105 Ark. 580 | Ark. | 1912
(after stating the facts). Counsel for appellants asked the court to direct a verdict for them, and the refusal of the court to do so is the only ground upon which we are asked to reverse the judgment. They asked for a directed verdict on the ground that no agreement was ever made between appellants and appellees, and contend further that, if there was an agreement entered into, it was an oral agreement, and not binding on the parties, because it was the understanding and intention of the parties that any agreement entered into should be reduced to writing before it should become binding.
The contract could be performed within a year, and contracts of this character are not prohibited by the statute of frauds in this State. Hence a written contract was not necessary. 6 Cyc. 10; Sarles v. Sharlow, 37 N. W. (Dak.) 748.
In the case of Emerson v. Stevens Grocer Company, 95 Ark. at page 426, the court said: “If the contract is actually entered into and made, whether by messages, correspondence or by word of mouth, the agreement becomes at once effective, although it was expected that the terms would afterwards be embodied in a written instrument and signed. The mere reference to a future contract in writing would not negative a present contract if the terms thereof were actually assented to by both parties. The written draft of the contract would only be a convenient record of the agreement and the evidence thereof, but it would only constitute evidence of the agreement, and its absence would not affect the binding force of the contract that was closed. Therefore, if an unconditional offer is made, and that offer accepted, this will constitute an obligatory contract, although the parties also understand that a written contract embodying the terms should be drawn and executed.”
The principles of law applicable here are well stated in the case of Rosster v. Miller, 3 App. Cas. (Eng.) at page 1151, where Lord Blackburn said: “I quite agree with the Lords Justices (wholly independent of the statute of frauds) it is a necessary part of the plaintiff’s case to show that the two parties had come to a final and complete agreement; for, if not, there was no contract. So long as they are only in negotiation, either party may retract; and, though the parties may have agreed on all the cardinal points of the intended contract, yet, if some particulars essential to the agreement still remain to be settled afterwards, there is no contract. The parties, in such a case, are still only in negotiation. But the mere fact that the parties have expressly stipulated that there shall afterwards be a formal agreement prepared, embodying the terms, which shall be signed by the parties does not, by itself, show that they continue merely in negotiation. It is a matter to be taken into account in construing the evidence and determining whether the parties have really come to a final agreement or- not. But, as soon as the fact is established of the final mutual assent of the parties so that those who draw up the formal agreement have not the power to vary the terms already settled, I think the contract is completed.”
To the same effect, see Western Roofing Tile Co. v. Jones, 26 Okla. 209, 109 Pac. 225, 23 A. & E. Ann. Cases, 127; 7 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 140; Page on Contracts, § 54; Boysen v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 87 N. Y. Supp. 995; Lowrey v. Danforth, (Mo. App.) 69 S. W. 39; Green v. Cole, 103 Mo. 70, 15 S. W. 317; International Harvester Co. v. Campbell, (Tex. Civ. App.) 96 S. W. 93; Lane v. Warren, 115 S. W. 903, (Tex. Civ. App.); Disten v. Herter, 73 N. Y. App. Div. 453.
In the application of the principles above announced to the facts in the case at bar, it can not be said that the undisputed evidence shows that the agreement made was not the end of negotiations between appellants and appellees.
Counsel for appellants insist that, because the contract was to be reduced to writing and a bond tendered accompaying it, and because the notice and advertisement and the plans and specifications did not provide a time of payment to the builder and a time for the completion of the contract, no contract could exist without such writing.
The testimony of appellees shows that the bond provided for in the notice and advertisement was executed by appellees and accepted by appellants; that their bid was accepted by appellants; that they subsequently agreed that the time for the completion of the building should be one hundred working days, and that the damages for delay in the completion of the building should be twenty-five dollars per day. It appears then from their testimony that all the terms of the contract were agreed upon and its reduction to writing was intended merely for facility of proof as to its terms. In such cases the provision for a contract in writing is not inconsistent with the present contract, and this is especially true in a case where the things to be done are provided for in written plans and specifications, which are so definite and detailed as to present a perfect guide as to the rights and duties of the respective parties in the erection of the proposed building. According to the evidence for appellees, the minds of appellants and appellees were in accord as to all the provisions of the contract, and the writing was intended to exhibit and set forth just what they had agreed upon and understood. Appellants did more than tell appellees that they were the lowest bidders. According to the testimony of appellees, they told them that they had gotten the job, and that their architect was then working on the contract. As we have already seen, the terms of the contract were then as definite and certain as they could be, except as to the time of payment, the time of completion of the work, and the amount of damages for delay in the completion of the work. The time for completion of the work and the damages for delay were subsequently agreed upon.
Moreover, where a contract fails to specify a time for completion, it will be implied that a reasonable time for performance was intended. 6 Cyc. 66; Long v. Chas. T. Abeles & Co., 77 Ark. 150.
In regard to the time of making payment, it may be said that, in the absence from the contract of any provisions on the point, the time of making payment is presumed to be completion of the work. 6 Cyc. 76; Wright v. Maxwell, 9 Ind. 192; Shanks v. Grifen, 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 153.
The contract then could not be said to be too uncertain and indefinite for enforcement. Under the instructions of the court, the jury in effect found that the contract was made or entered into, that its performance was to be immediately entered upon, and that the preparation of the written form of the contract was a matter to be subsequently attended to, and that the written contract was not intended to be a condition precedent to the taking effect of the contract. The verdict of the jury was supported by the evidence, and the court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict for appellants.
No other assignments of error are urged for the reversal of the judgment, and the judgment will be affirmed.