115 Iowa 438 | Iowa | 1902
Lead Opinion
The first question for solution in this case is that of the validity of the first mortgage as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, for it is evident that, if it is not a valid mortgage as between them, the controversy thereover between the mortgagee and the attaching creditor is at an end. No particular formality is necessary to make a mortgage valid as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee. Glover v. McGilvray, 63 Ala. 508; Janes v. Penny, 76 Ga. 797; Wilmerding v. Mitchell, 42 N. J. Law, 476; Merchants & Mech. Sav. Bank v. Lovejoy, 84 Wis. 601 (55 N. W. Rep. 108); Whiting v. Eichelberger, 16 Iowa, 422. Nor,
The appellant contends that the omission to name the species of stock mortgaged creates a patent ambiguity in the instrument which cannot be explained or helped by parol evidence, and says that it might apply "as well to “cattle, heifers, steers, bulls, horses, mules, sheep, swine, or goats.” We quite, agree with the argument that it may be so applied when standing alone, but, such being the case, a latent ambiguity is created, and nothing more, for “if the language of the document, though plain in itself, applies equally well to more objects than one, evidence may be given both of the circumstances of the case and of statements made by any party to the docuprent as to his intentions in reference to the matter to which the document relates.” Stephen, Digest Evidence, 169; Greenleaf, Evidence, sections 289, 290, 297; Chambers v. Watson, 60 Iowa, 339; Beach, Modern Contract, section 742; St. Luke’s Home for Indigent Christian Females v. Association for Relief of Respectable Aged Indigent Females, 52 N. Y. 191, 198 (11 Am. Rep. 697). It is also competent to
We think both of the mortgages under consideration good as against the attachment levied herein. This holding renders it unnecessary to consider the other matters •complained of.
The judgment of the district court is reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting), — As to the first mortgage referred to in the majority opinion, there is no contention that it was oral, nor is there any attempt to reform the written mortgage on the ground of accident or mistake. Therefore the language of the instrument itself, solely, is, so far as sufficiency of description is concerned, before us for consideration. Plaintiff had notice of this mortgage, not of •some other mortgage, oral or otherwise. If this mortgage is not sufficient as to him, then interveners cannot recover thereon, and we need not discuss the conflicting authorities ■as to what is sufficient description as between the parties to the instrument, and how far such description may be supplemented by evidence as h> their intention or mutual understanding. The question here is whether the description in the mortgage is sufficient as to a third person ■charged with notice thereof. Sufficiency of description is •one thing; evidence to identify the property in controversy as that described in the mortgage is another, and wholly •different, thing. If the description is not sufficient tn onn