In this summary proceeding, defendants appeal, by leave granted, a circuit court order affirming a district court’s judgment of possession in favor of plaintiff.
Defendants are mobile-home owners renting a space in plaintiff’s mobile-home park. In 1979, plaintiff sought to terminate defendants’ month-to-month tenancy in a prior summary proceeding. In the course of the earlier suit defendants demanded that they be offered a written lease, as required by the Mobile Home Commission Act, MCL 125.1128(l)(g); MSA 19.855(28)(l)(g). The district court judge concluded that plaintiff’s failure to comply with the act constituted a complete defense to the suit for possession. The parties then executed a six-month lease, which ran from February 1, 1980, through July 31, 1980.
Upon the expiration of the written lease plaintiff commenced the present summary proceeding for possession of the mobile-home space. Defendants raised the affirmative defense that the termination was in retaliation for their prior demand for a written lease, a right provided to them by state law. On the date set for trial, the district court judge ruled that the retaliatory eviction defense was not available as a matter of law since the termination was pursuant to the expiration of the written lease.
On appeal to this Court, defendants contend that the district and circuit courts erred by ruling that the retaliatory eviction defense did not apply. The issue before us is whether the defense of retaliatory eviction is available where a landlord seeks to regain possession of premises at the expiration of a fixed-term lease.
*686
The seminal case prohibiting retaliatory evictions is
Edwards v Habib,
130 US App DC 126; 397 F2d 687 (1968),
cert den
The defense of retaliatory eviction has since been recognized in a number of jurisdictions.
1
Moreover, in
Golphin v Park Monroe Associates,
In Michigan, the defense of retaliatory eviction is available pursuant to statute in summary proceedings for possession of realty. MCL 600.5720; MSA 27A.5720. Consequently, the limits of the defense must be determined by analysis of the statute itself. The primary and fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the purpose and intent as expressed by the Legislature.
White v Ann Arbor,
The retaliatory eviction statute, MCL 600.5720; MSA 27A.5720, reads in pertinent part:
*688 "(1) A judgment for possession of the premises for an alleged termination of tenancy shall not be entered against a defendant if 1 or more of the following is established:
"(a) That the alleged termination was intended primarily as a penalty for the defendant’s attempt to secure or enforce rights under the lease or agreement or under the laws of the state, of a governmental subdivision of this state, or of the United States.”
By its language, the statute precludes a judgment for possession for an alleged termination of a tenancy where
the termination
was intended primarily as a penalty for the defendant’s attempt to secure or enforce legal rights. Thus, the statute is distinguishable from the retaliatory eviction doctrine of
Edwards v Habib, supra,
which purports to prohibit the use of judicial process to accomplish
an eviction
for retaliatory purposes.
Golphin v Park Monroe Associates, supra.
Instead, the focus of the statute is upon the termination of the tenancy. In the instant case, plaintiffs motive in refusing to renew defendants’ lease may well have been, as alleged, one of retaliation for defendants’ prior assertion of rights under the Mobile Home Commission Act. The dispositive question, however, is whether, as a matter of law, the alleged termination in this case could be considered in retaliation for defendants’ actions. In making this determination, we consider the word termination according to its definition at common law. When a statute contains words having a settled, definite, and well-known meaning at common law, it is to be assumed they are used with the sense and meaning which they had at common law, unless a contrary intent is plainly shown.
People v Covelesky,
A tenancy from month-to-month, which is to last
*689
for an uncertain duration, is a tenancy at will and is terminable at the desire of either party upon the tender of sufficient notice.
Eg., Gurunian v Grossman,
We realize that our holding effects a severe limitation upon the retaliatory eviction defense. An unscrupulous landlord may accomplish the desired result of a retaliatory eviction, the intimidation of tenants, through the use of fixed-term *690 leases. Although a fixed-term tenant is not in the same position of vulnerability as a month-to-month tenant, since his tenancy cannot otherwise at any time be terminated upon his landlord’s whim, we consider retaliatory actions of any type abhorrent. Nevertheless, we are constrained to follow the dictates of the Legislature in this matter and enforce the retaliatory eviction statute as limited. The trial and circuit courts correctly ruled that the defense of retaliatory eviction is unavailable to defendants.
Affirmed.
Notes
See
e.g., Bowles v Blue Lake Development Corp,
504 F2d 1094 (CA 5, 1974) (interpreting Florida law),
Laster v Bowman,
52 Ohio App 2d 379; 6 Ohio Op 3d 428;