| N.Y. Sup. Ct. | Feb 18, 1892
This action was brought for the purpose of having declared mill and void and canceled of record a certain deed executed by the plaintiff to the defendant, whereby he conveyed a vested remainder which he owned in certain premises in the city of New York. It appeared from the evidence in the case that the premises were of the value of at least between $14,000 and $15,000, and probably more; and that they were owned by the plaintiff and his brother, and were subject to a mortgage of $10,000 and the life-estate of the father. At the time of this transfer the plaintiff had just passed his twenty-first year, and the interest in question was sold for the sum of $300; and it was claimed that it was done while he was intoxicated, and incapable of protecting his own interests, and that he was overreached and
It is claimed upon this appeal that the plaintiff, being a remainder-man, is entitled to greater protection at the hands of the court than persons dealing with their own property, and our attention is called to the rule which has obtained in the English courts that dealings of heirs in reference to their expectancies, and of reversioners and remainder-men in reference to their vested property, are the subjects of special protection by courts of equity; and transactions by persons belonging to those classes are set aside upon much slighter grounds than those which ordinarily obtain. This rule, however, has not been enforced by the courts of this country to the extent which has prevailed in the courts of England; and the evident inclination of the courts of this country has been to restrict the rule in as great a degree as possible. This is shown by the decision of the court in Parmelee v. Cameron, 41 N.Y. 392" court="NY" date_filed="1869-12-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/parmelee-v--cameron-3618515?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3618515">41 N. Y. 392, where they would not apply the rule to the sale of a legacy payable at a future day. But, where there is a gross inadequacy of price, that alone will raise a presumption of fraud in some instances, and form a sufficient basis to grant relief. It is true that cases of interferences simply upon this ground are few; and, in most instances in which a party has been relieved from an improvident bargain, there have been circumstances of a suspicious character connected with the transaction, or something in the relations of the parties, which renders it inequitable that the party should retain the advantages he received by his bargain. But in other cases where there is no positive evidence of fraud, but the inequality of the bargain is so gross that the court cannot resist the inference that, though there may be no direct evidence of fraud, such a bargain must have in some way been improperly obtained, relief has been granted. In the case at bar there is a dispute in regard to the value of the property, the evidence ranging from $14,000 to $18,000. The learned judge below thought the property was worth $14,000 to $15,000. There was a mortgage of $10,000 upon it, and a life-estate, the life-tenant-being 48 years of age. There was therefore an equity of redemption of $4,000 to $5,000, at least, subject to the life-tenancy. In the points of the respondent it is stated that, according to the tables, the expectancy of life of the tenant is 19 years, and, if the learned judge took this statement as to the expectancy, it may have very largely influenced his judgment. But, upon our examination of the tables, it would appear that, instead of the expectancy being 19 years, it was a little above 9¿ years, which makes a vast difference in the value of the remainder; and therefore, if the total value of the premises was between $14,000 and $15,000, the amount paid was about one-third of the value of the remainder; if it was $18,000, it was between one-fifth and one-sixth of its value,—gross inadequacy being apparent. It is, of course, not to be expected that the purchaser of such a remainder will pay the full value as