136 Iowa 699 | Iowa | 1907
Defendant’s answer was in. effect a general denial, and it also contained a counterclaim for money advanced to plaintiff, and unaccounted for by him. At the trial defendant introduced no testimony, and the case went to the jury upon the evidence adduced by plaintiff. As already stated, the verdict was for plaintiff, and the appeal is from the judgment rendered thereon. Something like twenty-one errors are assigned in the argument filed for defendant, but in the main they are based upon a few fundamental principles of the law of agency. For instance, it is contended that the authority of an agent cannot be proved by testimony as to his acts and declarations; that a person dealing with an agent is bound to ascertain the scope- and extent of his authority; that the unauthorized act of one assuming to act as an agent is not to be deemed ratified by the principal, unless it be that he, the principal, has knowledge of such acts; and that authority conferred upon an
„The main contentions in the case grow out of this brief statement of facts, and, before going to the controlling propositions, it is well to note that there was sufficient testimony to establish the alleged agreement with Sturtevant and Coon, the finding of a purchaser or purchasers to whom the defendant sold the elevator, and of plaintiff’s right to com
His (Sturtevant’s) duties was tbe same as'any grain man. He was to give instructions to tbe different bouses over tbe State. He had to look after keeping tbe accounts. Tbe accounts was rendered from that office. All my accounts was from that office — that is tbe grain, and tbe shape of tbe market when they made sale'. Tbe bills were made in Des Moines to me. While I was in Des Moines at those times I bad conversations with him about tbe business at Pocahontas. I received my instructions in reference to tbe business and its conduct,. so far as tbe Chicago Grain & Elevator Company was concerned, from Mr. Sturtevant. I know Mr. Coon. I know tbe work be did for this company. He simply traveled from bouse to bouse, and looked after what really was wanted, and looked after tbe biring of men, and one thing or another. I know of his having hired a man here in Pocahontas when I ceased having further connection with him. His name was Mr. Gibson. Mr. Gibson worked for this company some time after bis employ. I was at Des Moines at the time Mr. Sturtevant was working for tbe Chicago Grain & Elevator Company, in their office. He was just acting as any man would, attending bis office, looking after tbe general run of the business, and reported it, and dictating letters. I beard him telephone for tbe market, and send dispatches, and be told me to sell grain at such and sucb prices and sell it — authorized me to do so. I think Mr. Streams was tbe president of tbe Chicago Grain & Elevator Company in 1903, 1904, and 1905. I wrote letters to tbe Chicago Grain & Elevator Company during my employment. I addressed tbe letters to tbe Chicago Grain & Elevator Company, in Des Moines. I received answers to those letters always from Des Moines. These letters were signed as a rule, ‘ Chicago Grain & Elevator Company, dictated C. D. S.— C. D. Sturtevant.’ I*704 bad some conversation with Mr. Streams in tbe Savery Hotel, in Des Moines, in regard to tbe employment of Mr. Coon and Mr. Sturtevant. Mr. Streams at that time told me that Mr. Coon and Mr. Sturtevant, in regard to tbe elevator, would be about tbe same as Mr. Brown was, and Mr. Blasswell would be, along that line. Mr. Coon would look after tbe bouses generally — tell tbe men wbat to do; and Sturtevant would take care of tbe office in Des Moines, to sell tbe grain tbe same as Mr. Brown used to — simply take Mr. Brown’s place and act as tbeir general secretary.
There was also ample testimony to show that Sturte-vant and Coon finally closed an agreement with tbe purchasers procured by plaintiff, which agreement was recognized by defendant, and fully carried out according to its terms. No objection was made to tbe testimony which we have set out, save as is indicated, and we have now to deal with these objections. It nowhere appears that tbe authority of either Sturtevant or Coon was in writing, and we have the broad proposition, may one, who has shown some competency upon the subject, testify that another is an agent for some third party, and as to the extent of that agency ? This question is ruled by Heusinkveld v. Ins. Co., 106 Iowa, 229, wherein it is said that “ agency is a condition of which anyone having knowledge of it may testify, subject however to the test of cross-examination.” See, also, Gault v. Sickles, 85 Iowa, 266.
Here, again, a distinction should be drawn between a ratification of plaintiff’s contracts with defendant’s agents, and a ratification of a sale made by defendant’s own agents, for tbe purpose of showing tbe extent of tbeir authority in tbe premises. With tbis distinction in mind, tbe authorities cited by appellant, such as, Proctor v. Tows, 115 Ill. 138 (3 N. E. 569) ; Merchants’ Bank v. Nichols, 223 Ill. 41 (79 N. E. 38, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 752) ; Bristol v. Judd, 116 Iowa, 26; Britt v. Gordon, 132 Iowa, 431;
Finding no error, the judgment must be, and it is, affirmed.