60 Iowa 482 | Iowa | 1883
Henry W. Lee died in 1874, and the plaintiff was appointed and duly qualified as administrator of his estate. “From 1855 until his death, Henry W. Lee was the Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the diocese of Iowa,” and the defendant, William Stevens Perry, is the successor of said Lee as bishop. The diocese is an ecclesiastical body, consisting of parishes or congregations of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Iowa, associated for ecclesiastical purposes and government according to the canons of the church. It is not incorporated, nor is it a legal entity. An annual diocesan convention of delegates from the parishes is held, over which the bishop presides. But this body is not incorporated. The defendant, “The trustees of Gris-wold College,” is a corporation located at Davenport, and was organized under the auspices of the' Protestant Episcopal Church in Iowa, and is closely connected therewith. In 1866 said corporation owned certain real estate in Davenport, which by the provisions of its articles of incorporation could not be sold without “the consent of the convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the diocese of Iowa, and also of the bishop of said diocese.”
About 1866, Bishop Lee formed the plan of erecting a church edifice upon the college grounds, to be called the “bishop’s church.” The trustees of the college “voted to give sufficient land on the college grounds for a bishop’s church, if it should be desired, provided the remaining conditions of the articles of incorporation should be complied with as to the consent of the bishop and convention.” This action of the trustees was reported to the convention, and the proposed gift was assented to, “with the condition that said land shall be held by the bishop and his successors in trust, for the purpose aforesaid.” Afterwards the trustees adopted resolutions reciting the previous action, and that the land had been designated. The location was approved, the land sufficiently described, and the trustees determined it should be “leased to H. W. Lee, the bishop of the Protestant Epicopal
In making the advances, the bishop, undoubtedly, expected to be repaid from contributions he expected to receive. "We do not think he intended to give so largely from his individual means. But the bishop knew the convention, diocese, or church in Iowa did not have any funds which could be
From time to time Bishop Lee made statements to the annual conventions in relation to the progress of the work of construction, but no material action was taken in reference thereto until 1873, when it was reported to the convention the building was completed, whereupon that body recommended “that said church be consecrated as a cathedral, if such recommendation meet the wishes of the bishop and the principal donors.” At this time Bishop Lee stated to the convention that “in due time a detailed report of receipts and expedenitures will be made, but such report will be premature at present. There is no incumbrance on the property.” There is a cannon of 'the church which forbids the consecration of any church edifice “until the building and ground upon which it is erected have been fully paid for and freed from lien or other incumbrance, and, also, that such building and grounds are secured by the terms of the devise, or deed, or subscription by which they are given, from danger of alienation from those who profess and practice the doctrine, discipline and worship of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America.” The building was duly consecrated by Bishoj> Lee. After his death the plaintiff from time to time presented to the annual diocesan conventions the subject of reimbursing the estate for the amount expended over the amount received. Certain resolutions were adopted, recommending that a committee be appointed to “solicit subscriptions and take any other proper steps to raise a fund to reimburse the estate of the late Bishop,
In support of their respective theories, counsel have cited a large number of authorities, and have largely considered the whole doctrine of trusts as innumerated in the books, so far as the same relates to the lien of trustees and its enforcement. The decisions cited have been carefully examined, and we believe it can be safely asserted they, with a single exception, relate to trusts of a business as distinguished from those of a charitable or religous character. We do not deem it essential to determine whether or not the lien of a trustee for advances made for the benefit of the trust can be enforced by a sale of the trust estate, when the trust is of a business character. Conceding it may be done, and the trust destroyed, and the property- devoted to other purposes, this is but an incident which attaches to all enterprises of a business character. The property is not destroyed, but merely enters into other channels of business than was contemplated when the trust was formed. The destruction of a charitable or religious trust by a sale, such as is asked in the case at bar, is not an incident which usually attaches to such a trust.
We can readily conceive when a trustee makes advances for a trust estate, and there is a beneficiary known to the law, that equity might well require such beneficiary to reimburse the trustee. We shall not stop to inquire when or how this may be done, because in the case before the court there is no such person. The members' of the church or diocese, or, at least, many of them, had knowledge of what the bishop did, but no pecuniary obligation was incurred by them.' The diocese has no funds which can be legally devoted to the purpose of reimbursing the bishop’s estate, and no action can be maintained against it.
The authorities cited by counsel for appellant relate to trusts of a business character. It is true they were not distinguished from charitable trusts, because the cases did not require it. The language of the decisions is general and applicable to all trusts, but we think it should be confined to the character of the trust under consideration.
The trust in question is peculiar, and we are informed by
In that case the question was whether the plaintiff “was entitled to a lien upon a Raptist chapel at Exeter, on account of expenses incurred by her testator in the execution of the trust. In 1725 the chapel was established, and in 1822 it was rebuilt, and the management of the matter was intrusted to the chapel wardens, one of whom was Mr. Darke, the testator of the plaintiff. For this purpose they borrowed money from Ann Smith, and they deposited with her the title deeds of the chapel. They also made themselves personally liable to her for the repayment of the amount thus borrowed. Subsequently to this, payment of the debt was enforced against the estate of Mr. Darke, and the plaintiff, his representative, now insists that she is entitled to a lien on the chapel to be repaid the amount.” The court said: “In support of the plaintiff’s case, I have been referred to many authorities laying down this proposition, that a trustee is entitled to be repaid any expenses properly incurred in the execution of the trust. Of the correctness of this proposition there can be no doubt; but the question is whether a trustee can, for that purpose, destroy all the trusts,” and the relief asked was refused, although it was held the plaintiff was entitled to the custody of the title deeds, which in England, as we understand, ordinai’ily amounts to an equitable mortgage.
Counsel for plaintiff have attempted to distinguish this case from the one before the court, but we think they have failed in this respect. They further insist there have been cases subsequently decided in England which in substance have overruled it. Such cases have been examined, and we find they relate to trusts of a business character, and conceding the rule there announced conflicts with the foregoing decision, as applied to the facts before the court, still we think the foregoing decision must be regarded as an authority in a
It. cannot be presumed that the bishop would violate a canon of the church and consecrate a building which was not paid for. He declared it was free from encumbrance. In making this declaration there was no mental reservation He meant that the building was paid for by contributions, and
Now, it seems to us, the right of a trustee to a lien on the trust property must be based on an implied contract, obligation, or understanding, and that no such implication should be indulged in this case because of the character of the trust, and for the further reason such a thing never was contemplated by Bishop Lee.
The decree of the District Court establishes a lien on the building, to satisfy which the same may be sold. This implies it may be torn down and removed. No such result was contemplated by Bishop Lee, and it would be doing him great injustice for a moment to suppose, if living, he would sanction sueh a proceeding. The decree of the District Court, if carried out, can have but one result, and that is the total destruction of the trust, which it was the object of Bishop Lee to preserve and protect. We think the District Court erred in implying and enforcing- the lien under the circumstances.
We have no power to enforce the moral obligation, if sueh there be, resting on those who enjoy the benefits of the advances made by Bishop Lee. With such question we have nothing to do, and in justice should state that it -is only for the purposes of the case conceded that advances were made. It is not 'conceded as a fact, and such question has not been considered by us, because unnecessary.
It seems to us that it is immaterial what claims were paid, and the plaintiff must recover, if at all, because of the right to assert and enforce a trustee’s lien. The decree of the District Court must be reversed and the petition dismissed.
Reversed.