is capable of repetition, but evades review, State ex rel. Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v. Barnes, 38 Ohio St. 3d 165, 527 N.E.2d 807 (1998), or where there remains a debatable constitutional issue to resolve or where the matter is one of great public or general interest. Franchise Developers, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 30 Ohio St. 3d 28, 505 N.E.2d 966 (1987).
Id. (Froelich, P.J., concurring).
{¶ 21} Davis failed to seek a stay of execution in the municipal court and post a supersedeas bond following the filing of his appeal, and none of the exceptions to mootness apply herein. Accordingly, the instant appeal is moot. Since Davis’ appeal is moot, we do not reach the merits of his assigned errors; therefore, Davis’ appeal is dismissed.
FROELICH, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Joel Shapiro
James Davis
Hon. Mia Wortham Spells