431 Pa. 334 | Pa. | 1968
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
Edward McErlean was a candidate at the primary election held on May 16, 1967 for nomination by the Democratic party for the office of county commissioner of Delaware County. Prior to the primary election, a political committee, entitled “Friends of Mc-Erlean”, was formed to advance McErlean’s candidacy.
After the primary election and, on June 21, 1967, the committee filed its election expense account. This account, under the Election Code,
The Code
After the petition for an audit had been filed, Mc-Erlean’s political committee (the committee) petitioned the Court of Quarter Sessions of Delaware
An appeal was taken to the Superior Court and that Court, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the order of the court below with Judges Montgomery and Hoffman dissenting. We granted allocatur.
The positions taken by the respective parties are as follows: (1) the committee contends that the language of the statute is unequivocal as to the time of filing an audit petition, that the statute is mandatory and not directory, that the late filing of the audit petition prevented the court from taking jurisdiction to direct an audit and the fact that the account was tardily filed did not relieve the audit petitioners of compliance with the statutorily mandated time period; (2) the audit petitioners contend that the statute must be given a liberal construction, that the time limitation in the statute is directory and not mandatory and that the fact the committee was late in filing its account relieved the audit petitioners of strict compliance with the statute.
Initially, it must be noted that the Code makes no provision whatsoever for the giving of notice of the filing of an expense account and, therefore, it appears obvious that only by a check of the records in the Election Bureau can it be ascertained whether an account has or has not been filed.
We first consider the committee’s failure to timely file its primary election expense account. The statute
While this Court has not directly passed upon this question, Lurie v. Republican Alliance, 412 Pa. 61, 192 A. 2d 367 (1963), by implication, certainly did so. In Lurie, two electors instituted an equity action to compel a political committee to file an account of expenses incurred in a primary and general election after the statutory period for filing had expired. We held that, since the action was bottomed on a violation of the Code, equity lacked jurisdiction to entertain the action and that the electors must seek relief in the Court of Quarter Sessions. In answer to the contention that the Code provides no procedure to compel the filing of an account, this Court said the Code must be liberally and intelligently construed and that the Court of Quarter Sessions could “undoubtedly compel the production of all information necessary to a comprehensive and honest audit [of election accounts]”. (p. 64). Under the rationale of Luria, it seems evident that had the committee in the instant case not filed its account, it could have been compelled to do so by the Court of Quarter Sessions after the expiration of the statutory time period.
We have already noted that the Code makes no provision whatsoever for giving notice that an expense ac
It is undisputed that the audit petitioners had no knowledge that the committee had untimely filed its account until July 13, 1967, and then only through the medium of a newspaper article.
Upon the filing of an expense account an opportunity must be given to those who might question the validity of such account to scrutinize carefully the receipts and expenditures listed in such account, to determine the legal validity of such receipts and expenditures and to ascertain whether the listed receipts and expenditures encompassed all the receipts and expenditures. To do so requires time; the Code recognizes such fact and grants twenty days for such purpose.
Had the auditing petitioners commenced a proceeding to compel the filing of this account and had the court directed the filing of an account, we have no doubt they would have been entitled to the statutory period of twenty days — starting with the time of filing of the mandated account — within which to petition for an audit of the account. We can see no sound reason why, when an account is tardily filed, a time period of twenty days, starting with the date when knowledge of the filing of the account is admittedly gained, should not be given within which to petition for an audit.
As we stated in Lurie, the Code must be liberally interpreted to carry out the evident legislative intendment that expense accounts of candidates for public office and their committees might be subject to the closest scrutiny.
Order affirmed.
Act of June 3, 1937, P. L. 1333, art. XVI, §1607-a, as amended, 25 P.S. §3227.
Ibid, art. XVI, §1611, 25 P.S. §3231.
Those who petitioned for the audit seek to excuse the delay on the ground that they did not become aware that the account had been filed until they saw a newspaper account of the filing of the account on July 13, 1967.
Each auditing petitioner filed an affidavit to this effect. These affidavits stand uncontradicted of record.
June 15, 1907 was the last day of the statutory thirty day period within which the committee should have filed its account.
The committee filed its account on June 21, 1967.
Concurrence Opinion
This case and Lurie v. Republican Alliance, 412 Pa. 61, 192 A. 2d 367 (1963), point np the necessity for legislative amendment to the Election Code so that the procedures, both in the filing and in the auditing of expense accounts, may be made more certain and understandable and the sanctions for failure to comply with the Code be made more explicit.