15 Utah 83 | Utah | 1897
In his petition filed in the court below, the plaintiff asked for a writ of mandamus commanding the defendants to recognize and provide for the payment of 20 county warrants issued upon liabilities incurred in 1896. It was alleged that they were duly signed by the county auditor, and certified by him to be within the debt limit of that year, that they were duly delivered to him, and that he owned them. The defendants filed an answer to the petition, to which the plaintiff interposed a demurrer, which the court sustained, and, the defendants having elected to stand on their answer, the court ordered the writ as prayed. From this judgment the defendants ap
The defendants rely upon the following statement of the revenue of the county, and its liabilities for the year 1896, as a defense to the action:
Statement of Revenue of 1896.
Cash, from 1895 account..... $40,244 52
Cash from licenses, fees, fines, pauper account, poll tax, rent, and miscellaneous items-.... 51,541 12
Tax for year 1896..:... 180,066 17
From the state, one-half salaries of attorney, assessor, and treasurer....-.— 2,887 50
Taxes of 1894 and 1895, collected in 1896. 29,280 97
Tdx-sale redemptions paid into treasury in 1896- 11,889 12
Total revenue... $265,859 40
Liabilities.
Appropriations made during the year 1896... $222,616 12
Appropriations January 2, 1897, for salaries, etc., for liabilities of 1896..1... 19,786 94
Amount due jury and witness fees, as per auditor’s books, to December 22, 1896... 4,390 95
Interest due on county warrants from January 1, 1891, to August 1,1896.... 20,496 30
Claims due the state of Utah and board of education, as audited by the auditor...;. 12,860 88
*87 .Appropriations from January !, 1896, to June 5, 1896, . for claims previous to January, 1896. $21,869 23
Total liabilities_...... $302,010 42
Liabilities over revenue. $36,151 02
Tbe following items of possible revenue, as shown by statement in answer, left out of above statement:
Amount due from former treasurer Leonard, presumably uncollected taxes.-.-.... $25,559 60
Amount due from former treasurer, Spencer, presumably for like taxes. 60,707 02
Total... $86,266 62
Tbe following items of possible indebtedness, as shown by statement in answer, left out of first statement above:
Scbool-fund proportion of amounts due from Leonard and Spencer.... $38,044 94
Interest on $92,522.86, county warrants, incurred in 1896, due January 1, 1897_______ 3,084 05
Due on warrants issued in 1896 _‘.... 2,500 00
Claims presented to board, but not acted on... 1,943 36
'Total... $45,572 35
Possible revenue over possible liabilities. $40,692 27
The question is presented for our consideration and decision, do plaintiff’s warrants constitute a debt in excess of the taxes of Salt Lake county for the year 1896, and would their payment be a violation of section 3 of article 14 of the constitution of this state, as follows: “No debt in excess of the taxes for the current year shall be created by any county * * * in this state; unless the proposition to create such debt shall have been sub- - mitted to a vote of such qualified electors as shall have paid a property tax therein in the-year preceding such
In City of Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind. 1, the supreme court of that state held the limitation to indebtedness imposed upon political corporations by the constitution • did not apply to payments for water to be furnished, provided the contract price could be paid from the current revenues as the water should be furnished, without increasing the corporate indebtedness beyond the constitutional limit, or encroaching upon the funds set apart for other purposes. In nearly all the cases to which we have been referred, the term “indebtedness” was considered as found in constitutional provisions laying down a general rule limiting all classes of indebtedness at all times, while the provisions under consideration forbid a debt in excess of the taxes for the current year unless it is authorized by a vote of the electors. The general limitation in the Utah constitution is found in section 4 of the same article, and establishes 2 per cent., of the assessed value of taxable property as the limit.
Dill. Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) § 136a, states the rule in the states named as follows: “Under the constitutional provisions of Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, and Pennsylvania, referred to, it is held that a corporation may make a contract (at least for necessaries), covering- a series of years, upon which an obligation to pay may arise from year to year as the thing contracted for is furnished; and in such case the whole amount which may ultimately become due does not constitute a debt, within the constitutional prohibition. But in order to ascertain whether the corporation, by such contract, is transgressing the limit, regard is had only to the amount which may fall due within a certain year or other period; and if the rev
The plaintiff also relies upon the case of Penton v. Blair, 11 Utah 78. This decision was made under the limitations imposed by the organic act and the laws of the territory. Section 4 of an act of congress in force July 80, 1886, declared that no county should ever become indebted in any manner, or for any purpose, to an amount, in the aggregate, including existing indebtedness, exceeding 4 per cent of the value of the taxable property within such county, to be ascertained by the last assessment for territorial and county taxes previous to incurring the indebtedness. In this way the provision fixed the amount of the indebtedness that the county might incur. And, subject to this provision, the territorial legislature provided “that no county should incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner, or for any purpose, to an amount exceeding in any year the total 'amount of its income and revenue for the two fiscal years immediately preceding the incurring of such indebtedness.” 1 Comp. Laws Utah, p. 293, § 173.
It is also urged that only indebtedness arising from voluntary contracts should be included, in determining when the limit is reached. That indebtedness for salaries and liabilities for the negligence of the officers or agents of the county for which it may be liable should not be included. The language of the constitutional provision is, “No debt in excess of the taxes for the current year shall be created.” That language includes all debts where the proposition to create has not been submitted to the electors. The number of officers of the county, and their salaries, are largely within the discretion of the county board. The commissioners, by the exercise of reasonable foresight and discretion, can avoid any lack of revenue for the payment of salaries or fees, or the payment of damages in consequence of torts, by taking such salaries and fees into consideration in estimating the amount of the tax levy, and by making a reasonable estimate for extraordinary demands for torts.
The case of Rollins v. Lake Co., 34 Fed. 845, is relied upon. This case afterwards came before the supreme court of the United States upon a writ of error, and by that court the decision relied upon was reversed. In that case a large number of warrants constituted the cause of action, and the contention was as to a constitutional provision of the state fixing the debt limit of county indebtedness, and as to what indebtedness should be included in determining whether it had been reached. In its decision the supreme court said: “Neither can we assent to the position of the court below, that there is, as to this case, a difference between indebtedness incurred by contracts of the county and that form of debt denominated compulsory obligations. The compulsion was imposed by the legislature of the state, even if it can be said correctly that the compulsion was to incur debt; and the legislature could no more impose it than the county could voluntarily assume it, as against the disability of a constitutional prohibition. Nor does the fact that the constitution provided for certain county ■ fficers, and authorized the legislature to fix their compensation and that of other officials, affect the question. There is no necessary inability to give both of the provisions their exact and literal fulfillment.” Lake Co. v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662. We are of the opinion that the limitation embraced in the third section of the constitution quoted includes debts incurred by operation' of law as well as those arising from express contract.
The plaintiff also claims that the law will not permit the defendants to deny the legality of his warrants, because they were issued by the county auditor, and certified by him to be within the debt limit. The authority and duties of the auditor were defined by public law, and the debt limit was fixed by the constitution. Persons dealing with the county, or receiving its warrants, must be presumed to know the law, and by inquiry they can ascertain the amount of the liabilities incurred and
The plaintiff’s claim against the county is evidenced by warrants, and they are valid as against the revenue of 1896. We are unable to determine from the facts stated in the answer whether all of the revenue of 1896 has been applied to the payment of the liabilities of that year. The fact that more warrants were issued than there was revenue to pay furnishes no excuse for not paying as far as it will go. Payment should be made to the limit, and the limit is the revenue of that year. And, if revenue shall arise from the collection of taxes levied in 1896, it shall be applied to the payment of that year’s indebtedness, as far as it will go; and, if any of such revenue remains after all the indebtedness of that year shall have been paid, it will become 1897 revenue. And, if any of the revenue of 1896 has or shall be paid on the indebtedness incurred in 1897, an equal amount of its revenue, if required, should be applied to the indebtedness of the former year, and so from year to year. For the reason that the answer does not show that all the revenue of 1896 has been applied to the payment of indebtedness of that year, we are of the opinion that the answer would have been demurrable, had the suit been brought against the treasurer. We reverse the judgment of the court below, granting the writ, because the plaintiff’s complaint does not state a cause of action against the defendants. The cause is remanded, with directions to that court to permit the county treasurer