Alexander Friedmann, who is proceeding pro se, аppeals the district court’s dismissal of his prisoner civil rights claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The appellant, who is no longer incarcerated, alleges that he was transferred from the South Central Correctional Facility [“SCCF”], a privatе institution in the State of Tennessee operated by the Corrections Corporation of America [“CCA”], to the Northwest Correctional Center [“NCC”], in retaliation for the exercise of his rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was transferred because he voiced opposition to the privatization of prisons. For the reasons that follow, the decision of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
I.
In November 1997, while incarcerated at SCCF, Plaintiff-appellant. Alexander Friedmann [hereinafter referred to as “Friedmann”], was interviewed by a journalist for a nationally published magazine, The Nation, for an article concerning prison privatization. Althоugh a copy of the publication was later forwarded to Friedmann at SCCF, Warden Kevin Myers notified Friedmann on January 29, 1998 that he would not be permitted to receive the same. Friedmann did, however, prepare a comрilation of various news articles regarding prison operation, which articles had appeared in publications that Friedmann was permitted to receive at SCCF. Friedmann named his compilation “News That CCA Would Prefer Yоu Didn’t Know.” (Exhibit A attached to Complaint). Friedmann intended to forward the document to state legislators.
On February 11, 1998, Friedmann’s request to photocopy the document was rejected by Defendant Clara Floyd, an SCCF employee. Friedmann’s document was then forwаrded to Defendant Warden Myers for review. Sometime shortly thereafter, Friedmann was informed by Defendant Lee Campbell that Defendant Myers had ordered a special reclassification hearing on the issue of involuntarily trаnsferring Friedmann to another institution. A reclassification hearing was held on February 13, 1998. The panel, consisting of Defendants Lee Campbell, Charles Grimes and Mark Collins, recommended that Friedmann be transferred. The following reason was given for the decision:
[I]nmate Friedmann continues to create and disseminate information concerning negative incidents experienced by CCA in the past. Inmate Friedmann solicits outside support in his cause to disrupt oрerations of this facility. Inmate Friedmann disrupts the normal day to day operation of this facility by soliciting other inmates to join him in his efforts to degrade CCA with negative articles and outside sources. In addition, inmate Friedmann continually сomplains of retaliation, harassment, and other forms of bias by staff.
(Exhibit B attached to Complaint).
Friedmann appealed the panel’s decision to the Director of Classification Programs. Friedmann was, however, transferred to NCC on February 20, 1998. On February 27, 1998, thе Director upheld the panel’s decision, stating:
After review of appeal and discussion with warden classification is upheld. (sic). [W]arden’s reasons appear sound, i.e., the potential for disruptive conduct on the part of inmates, as a result of another inmatе making a deliberate effort to disseminate material which is negatively oriented to the prison operating company, is of concern. Methods of a particular inmate or group of inmates to influence inmate attitudes*469 by concentrating material within an incarcerated population is viewed as more significant than the availability of news articles via mail or media.
(Exhibit C attached to Complaint).
Friedmann maintains that he was transferred in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. Friedmann further alleges that the transfer placed a hardship upon him because NCC is approximately three hundred miles away from those who visit him
In her Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Griffin concluded that the Friedmann’s retaliation claim failed to state a basis for relief. The Court reasoned that an administrative transfer from the general population of one prisоn to the general population of another prison fails to constitute the sort of “adverse action” required for a retaliation claim, as that standard is set forth in Thaddeus-X v. Blatter,
This Court reviews de novo a District Court’s determination of dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Murphy v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc.,
II.
In Thaddeus-X v. Blatter,
Although the Magistrate Judge did not address the first element of Friedmann’s retaliation claim, clearly Friedmann’s criticism of private prison operation was conduct protected by the First Amendment, at least tо the extent that the conduct was not contrary to legitimate penological concerns. See Pell v. Procunier,
In Thaddeus-X, this Court held that “[i]n the prison contеxt, an action comparable to transfer to administrative segregation would certainly be adverse.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d at 396. Whether other actions are sufficiently adverse depends upon “whether an official’s acts would chill or silеnce a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.” Id. at 397 (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, this Court reasoned that prisoners may be required to tolerate more than average citizens before an action is considered adverse. Id. at 398. This Court also recognized, however, that the benefit of the standard is that it is an objective inquiry, capable of being tailored to the different circumstances in which retaliation claims arise “аnd capable of screening the most trivial of actions from constitutional cognizance.” Id. Furthermore, the objective “adverse action” standard “is not a means whereby solely egregious retaliatory acts arе allowed to proceed past summary judgment.” Id.
As the appellees point out, this Court has addressed the adverse action requirement on several occasions post-Thaddeus-X. In these unreported decisions, this Court has repеatedly held that transfer from one prison to another prison “cannot rise to the level of an ‘adverse action’ because it would not deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of his First Amendment rights.” Mandela v. Campbell, No. 97-5712,
Similarly, in Goss v. Myers, No. 99-5544,
This Court has, however, found certain action sufficiently adverse for purposes of a retaliation claim. In Dunham-Bey v. Holden, No. 98-1522,
As evidenced by the foregoing, it is clear that, in order to constitute “adverse action,” the cirсumstances must evidence some form of deterrent effect on the inmate. Clearly, placement in segregation satisfies this requirement. In addition, as this Court noted in Thaddeus-X, allegations of harassment and physical threats may also evidence a likely deterrent effect on the inmate’s First Amendment conduct. Thaddeus-X,
In this case, Friedmann makes no allegation of any aggravating circumstances in connection with his transfer to thе NCC. He simply claims that the institution was located farther away from those who visited him and that the institution did not offer the programs in which he had previously participated. This Court concludes that such circumstances are not sufficient to support a showing of “adverse action” for purposes of a retaliation claim. In other words, this Court concludes that, in the absence of any aggravating circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that Friedmann’s transfer to NCC would deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of his First Amendment rights.
In sum, this Court concludes that the district court did not err in holding that Friedmann failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The decision of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. SCCF is located approximately one hundred miles from Friedmann's friends and family.
. At SCCF, Friedmann was involved in the Pledge Program, an organization that collected funds for Special Olympics; the Christian Children's Fund; and TALL, a self-help program for at-risk youth.