165 P.2d 838 | Okla. | 1945
The accident giving rise to this proceeding occurred November 26, 1942. At that time respondent was working for the petitioner in the cotton storage house feeding seed cotton into the suction to be conveyed thereby to the ginning stands. A defective door in the cotton house caused respondent to fall upon a concrete slab fracturing his skull, right shoulder, and causing internal injuries. The award was for 500 weeks' compensation.
No question is raised here as to the compensable nature of respondent's injuries. The only objection urged to the order of the State Industrial Commission is that the weekly rate of compensation was determined under the wrong subdivision of section 21 of the Workmen's Compensation Law. It is insisted that the rate of compensation should have been calculated under subdivisions 3 and 4 of said section, and that there is no competent evidence in the record to sustain the rate of compensation fixed by the commission under subdivision 2 of that section.
It is disclosed by the record in this case that the respondent, Harlin Allred, was an unskilled day laborer and that he engaged his services as such unskilled day laborer to any person in his community needing his services; that his principal employment during the year preceding his injury was that of a farm laborer but occasionally he worked at petitioner's gin in the same capacity during the ginning season and especially when the weather was such that he could not engage in field work. It is disclosed by the record that his daily wage as a farm laborer was from $1.50 to $3 per day; that during the cotton harvesting season he earned from $8 to $10 a day picking cotton and pulling boles; that when he worked in the cotton house at the gin he received 50c an hour, or $4 a day, which was the regular rate paid by the gin company to unskilled labor in its employ; that by his labor on farms and at the gin he earned annually approximately $1,200; that other laborers in the Friendship community doing farm work and unskilled labor at the gin earned approximately the same annually as did the respondent; that he worked for petitioner 17 or 18 days during the year preceding his injury; that an employee of another gin company in the neighborhood or community worked as a common laborer 251 days during the year preceding the injury complained of.
From all of the evidence adduced on the various hearings the commission made the following order:
"That at the time of said injury claimant was being paid wages at the rate of fifty cents per hour or $4.00 per day; that the claimant had not worked in said employment for substantially the whole of year next preceding the date of said injury, but the Commissioner finds from all the evidence introduced herein that fifty cents per hour or $4.00 per day was the average *464 wage scale being paid for the same or most similar work in the community where claimant was injured, at the time of said injury, and that said sum of $4.00 per day fairly represents claimant's average daily earnings for the year next preceding the date of said injury, and, therefore, claimant's compensation rate should be fixed at $15.39 per week."
It is the contention of petitioners that the respondent was employed and injured in an intermittent and noncontinuous employment and that his rate of compensation should have been computed under subdivisions 3 and 4 instead of under subdivision 2 of section 21, 85 O. S. 1941. In support of the theory thus advanced petitioners rely upon and cite numerous authorities from other jurisdictions, including Michigan, New York, and Federal Circuit Courts. In those cases cited and quoted from by petitioners, wherein statutes substantially like our own were construed and applied, the employees were skilled mechanics engaged in occupations which were seasonal in their nature but in which unskilled labor was not the class of labor involved. Other cases cited involved statutes differing so substantially from ours as to make the interpretation placed thereon of little value in determining the question here involved.
Wages received by employees for labor performed in a different class of employment or industry than that in which the accident occurred may not be used as a basis for calculation of the rate of compensation. Briscoe Construction Co. v. Miller,
It must be conceded that actual ginning in this state is seasonal. According to the evidence and common knowledge an employee could not actually gin cotton more than five or six months during the year. Compensation rates must be based upon earning capacity in the industry by the class of labor injured. If the industry or one similar does not furnish employment to the class of laborers to which the injured employee belongs for the substantial whole of the year, then neither subdivision 1 nor 2 can apply, but it does not necessarily follow that because the principal business of an employer is intermittent the earning capacity of a certain class of laborers who worked or could work in such an industry for the substantial whole of the year must be limited to their earning capacity during the season. It was the intention of the Legislature that the industries classified under the Workmen's Compensation Law should bear the burden of decreased earning capacity resulting from accidents within the industries classified. For this reason the Legislature made the amount of compensation dependent upon the class of labor and the class of employment. Obviously the intention of the Legislature would be thwarted if common laborers who work or could work in a so-called seasonal industry for the substantial whole of the year were limited for compensation purposes to their earning capacity during the seasonal operation of the principal intermittent business of the employer.
The determination of the Industrial *465
Commission that common laborers are employed for substantially the whole of the preceding year by the employer or others engaged in the same employment in the neighborhood and compensation based on the average daily wages of such workmen will not be disturbed by us if there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to support such determination. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Co., Inc., et al. v. Spencer et al.,
Award sustained.
GIBSON, C.J., HURST, V.C.J., and WELCH, CORN, and DAVISON, JJ., concur.