Frese v. FormellaFrese v. Formella
I.
New Hampshire‘s criminal defamation statute provides that “[a] person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he purposely communicates to any person, orally or in writing, any information which he knows to be false and knows will tend to expose any other living person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.”
New Hampshire‘s misdemeanor enforcement process empowers police departments to prosecute defamation. In the absence of the exercise of discretionary supervisory authority by the state Attorney General or County Attorneys, municipal police departments may initiate prosecutions for misdemeanors, including criminal defamation, without prior input or approval from such prosecutors. See State v. La Palme, 104 N.H. 97, 98-99 (1962) (“The prosecution of misdemeanors by police officers is a practice that has continued in one form or another since 1791 and is still permissible under existing statutes.” (citing State v. Urban, 98 N.H. 346 (1953))); see also
Although criminal defamation is rarely prosecuted in New Hаmpshire, Frese has twice been charged under section 644:11. In
Frese‘s second arrest generated public controversy. In response, the New Hampshire Attorney General interposed and concluded that the police department had arrested Frese without probable cause because there was no evidence that Frese knew his statements were false. The Exeter Police Department subsequently dropped the charges.
In late 2018, maintaining that he feared future arrest, Frese filed a complаint in federal district court asserting that section 644:11 is so vague as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. After initial skirmishing, Frese filed an amended two-count complaint, which is the operative complaint before us. As before,
II.
We review the district court‘s dismissal of the complaint under
A. First Amendment Claim
Frese argues that section 644:11 violates the First Amendment because criminal defamation laws should be per se unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, however, has upheld the criminalizing of false speech, explaining that deliberate and recklessly false speech “do[es] not enjoy constitutional protection.” Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75. Thus, the state can “impose criminal sanctions for criticism of the official conduct of public officials” so long as the statements were made with “‘actual malice’ -- that is, with knowledge that [they were] false or with reckless disregard of whether [they were] false or not.” Id. at 67 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)); see also Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 66 (1st Cir. 2003).
Frese concedes that Garrison forecloses his First Amendment claim but argues that “[t]he time has come to revisit that decision.” But, as Frese acknowledges, we do not have the power to revisit Supreme Court decisions. See Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-53 (1998); United States v. Morosco, 822 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[B]ecause overruling Supreme Court precedent is the Court‘s job, not ours, we must follow [prior decisions] until the Court specifically tells us not to . . . even if these long-on-the-books cases are in tension with [newer cases].“). Accordingly, we must find that Garrison precludes Frese‘s First Amendment attack on section 644:11.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Vagueness
“The vagueness doctrine, a derivative of due process, protects against the ills of laws whose ‘prohibitions are not clearly defined.‘” Nat‘l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 62 (1st Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)). A statute is impermissibly vague if it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)); see also Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015). This creates two avenues by which to attack a vague statute: discriminatory enforcement and lack of noticе.
To prevent the chilling of constitutionally protected speech, we apply a “heightened standard” in cases involving the First Amendment and “require[] a ‘greater degree of specificity‘”
Frese mounts a facial challenge to section 644:11, as well as a “hybrid” challenge. We first consider his facial challenge. To succeed, Frese must “establish that no set of circumstances exists undеr which the [statute] would be valid.” Dutil v. Murphy, 550 F.3d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). We are mindful that facial challenges “are disfavored” because they “often rest on speculation,” “run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint,” and “threaten to short circuit the democratic process.” Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 76-77 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008)).
1. Discriminatory Enforcement
A “statute authorizes an impermissible degree of enforcement discretion -- and is therefore void for vagueness -- where it fails to ‘set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officiаls and triers of fact in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.‘” Act Now to Stop War & End Racism Coal. v. District of Columbia, 846 F.3d 391, 410-11 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974)); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (explaining that the most “important aspect of vagueness doctrine” is “the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement” (internal citation omitted)).
We conclude that the statute at issue here provides adequate guidelines for law enforcement, and therefore passes constitutional muster. Frese argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, because different persons may have “different standards for determining what is and is not defamatory.” But the statute provides reasonably clear guidance -- defamatory statements are thosе false statements that “expos[e]
The parties also agree that section 644:11 adopts part of New Hampshire‘s common law defamation standard. Under the common law, “[w]ords may be found to be defamatory if they hold the plaintiff up to contempt, hatred, scorn or ridicule, or tend to impair [the plaintiff‘s] standing in the community.” Boyle v. Dwyer, 172 N.H. 548, 554 (2019) (second alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Tel. Publ‘g Co., 155 N.H. 314, 338 (2007)). The incorporation of common law standards provides further guidance to law enforcement about the meaning of the statute, not least because the definition of defamation under New Hampshire common law has remained relatively consistent for over one hundred years, and has been regularly analyzed by courts and applied by
Additionally, common law defamation in New Hampshire is subject to objective measurement, which further protects against arbitrary enforcement. Under New Hampshire common law, liability may be imposed only if “the defamatory meаning . . . [is] one that could be ascribed to the words by persons of common and reasonable understanding.” Id. (quoting Thomson v. Cash, 119 N.H. 371, 373 (1979)).
Nevertheless, Frese contends that “the common law of civil defamation is not stable or precise enough to define a criminal restriction on speech.” Frese cites three cases to support this contention. But in each of these cases the laws found to be unconstitutionally vague were significantly broader than section 644:11 and did not contain a requirement that the speaker know the statement to be false. See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 198 (1966) (trial court defined criminal libel as “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace, corrupt the public
Thus, none of Frese‘s cited cases involved a statute on all fours with the one here, and Frese offers us no reason to discount this distinction. And at least one federal district court
Section 644:11 also provides significantly more guidance than statutes that have been determined unconstitutionally vague. In Kolender, the Supreme Court concluded that a California statute targeting loitering wаs unconstitutional. The law required a suspect stopped by police to provide “reliable” identification and to account for his presence. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 353. When asked to give “examples of how suspects would satisfy the [statute‘s] requirement[s],” counsel explained that “a jogger, who was not carrying identification, could, depending on the particular officer, be required to answer a series of questions concerning the route that he followed to arrive at the place where the officers detained him or could satisfy the identification requirement simply by reciting his name and address.” Id. at 360 (internal citations omitted).
Nor is the statute vague because it requires some exercise of law enforcement judgment -- indeed, “enforcement [inevitably] requires the exercise of some degree of police judgment,” and the question thus becomes whether “the degree of judgment involved . . . is acceptable.” Hill, 530 U.S. at 733 (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114). The language of section 644:11 is sufficient, as it gives reasonably specific guidance to law
2. Lack of Notice
A statute is impermissibly vague for lack of notice “only if it ‘prohibits . . . an act in terms so uncertain that persons of average intelligence would have no choice but to guess at its meaning and modes of application.‘” McKee, 649 F.3d at 62 (quoting United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 84 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc)).6 We conclude that the statute provides sufficiently clear
In Hill, the Supreme Court confrоnted a challenge to a Colorado statute that that prohibited “knowingly approach[ing]” a person to “engag[e] in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person.” Id. at 707. The Court concluded that the statute provided adequate notice. Specifically, it reasoned, while there might be some hypothetical cases where there would be a “nice question” about the “meaning of these terms,” courts cannot require statutes to use language with “mathematical certainty.” Id. at 732-33 (quoting Am. Commc‘ns Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950), then Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110). As with the Colorado statute considered in Hill, section 644:11 may beget cases where there are questions about whether the conduct at issue falls within the language of the statute. However, this alone does nоt create a notice problem, given that “it is clear what the [statute] as a whole prohibits.” Hill, 530 U.S. at 733 (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110); see also Henderson v. McMurray, 987 F.3d 997, 1004 (11th Cir. 2021).
Refining his notice argument, Frese takes issue with section 644:11‘s definition of “public” to include “any professional or social group,” which Frese claims does not consider
We are not convinced. First, the incorporation of the common law provides safeguards against imposing criminal liability for speech that offends the views of particularly niche or idiosyncratic groups, which in turn shields against any notice problems. As discussed previously, the common law objectivity standard requires that “the defamatory meaning . . . [is] one that could be ascribed to the words by persons of common and reasonable understanding.” Boyle, 172 N.H. at 554. And section 644:11(I)‘s knowledge requirement creates additional protection.8
Having addressed Frese‘s facial claims, we return briefly to what he characterizes as his “hybrid” vaguеness claim. Frese asserts that section 644:11 “is unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied in the context of New Hampshire‘s system for prosecuting [c]lass B misdemeanors.” (Emphasis added). Frese characterizes this second claim as a “hybrid vagueness claim“: “it is ‘facial’ in the sense that it is not limited to Frese‘s particular case, but it is ‘as applied’ in the sense that it does not seek to strike [section 644:11] outside the context of New Hampshire‘s particular misdemeanor process.” The district court dismissed Frese‘s “hybrid” claim for the same reasons that it dismissed his facial claim.
As we discussed above, the New Hampshire statute is not unconstitutionally vague, becausе it gives meaningful enforcement guidelines and adequate notice. Nor does consideration of the New Hampshire prosecution context alter that conclusion -- regardless of the enforcement setting, the statute is not standardless and provides adequate guidelines for enforcement. See supra note 5. His hybrid claim therefore falls with his facial claim.
III.
Assuming Frese‘s 2018 prosecution to have been brought without reasonable cause to believe that Frese knew that his speech had been false, then it was certainly wrongful, as implied by its
-Concurring Opinion Follows-
Ours is a country that touts a “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). That commitment may well be profound; but it is not the whole story. And lately, one needn‘t look far for examples of speech curtailed or, by contrast, speech that seems to be wholly divorced from the truth but goes unaddressed by the law. When, as has been the case in this country of late, the truth often seems up for grabs and objectively accurate facts are tossed aside in favor of alternative versions that suit a given narrative, drawing the line between truths and
It‘s at the intersection of history, present day, fact, and fiction (and everything in between) that today‘s case arises.
As we know, this is a case about New Hampshire‘s criminal defamation statute, which explains that “[a] person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he purposely communicates to any person, orally or in writing, any information which he knows to be false and knows will tend to expose any other living person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.”
The troubling seditious-criminal-libel historical context that underpins a law like this one is well known to First Amendment scholars, advocates, and jurists -- and perhaps most deeply felt by those who‘ve had brushes with it. See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 68-70; id. at 79-80 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 80-83 (Douglas, J., concurring); New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 296-97 (Black, J., concurring); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 287 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (joined by
Perhaps the persistence of these laws owes to society-at-large‘s unawareness of or ambivalence to them. It‘s possible many believe criminal defamation is basically off the books; Garrison can be read to have been aimed at accomplishing as much, at least from a federal standpoint, in that it nixed as unconstitutional civil and criminal penalties for truthful statements about public officials, leaving room to sanction only those statements made with actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth). See 379 U.S. at 74. But
And indeed, this is remarkable. Particularly so given the current political climate in this country, with “truth” at a premium. It seems to me that if these laws were robustly enforced, dockets in these states would be positively teeming with prosecutions. That‘s not what happens. Why is that? Probably because there is no readily discernible boundary between what gossip or loose talk amounts to being criminal and that which does not. Instead, the boundary emergеs case by case, lying solely in the eye of the charge-bringing beholder -- or the ego of the person offended or called out by the speech. And this is troubling because it underscores the simple truth that a criminal defamation law can be wielded, weaponized by a person who disagrees with whatever speech has been uttered.12
To those who might disagree, it strikes me as out of touch with reality to suggest these laws are not being selectively harnessed or that these laws aren‘t particularly susceptible to such use and abuse. See, e.g., Garrison, 379 U.S. at 80-83 (Douglas, J., concurring) (warning of the dangers posed by criminal defamation laws and those laws acting as “instrument[s] of destruction” for free еxpression); Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289, 292 (Alaska 1978) (“It has become clear that the real interest being protected by criminal defamation statutes is personal reputation. Whether that purpose justifies use of the criminal law has been questioned.“). And by virtue of their very existence, criminal defamation laws deter and chill speech -- indeed, their existence represents a looming threat of criminal prosecution, which of course will cause many to think twice before speaking out. This is all the more so when, as in New Hampshire, a plea deal or successful criminal defamation prosecution would show up on a background check (and remember, criminal defamation defendants have no right to trial by jury and don‘t get court-appointed counsel). But “[f]ining [people] or sending them to jail for criticizing public officials not only jeopardizes the free, open public discussion which our Constitution guarantees,
It is not lost on me that proponents of criminal defamation laws see utility in having them as an alternative to civil suits to be deployed when, for example, an alleged defamer might be what we refer to as “judgment-proof,” i.e., even if a favorable verdict resulted from a civil defamation suit, the defamer wouldn‘t have the cash available to cover any damages that were assessed. This assumes money damages are the best reliеf for a victim of defamation, and I cannot abide that premise. Does it not also invite criminal prosecution of people with less means? And critically, having a criminal defamation route enables an end-run around the important constitutional restrictions imposed in civil defamation cases. And I haven‘t spied any requirement that, to bring a criminal prosecution, one must demonstrate the criminal charge is being pursued because a civil suit just wouldn‘t cut it for some legitimate reason or another. This brings me back to the reality that criminal defamation laws are all too easily wielded as a silencing threat of punishment for speech.
By my lights, criminal defamation lаws -- even the ones that require knowledge of the falsity of the speech -- simply cannot be reconciled with our democratic ideals of robust debate and uninhibited free speech. See id. at 79-80 (Black, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court is mistaken if it thinks that requiring
Notes
Similarly, citing Smith, 415 U.S. at 580, and Ashton, 384 U.S. at 200, Frese argues that a mens rea requirement cannot cure an inherently vague statute. Again, while this may be true, our analysis does not rely solely on section 644:11‘s mens rea component, and we have no trouble finding that the knowledge requirеment -- considered in combination with the other factors discussed -- helps to limit vagueness concerns. See United States v. Nieves-Castano, 480 F.3d 597, 603 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that the statute‘s “scienter requirement ameliorates any vagueness concerns” (citing Hill, 530 U.S. at 732)).