56 Ct. Cl. 423 | Ct. Cl. | 1921
delivered the opinion of the court:
On September 24,1917, the Coastwise Transportation Company, of Boston, Mass., entered into a charter party with E. J. Lavino & Co., of Philadelphia, Pa., for the use of the steamship Middlesex. The terms of the charter provided a
The plaintiff by this suit endeavors to recover from the United States the precise amount he would have earned under his contract with the Coastwise Transportation Co., which he alleges he was prevented from receiving by the intervention of the Government. There is no vital dispute as to the facts. It is perfectly obvious that the. defendant, by requisitioning the vessel, rendered the inter ¶artes agreement between the plaintiff and the Coastwise Transportation Co. ineffective, and did serve, for the time being at least, to preclude the plaintiff from realizing a very substantial sum of money. It is, however, manifest upon the face of the charter party that the parties directly concerned in its negotiation and execution, including the plaintiff, all knew that what was said and done and every transaction which surrounded the proceedings was in the light and positive anticipation of the happening of the event which did happen and thereby forestall the plaintiff in reaping the rewards of his contract. The parties knew that the country was in war; they knew the necessities of the Government with respect to ocean transportation; they apprehended the intervention of the Government and very wisely and judiciously adjusted their respective rights in conformity with the disturbed con
On the contrary, the defendant has decidedly facilitated such a proceeding, for the use of the vessel has been fully paid for and the vessel returned to the company by the defendant. It will not answer this contention to say that the defendant’s conduct destroyed the right and remedy. The taking of one’s property for which the defendant is answerable is necessarily such a property as is free from the happening of contingencies which, when they do happen, destroy the same and leave the party with a valueless possession. Parties are, as a general rule, free to make such contracts as they mutually agree upon. Of course, a contract is property, but this single fact alone is not sufficient to render the Government liable in a proceeding of this sort, where the very contract which creates a property right is subject, under the precise conditions which subsequently obtained, to. degen-ei'ate into an unenforceable legal nonentity. The defendant took nothing away from the plaintiff, for the simple reason that the plaintiff had nothing to take.
The case is in nowise similar to the various authorities ■cited, wherein the Government, directly or indirectly, takes the lands and other incidental property rights from riparian owners in improving navigable streams in aid of commerce. These are direct proceedings between the owners and the Government, predicated upon the right of eminent domain. They do not involve contingent undertakings between the owners and third parties, to which the United States was not a party and of which it had no notice. It might just as well be said that if a riparian owner of land had executed a contract with a real estate agent to dispose of his estate and to pay therefor a certain commission in the event the Government did not take it, the subsequent taking by the Government which forestalled the collection of the commission operated to impose a liability upon the latter to make good the agent’s losses.
A contention is advanced to bring the case within the act of June 15, 1917. It is obviously futile.
The petition will be dismissed. It is so ordered.