230 Mass. 163 | Mass. | 1918
There was evidence that the plaintiff had a contract with the federal government to carry the mail from mail trains, when they arrived at the railroad station in Weston, to the post office in that town. He had rendered this service under similar contracts for about thirty years before January 31, 1914, when he was struck by an engine of the defendant and received the injuries for which this action is brought.
The defendant maintains a single track in Weston, which .runs east and west, the station being on the southerly side. ’Opposite the station — north of the main track — there is a long •.siding with a switch at each end so that approaching trains can pass each other at this point. A platform in front of the station, ■eight or ten feet wide, extends to within about two feet of the Southerly rail of the main track; and the space between the northerly rail of the main track and the southerly rail of the siding — a distance of approximately nine feet — is filled in with cinders almost level with the tops of the rails.
At the time of the accident there was a mail train from Boston due to arrive at the station about 6:11 o’clock in the evening; and it was the practice to discharge the mail and express matter and to allow passengers to leave and enter the train. There was
Upon this evidence it could not have been ruled that the plaintiff was a trespasser, or merely a licensee, while between the tracks. But it could have been found that he was there rightfully, — at a place where he was required to be in the performance of his duties in receiving the mail from the train, — and in accordance with a practice which existed respecting the discharge of mail from the train and of which the defendant had knowledge. Turner v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 158 Mass. 261, 263. Kilburn v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad, 218 Mass. 493. Joyce v. Boston, Revere Beach & Lynn Railroad, 219 Mass. 476. Palmer v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 227 Mass. 493, 497.
The question whether the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care also was for the jury. As the cause of action arose before St. 1914, c. 553, went into effect, the statute is not applicable.
It could not have been ruled as matter of law that the plaintiff was careless because he did not look a second time in travelling a distance of fifteen or twenty feet from the car to the place where he was injured. Manley v. Bay State Street Railway, 220 Mass. 124, 128.
There was evidence which would have warranted a finding that the engineer did not bring his train to a stop in accordance with a practice which could have been found to exist; or, that if he did. stop, that he again started and ran his train at an unreasonable rate of speed past the station at a time when passengers and others were invited to cross the main track. Either finding would be evidence of negligence. Conry v. Boston & Maine Railroad, supra. Hines v. Stanley G. I. Electric Manuf. Co. supra. Hicks v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad, 164 Mass. 424.
In accordance with the terms of the report, judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff in the sum of $400, as damages.
So ordered.