[¶ 1] Karisa and Roger Frith appealed from a judgment dismissing their' complaint against the Park District of the City of Fargo and the North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund. We affirm, concluding the district cоurt did not err in concluding the Friths’ claims against the Park District were precluded by the statute of limitations.
I
[¶ 2] The Friths sued the Park District and Insurance Reserve Fund seeking monetary damages for injuries Karisа Frith
[¶ 3] In November 2015, the Park District moved for summary judgment, arguing the Friths’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations because the three-year statute of limitаtions for claims against a political subdivision expired before the Friths commenced the action. The Friths responded to the Park District’s motion, arguing the three-year statute of limitаtions does not apply and their claims for relief did not accrue until September 12, 2013, when they received information from an expert witness that there was reasonable cause to believe the Park District was negligent.
[¶ 4] After a hearing, the district court granted the motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The court concluded the Friths’ claims against the Park District were barred by thе statute of limitations because the three-year statute of limitations for actions against a political subdivision applied to the Friths’ claims and the statute of limitations expired before the action commenced. The court also dismissed the claims against the Insurance Reserve Fund, concluding the claims fail as a matter of law because the Insurance Reserve Fund does not owe any duties to the Friths. A judgment was entered dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
II
[¶ 5] Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of matеrial fact or inferences that can reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law.
Ferguson v. City of Fargo,
í—i )—i t—4
[¶ 6] The Friths argue the district court erred in dismissing their complaint because it aрplied the wrong statute of limitations.
[¶ 7] Section 32-12.1-03(1), N.D.C.C., states a political subdivision is liable for money damages for “injury caused from some condition or use of tangible property, real or personal, under circumstances in which the political subdivision, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant.” “An action brought under [chapter 32-12.1] must be commencеd within three years after the claim for relief has accrued.” N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-10.
[¶ 8] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which is fully reviewable on appeal.
Eagleman v. State,
[¶ 9] The Park District is a political subdivision, and N.D.C.C. ch. 32-12.1 applies to tort claims against the Park District.
See
N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-02(6);
see also Finstad v. Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc.,
[¶ 10] The Friths contend a six-year personal injury statute of limitations applies because a private contractor applied the patching material that was responsible for Karisa Frith’s injuries. However, the Friths sued the Park District, and not the contractor. The three-year statute of limitations under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-10 applies to the Friths’ claims against the Park District.
[¶ 11] The Friths argue their claims did not accrue until September 2013 when they were informed by an attоrney there was reasonable cause to believe the Park District was negligent. Determining when a cause of action accrues is normally a question of fact, but it becomеs a question of law when the material facts are undisputed.
Funke v. Aggregate Constr., Inc.,
[¶ 12] The Friths were required to commence an action within three years after the claim for relief accrued on July 7, 2012. A civil action is commenced by the service of a summons. N.D.R.Civ.P. 3. Valid servicе of process, as directed by N.D.R.Civ.P. 4, is necessary for a court to acquire personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
Sanderson v. Walsh Cty.,
[¶ 13] To the extent the Friths argue the district court abused its discretion by failing to еxtend the time for the statute of limitations under N.D.R.CÍV.P, 6(b), we have held Rule 6(b) does not apply to periods of time which are definitely fixed by statute.
Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau,
[¶ 14] The Friths also argue the court erred in dismissing their claims against the Insurance Reserve Fund. However, the Insurance Reserve Fund’s liability, if any, is dependent upon the Park District’s liability, and the Park District has no liability • becáuse the statute of limitations expired before the suit was commenced. The district court did not err in dismissing the Friths’ claims against the Insurance Reserve Fund.
IV
[¶ 15] ■ The Friths argue the district court improperly dismissed their complaint with prejudice. They contend the court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction ■based on improper service of process, the court did not have jurisdiction to grant the motion for summary judgment, and therefore the court should have dismissed their case without prejudice.
[¶ 16] The district court found, the summons and complaint were impropеrly served on July 2, 2015, and therefore the court lacked personal jurisdiction of the Park District. However, the court also found -the Park District was properly served with the summons and complaint on October 5, 2015, after the statute of limitations expired. The court had personal jurisdiction after the summons and complaint were properly served and the court grantеd summary judgment and dismissed the complaint because the statute of limitations had expired. The dismissal of an action because the statute of limitations has expired has the “praсtical effect of terminating the litigation in the plaintiffs .chosen forum” and “effectively forecloses litigation in- the courts of this state,”
Podrygula,
V
[¶ 17] Because the statute of limitations expired and the district court did no.t err in dismissing the Friths’ claims against the Park District and Insurance Reserve Fund, it is unnecessary to address the Friths’ remaining issues. We affirm the judgment dismissing the Friths’ complaint.