493 F.2d 1061 | 2d Cir. | 1974
We are faced once again with an offshoot of the bitter conflict among various local painters’ unions, District Council No. 9, and the International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL-CIO.
Judge Brieant wrote a thorough opinion, D.C., 359 F.Supp. 380, which so well summarized the facts and prior history of these consolidated cases that we shall restate them only briefly, incorporating by reference the more detailed findings of the trial judge. Plaintiffs’ complaints focus on the office of the Secretary-Treasurer of the District Council and his functions with regard to two sets of constituent local unions, which the parties call “painters’ ” locals and “autonomous” locals. Plaintiffs are all members of painters’ locals. The Secretary-Treasurer performs a number of traditional duties for all of the constituent locals. For the painters’ locals alone, however, he is intimately involved in the negotiation, administration and policing of collective bargaining agreements, functions handled for the autonomous locals by their own local officials. Nevertheless, the Secretary-Treasurer is elected by the vote of all the members of both types of locals.
Plaintiffs argued to the district court, as they do to us, that the alleged dilution of their voting rights violates Title I of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1), and that the rejection of the proposed Painters' Section by-law by the International was in bad faith and therefore illegal under both federal and state law. After a four-day trial, Judge Brieant rejected both contentions. Analyzing the judicial decisions interpreting the LMRDA, the judge held that plaintiffs’ claim of dilution arose not under Title I, but under Title IV of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 481(e), and was therefore cognizable in the district court only at the instance of the Secretary of Labor. As to the
On plaintiffs’ principal claim, we hold that they did not prove a violation of Title I of the Act. As the Supreme Court held in Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 139, 85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964), and as we emphasized in Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899, 902-903 (1973), the essence of Title I is the command not to discriminate against members and classes of members in their right to vote and nominate. As in Calhoon, “[t]he complaining union members here have not been discriminated against in any way and have been denied no privilege or right to vote or nominate which the union has granted to others.” 379 U.S. at 139, 85 S.Ct. at 295. Certainly, the plaintiffs here cannot claim, as did those in Acevedo v. Bookbinders Local 25, 196 F.Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y.1961), and Hughes v. Bridge Ironworkers Local 11, 287 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829, 82 S.Ct. 51, 7 L.Ed.2d 32 (1961), that they have been totally denied the right to vote for important union offices.
The true gravamen of plaintiffs’ case appears to be a desire for redefinition of the powers and duties of the Secretary-Treasurer. As to that, the present union procedures for amendment do not appear to be unreasonable and “intermeddling by the courts” would seem inappropriate. Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1964). Assuming arguendo that it was proper for the district judge to reach the claim relating to the interpretation of the International constitution, we affirm on his opinion.
Judgment affirmed.
. Some, but by no means all, of the related lawsuits involving these organizations are summarized in Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899, 901 n. 2 (2d Cir. 1973).
. Also named as defendants were various officers and members of the District Council and the International.
. The membership of the painters’ locals is approximately double that of the autonomous locals.
. Although plaintiffs disclaim any intention to assert Title IV rights, the district court indicated that they might well have a meritorious claim under that title. We need not decide that question,
. In Acevedo, even “Class B” union members who were denied the right to vote for local president, first vice-president and secretary-treasurer were held to have a claim cognizable only under Title IV since the challenged election had already taken place. 196 F.Supp. at 314. Of course, we do not pass upon the correctness of the Acevedo holding at this time.
. Several judges of the district court have considered this argument and have reached different conclusions. In 1964, Judge Sugar-man dismissed a complaint making similar attacks on the voting scheme for Secretary-Treasurer. Schonfeld v. Caputo, 49 Labor Cases ¶ 19,078 at 31,765 . (S.D.N.Y.). Partly on the basis of this decision, Judge Frankel denied a motion, by plaintiffs Fritsch and Rossiter at an earlier stage of their case, for a preliminary injunction against the 1967 election for Secretary-Treasurer. 66 L.R.R.M. 2366. On the other hand, Judge Lasker denied a pre-trial motion to dismiss Schonfeld’s complaint, holding that the complaint alleged a direct attack upon voting rights guaranteed to the painters by Title I. Schonfeld v. Raftery, 335 F.Supp. 846, 850-851 (D.C.1971), relying upon Navarro v. Gannon, 385 F.2d 512, 520 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 989, 88 S.Ct. 1184, 19 L.Ed.2d 1294 (1968). For tbe reasons stated in text, we hold that the attack on plaintiffs’ voting rights is in fact far from direct; we also note that the Title I claim in Navarro was upheld not because of the threat to the voting rights of the union members but because of the invasion of their right of free discussion. 385 F.2d at 520.
. See, e. g., Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1973) ; Schonfeld v. Raftery, 381 F.2d 446 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), aff’g, 271 F.Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y.1967) ; Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946, 84 S.Ct. 344, 11 L.Ed. 2d 275 (1963).
. Plaintiff Schonfeld, an indefatigable opponent of the union leadership, was himself elected Secretary-Treasurer in 1967 and again in 1970 under the challenged voting scheme. He was defeated in 1973, but we are informed that he would have lost even if the votes of members of the autonomous locals had not been taken into account.
. Nor do we find any basis in Title I for accepting an alternative, and rather theoreti