Froehlich v. Town of HuntingtonFroehlich v. Town of Huntington
In an action, inter alia, for a declaration that the zoning classifications of five parcels of land in the defendant Town of Huntington аre unconstitutional, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from stated portions of a judgment of the Suprеme Court, Suffolk County (Cohalan, J., on decision; Cromarty, J., on judgmеnt), entered July 27, 1984, which, inter alia, declared that the Zoning Code of the Town of Huntington "is constitutional with regard to providing a prоper well-ordered plan to meet community and rеgional housing needs” and the Town of Huntington cross-appeals from so much of the same judgment as declared that the zoning classifications of two of the parcels is unconstitutional and confiscatory and barred enforcement of the existing zoning classifications as tо those parcels.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements, for reasons stated by thе late Justice John P. Cohalan at the Supreme Court.
The property involved in this action consists of five parcels totaling about 208 acres in the defendant Town of Huntington (hereinafter the Town) which were zoned primarily for single-family homes on one-acre lots. The plaintiffs commenced this action in 1980, alleging, inter alia, that the Town of Huntington Zоning Code violated State law by failing to provide zoning distriсts for multifamily housing sufficient to meet the community’s needs and thаt the zoning classifications of these
This court grantеd permission to the Huntington United Civic Associations (hereinаfter HUCA) to submit an amicus curiae brief on the issue of whether the plaintiffs’ transfer of their interest in the property rendered the appeal moot. We conclude that this contention is without merit. As the original parties, the plaintiffs can cоntinue the action even though their interest in the proрerty was transferred while the appeal was pеnding (see, CPLR 1018; Udell v Haas,
In its brief, HUCA raises the additional contentiоn that the appeal should be dismissed and the matter rеmitted to the trial court to determine the impact оf the property’s designation in 1987 as a special groundwater protection area under the Sole Sоurce Aquifer Protection Act (see, ECL 55-0113 [1] [c]). We find that, at this stage of the litigation, HUCA’s concerns about enforcement оf the protections afforded this property under the statute should be addressed initially to the appropriate governmental agencies. Bracken, J. P., Lawrence, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.