Plaintiff, David J. Friske, appeals by leave granted from an order entered in Saginaw Circuit Court affirming the decision of the 70th District Court grаnting summary judgment in favor of defendant, Jasinski Builders, Inc. We affirm.
Plaintiff had been employed by defendant since February 16, 1955. On or about Deсember 30, 1968, defendant instituted a deferred compensation program covering its employees, including plaintiff. The defеrred compensation agreement entered into by plaintiff and defendant provided that, at plaintiffs retirement upon the first day of the month nearest his sixty-fifth birthday, he was *470 to receive the payment of a sum equal to $330 for each year of сontinuous service performed for defendant. Plaintiff was given the, election to receive the money in a lump sum or in monthly income. The agreement further provided:
6. If Friske shall voluntarily terminate his employment during his lifetime and prior to his said retiremеnt or if his employment shall be terminated for sufficient cause as determined by the Board of Directors of the Company, this аgreement shall automatically terminate and the Company shall have no further obligation hereunder.
The agreement was funded by two life insurance policies purchased by defendant.
Plaintiffs employment was terminated on February 28, 1980, when plаintiff was fifty-six years old, pursuant to defendant’s board of directors’ decision to cease operations as contrаctors and permanently discharge all of its employees connected with those operations. Plaintiff was given severance pay equal to four weeks’ pay and the two insurance policies that funded his deferred compеnsation plan, which were prepaid by defendant. Plaintiff disputes defendant’s assertion that the policies were given him in sаtisfaction of defendant’s liability under the deferred compensation agreement.
Plaintiff brought suit in circuit court to recover the benefits allegedly due him under the deferred compensation agreement. The action was removed to thе 70th District Court, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to DCR 117.2(3) on the basis that there was no genuine issue of material faсt. The district court held that paragraph 6 of the agreement created a "satisfaction contract” and, there being no allegation by plaintiff that the closing of defendant’s con *471 struction business was motivated by fraud, bad faith or subterfuge, that рlaintiffs discharge because defendant ceased operations as a contractor was "sufficient cause.”
On appeal, the circuit court affirmed. Although noting that the district court’s analysis was less than satisfactory, the circuit cоurt concluded, as a matter of law, that the termination of plaintiffs employment which followed an economicаlly motivated business closing was "for sufficient cause” as provided in the agreement.
On appeal to this Court plaintiff contends that under the language of paragraph 6 of the deferred compensation agreement his employment may be terminated only for "sufficient cause,” which must be interpreted as cause attributable to misconduct in the performance of his employment duties. We disagree.
This case appears before this Court as a result of the circuit court’s affirmance of the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant pursuant to DCR 117.2(3). A motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact tests whether there is factual support for the claim. When passing upon such a mоtion the court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence available to it.
Longley v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan,
The essentiаl facts in the within case are undisputed. Plaintiff and defendant entered into a de *472 ferred compensation agreement which provided for automatic termination of the agreement if plaintiffs employment was terminated for sufficient cаuse as determined by the board of directors of defendant corporation. The board determined that, due to economic necessity, it was forced to cease its contracting operations and terminate the employment of all employees connected therewith, including plaintiff. Plaintiff does not claim fraud, bad faith or subterfuge on the pаrt of the board in its decision to cease its contracting operations.
Case law indicates that termination of the employment of an otherwise competent employee due to an economically motivated business closing is not grounds for a wrongful discharge claim. See, e.g.,
Bouwman v Chrysler Corp,
The agreement herein empowered the board of directors to terminate plаintiffs employment for sufficient cause. The determination as to what constituted sufficient cause was left to the board’s discretion. We find the agreement to be unambiguous in this regard and, therefore, must construe it
*473
according to its plain meaning.
Bank of the Commonwealth v Criminal Justice Institute,
In view of this conclusion, review of plaintiffs remaining argument with respect to damages is not necessary.
Affirmed.