Friends of Pine Bush v. Planning BoardFriends of Pine Bush v. Planning Board
OPINION OF THE COURT
At a public meeting of the City of Albany Planning Board (board) on July 17, 1978, after public hearings before said body on June 22 and July 5, 1978, the board
Preliminarily, we are constrained to conclude that the issue of the validity of the board’s action in approving the Dunes and Pinehurst subdivision plats is moot. The improvements have been installed at city expense and, in part, have been specially assessed against each parcel benefited thereby. Approximately 30% of the approved residential structures have been built and considerable excavation in contemplation of further development has been completed. Further, when this matter was previously before us, petitioners made application for a stay alleging their belief “that if the automatic stay of the Board’s decision [effective upon commencement of the article 78 proceeding pursuant to section 38 of the General City Law but dissolved upon dismissal of the petition by Special Term] is not extended by this Court * * * the developers will begin clearing and construction in the subdivisions, thus rendering any scrutiny of the determination of the Albany Planning Board moot”. After our order, dated December 8, 1978, denying the extension of the automatic stay was entered, no further action was taken by petitioners. Next, on October 23, 1980, the judgment of Special Term which is the genesis of this appeal was entered. Petitioners made no motion for a stay pursuant to
However, given the sensitivity of the ecological concerns of petitioners with respect to the further development of the Pine Bush generally and the candid admission of the Corporation Counsel of the City of Albany in his brief that “[t]he respondent Board is unable to advise the Court whether this situation will recur, however, until advised otherwise, it takes the position that it had the power under § 33 of the General City Law to do what was done here” (emphasis added), we conclude that this appeal should not be dismissed on the ground of mootness since a question of general interest and substantial public importance is present and is likely to recur if not judicially resolved (see Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne,
Section 33 of the General City Law, after detailing the specifics of the improvements to be required by a planning board, states that such improvements “shall be installed * * * in accordance with standards * * * acceptable to the appropriate city department, or alternatively that a performance bond sufficient to cover the full cost of the same * * * shall be furnished to the city by the owner; provided however, that the planning board may waive * * * the provision of any or all such improvements as in its judgment * * * are not requisite in the interests of the public health, safety and general welfare” (emphasis added). In the instant case, the improvements were not installed
This procedure followed by the board was clearly violative of the provisions of section 33 of the General City Law. The only construction that can be given to the statutory language of section 33 of the General City Law is that the owner of the land shall install the improvements, or alternatively, post a bond to cover the costs thereof. This interpretation is harmonious with the legislative intent so clearly evident in the 1938 amendment to section 33 (L 1938, ch 205) which added the provision that a city planning board require, as a condition of approval of a subdivision plat, that such improvements be installed or that a performance bond shall be furnished by the owner (see Matter of Brous v Smith,
Finally, respondents’ argument that chapter 523 of the Laws of 1929 (as amd by L1943, ch 710) permits a course of action with respect to subdivision plat approval inconsistent with the requirements of section 33 of the General City Law is untenable. Chapter 523 of the Laws of 1929, an act relating to street and other public improvements in the
Accordingly, we sua sponte convert this CPLR article 78 proceeding into an action for declaratory judgment and declare that section 33 of the General City Law mandates that the costs of improvements in a subdivision must be borne by the owner, or alternatively, that said owner post a performance bond sufficient to cover those costs.
The judgment should be reversed, on the law, without costs, and the petition, granted to the extent that it is declared that section 33 of the General City Law requires that owners install improvements or post a performance bond sufficient to cover the full cost thereof prior to approval of a subdivision plat by the City of Albany Planning Board.
Casey, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Levine, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed, on the law, without costs, and petition granted to the extent that it is declared that section 33 of the General City Law requires that owners install improvements or post a performance bond sufficient to cover the full cost thereof prior to approval of a subdivision plat by the City of Albany Planning Board.
Notes
When this matter was previously considered by this court, we modified Special Term’s judgment (