Froebrich v. Lane, 76 P. 351

Froebrich v. Lane

76 P. 351 | Or. | 1904

Mr. Justice Wolverton,

after stating the facts in the foregoing terms, delivered the opinion of the court.

1. The jurisdiction of acourt of equity to interpose and set aside the order or decree of a county court approving and settling the final account of an administrator is first challenged by the demurrer. The especial ground for invoking equitable jurisdiction is fraud in procuring the order settling the account, consisting in the disregard and violation on the part of the administrator of the alleged compromise agreement, whereby he agreed that he would claim no extra compensation for his own services and no more than $300 as attorney fees and charges. It is the undoubted province of equity, long maintained, to set aside and enjoin the execution or enforcement of judgments at law and of its own decrees, when they have been procured by fraud, unaccompanied by negligence, laches, or fault on the part of him who invokes the interposition of the remedy. This general statement of the law will hardly be controverted: 3 Pomeroy, Eq. § 1364; 1 Black, Judg. (2 ed.) § 321; Phillips v. Negley, 117 U. S. 665 (6 Sup. Ct. 901); Hayden v. Hayden, 46 Cal. 332; Gates v. Steele, 58 Conn. 316 (20 Atl. 474, 18 Am. St. Rep. 268); Brooks v. Twitchell, 182 Mass. 443 (65 N. E. 843, 94 Am. St. Rep. 662). It is earnestly and strongly controverted by respondent, however, that the rule has application to probate proceedings, and especially under our own procedure, where the county court is given the exclusive jurisdiction, in the first instance, pertaining to a court of probate,the statute *21enumerating, among other powers, to grant and revoke letters testamentary of administration and of guardianship, and to direct and control the conduct and settle the accounts of executors, administrators, and guardians: B. & C. Comp. § 911. Speaking generally upon the subject, Mr. Woerner says : ‘‘In dealing with the judgments and decrees of probate courts upon the final settlements of executors and administrators precisely as with the judgments of other courts, courts of chancery review, enjoin, or annul them upon application of injured parties for fraud, and in some cases for mistake, or where the matter complained of may have arisen either from fraud or mistake, or constitutes constructive fraud 2 Woerner, Am. Law Adm. (2 ed.) § 508. So it was held in Griffith v. Godey, 113 U.S. 89 (5 Sup. Ct. 383), a suit in equity to surcharge the account of an administrator, that a probate settlement of an administrator’s account does not conclude as to property fraudulently withheld from it; and; in Nevada (Lucich v. Medin, 3 Nev. 93, 93 Am. Dec. 376), that “a court of equity certainly has the power to inquire into the final account of an executor, and proceed to hear evidence to falsify and surcharge the account for fraud, and to render such decree as is necessary to do equity in the case”; and again, in Illinois (Anderson v. Anderson, 178 Ill. 160, 52 N. E. 1038), that a judgment of the county court on final settlement betwreen the executor and the beneficiaries may be impeached in equity for fraud. See, also, Waldrom v. Waldrom, 76 Ala. 285, Benson v. Anderson, 10 Utah, 135 (37 Pac. 256),and Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 640 (4 Sup. Ct. 619), as to the general doctrine applied to probate matters.

But the doctrine is applied as well in Arkansas (Reinhardt v. Gartrell, 33 Ark. 727), where the-statute, like our own, has accorded exclusive original jurisdiction in the matter of the administration of the estates' of decedents *22to the probate courts. Mr. Justice Eakin, rendering the opinion in that case, says: “The courts of chancery have no power to take such cases out of the probate courts, for the purpose of proceeding with the administration. But their power and functions to relieve against fraud, accident, mistake, or impending irremediable mischief is universal, extending over suitors in all courts, and over tlie decrees in those courts obtained by fraud, or rendered under circumstances which render it inequitable that they should be enforced. Hence any frauds in the settlements of administrators or executors may be corrected. When that is done, if there be still a necessity for continued proceedings in the course of administration, such proceeding should go on, in the probate court, upon the basis of the reformed settlement.” To the same purpose, see Shegogg v. Perkins, 34 Ark. 117. Indeed, there can be no reason why the rule should not be applied in probate matters, where the order and decree complained of is in effect final, and not merely interlocutory, with the same efficacy as to the judgments and decrees of courts of law and equity possessing general jurisdiction within their peculiar province. The circuit courts of the state possess exclusive jurisdiction in all matters not accorded to the inferior courts, yet it is competent' for equity to interpose and set aside or enjoin the enforcement of their judgments at law or decrees in equity where such judgments, or decrees have been superinduced by fraud, and the complainant is free from inattention, negligence, and fault upon his part. So that the fact that the county court is accorded exclusive jurisdiction in the first instance has no peculiar emphasis or force to differentiate its final orders or decrees from those of any court of record possessing exclusive jurisdiction within its compass. The equitable remedy of which we are now treating has its just limitations, however. It cannot be utilized for the correction of errors and *23irregularities, and, where the party has had an opportunity to be heard in the original proceeding and to have the matters revised on appeal, but has neglected to avail himself thereof, he is not entitled to redress in the equitable forum: Galbraith v. Barnard, 21 Or. 67 (26 Pac. 1110); Handley v. Jackson, 31 Or. 552 (50 Pac. 915, 65 Am. St. Rep. 839); Conant’s Estate, 43 Or. 530 (73 Pac. 1018).

2. It is further urged that the plaintiffs had a complete remedy in the county court to open up the order of final settlement, under Section 103, B. & C. Comp., providing for the relief of a party from a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. It may well be doubted whether such fraud as is here complained of is embraced within the purview of that section, and the question is made whether it was intended to apply in probate proceedings. But, however this may be, the remedy was not invoked, nor an adjudication had with reference to it, so that it did not preclude plaintiffs from proceeding in equity. The remedy thereby accorded, in whatsoever capacity it may be employed, is equitable in character, and we have held that when invoked in a proper case the party will be precluded by the adjudication from applying to a court of equity for relief of the same nature based upon grounds identical with those there urged : Thompson v. Connell, 31 Or. 231 (48 Pac. 467, 65 Am. St. Rep. 818). Hence the statute is not operative as an estoppel here, in any view we may take of its application in county court proceedings.

3. Again, it is suggested that the county court has not fully disposed of the matter, the distribution not having been made, the receipts filed, or the administrator finally discharged. But we think this is not controlling, as the order settling the account was the final adjudication respecting it. The rights of the respective parties were then ascertained and determined, leaving the administrator *24nothing to do but to comply witli the directions ol the court, whereupon he would be entitled to his discharge. In view of these considerations, we are constrained to hold that a court of equity has jurisdiction of the cause.

4. The complaint is also challenged upon the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of suit; but we are impressed that it does. The fraud complained of was such, it is true, that the heirs might have set it up before the county court by way of objections to the final account, if they had known that the account was filed and the time fixed for settling the same, but of this they were not apprised. The fraud complained of consists in the administrator’s failure to keep and observe the stipulations of the compromise agreement upon his part. The heirs had a right to assume that he would faithfully observe them, and were not called upon to keep a check upon his actions and take especial notice of the proceedings had in that regard. While it may be conceded, without deciding the question now, that the notice published was sufficient to inform them constructively of the filing of the final account, and consequently of the administrator’s breach of his agreement, yet, nevertheless, they allege that they had no actual notice of it until after the court had settled the account, and were thereby prevented from making the objections which they were entitled to interpose at the hearing. Under such allegations, it was not laches on the part of the heirs that they were not present at the hearing. Furthermore, it is averred that their attorneys on two occasions, after the account had been actually filed, and before the time set for hearing, inquired concerning it, and were led to believe by the administrator that it had not yet been filed, thus showing positive interposition to mislead interested parties, and thus to conceal the intended fraud.

5. Nor does the fact that plaintiffs did not institute the *25present suit until more than eight months after the entry of the order of final settlement constitute such laches as to preclude them from insisting upon the remedy invoked.

The decree of the trial court will therefore be reversed, the demurrer to the complaint overruled, and the cause remanded for such further proceedings as may seem appropriate. Reversed.