58 Ga. App. 694 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1938
The petitioner, while alleging generally that it had a permit from the Southeastern Fair Association to deliver ice to the Teeny Weeny stores within the fair grounds, and that it has been damaged by the breach of that permit and the alleged conspiracy or effort on the part of the defendants to disrupt and ruin its business, fails by its specific allegations to show that its rights have been in any way encroached upon. The exhibit attached to the petition, which the plaintiff refers to as a permit, is entirely lacking in the respect claimed, and is the only evidence relied on to sustain such general contention. It is alleged that the plaintiff
But the plaintiff, aside from any permit or contract, claims that it has been damaged in the following respects: that the association is of a quasi-public nature and has no right to make an exclusive contract with the defendant ice company, but is obliged in law to allow all dealers in ice to make sales within the fair grounds, and that in an effort to injure and damage and ruin its business the two defendants conspired to prevent the plaintiff from selling to any one who might require its product, informing the Teeny Weeny stores that they could buy ice only from the defendant ice company, and that the plaintiff’s trucks would not be permitted to enter the fair grounds; that in pursuance of such conspiracy the association, through its agents, did in fact, on October 7, 1937, bar one of its trucks from entering the grounds, and that in consequence thereof it sustained a loss of $23.50 because of the fact that the ice melted in the hot sun, that it was unable to fulfill its contract with the Teeny Weeny stores, who were forced to buy from the defendant ice company, and that the acts of the defendants amounted in law to a boycott and restraint of trade. Manifestly a conspiracy
The acts alleged plainly do not constitute a tort. Just as the association had the right to permit the plaintiff, upon complying with reasonable requirements as to the method and manner of delivering the ice, to- enter its trucks in the fair grounds for such purpose, it had the right, when the plaintiff did not enter into the proposed contract, to permit the defendant ice company to make deliveries of ice; and further, while the specific question has not come up for decision in this State, we see no reason why the association, alleged to be a quasi-public corporation, could not, in the exercise of police powers in properly regulating and controlling the public fair grounds on a reservation of the city, grant to one person, firm, or corporation the exclusive privilege of delivering a single commodity. If all be permitted to ply their trucks up and down the thoroughfares of the grounds, which are usually in fair time thronged with visitors, it can readily be perceived that much confusion and inconvenience, if not hardship or injury, might result to the public. Having granted the exclusive right to make deliveries of ice, it was the duty of the association to protect the defendant ice company against infringement of that right. “Where a society has, for a consideration, granted an exclusive privilege or concession, it is bound to protect the purchaser against its infringement by others, or by the society itself, and is liable for any loss
In State v. Reynolds, 77 Conn. 131 (58 Atl. 755), where the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a statute prohibiting any one from engaging in the temporary business of selling articles of provisions within a mile of a fair of any incorporated society, without consent of the society, is not unconstitutional but is valid as being within the police power, the court said: “It has long been the policy of the State to protect and aid financially public societies of the kind contemplated by the statute here in question, for the encouragement or improvement of agriculture. To this end the State encourages them to hold such exhibitions and fairs as the statute in question contemplates, and delegates to them certain
Nor can the plaintiff, not having obtained any right to deliver its ice within the fair grounds, complain that the defendants have sought to obtain a monopoly of the ice business. The remedy in
Judgment affirmed.