107 Wis. 627 | Wis. | 1900
Sec. 2902, Stats. 1898, is to the effect that a money judgment, when docketed as provided by law, shall, for a period expiring ten years from the date of the rendition thereof, be a lien on the real property of the judgment debtor, except his homestead, in the county where the same is docketed. If the real estate which respondent seeks to reach in this action was the property of Lavoie, within the meaning of that section, when the judgment against him was docketed it obviously became a lien thereon. Sec. 2978 provides that after the expiration of one year from the
From what has preceded this is the first question to be solved in reviewing the decision of the circuit court overruling the demurrer to the complaint: Is a judgment, properly docketed in the county where real estate is located which the judgment debtor previously owned but before such docketing conveyed to another, a lien on such real estate if such conveyance is void under sec. 2320, Stats. 1898? That section provides that: “Every conveyance or assignment, in writing or otherwise, of any estate or interest in lands, . . . made with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors or other persons of their lawful actions, damages, forfeitures, debts or demands . . . shall be void.” The learned counsel for respondent contend that the word “ void ” in the section means absolutely void; that as regards a person circumstanced as plaintiff was when La-voie made his deed to Theriault, the title to the property attempted to be conveyed remains entirely unaffected by
The foregoing renders unnecessary any attempt even to review the able argument of counsel for respondent, by which the idea was vigorously pressed upon our attention and consideration that the word “ void ” in sec. 2320 means absolutely void as to creditors, and that a judgment against the fraudulent vendor attaches to the property fraudulently conveyed regardless of the conveyance. It is sufficient to say that the contrary is the law of this state and that it is so firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence as not to be open to question. However, it is deemed best not to dismiss the subject without correcting the error counsel seems to have fallen into, that Gilbert v. Stockman, 81 Wis. 602, and Hyde v. Chapman, 33 Wis. 391, are out of harmony with other cases decided by this court. In endeavoring to make such correction we shall not attempt to defend the reasoning of prior decisions, but merely state the facts and conclusions of each case, treating the results as not now open to question.
In Eastman v. Schettler, 13 Wis. 325, upon which great reliance is placed to support the attack on Gilbert v. Stockman, it will be noted that, while the court said arguendo that ‘if the conveyance of the land was made with intent to defraud the judgment creditor it was void and the judgment became a lien upon it,’ the court was not speaking of the effect of the judgment by itself, but its effect under the circumstances of that case, which were that it had been enforced by a seizure of the realty in question (so far as such a seizure can. take place under an execution), a sale thereof under the execution, and the perfection of the sale by the making and delivering of a deed to the purchaser. Under those circumstances it was said that the purchaser could maintain an action to recover the land, because the deed
In the Gilbert Case the rule of the Eastman Case was limited to its facts upon the theory that the proceedings under the execution created a lien upon the property, but that none existed before the levy under the execution, which is in harmony with the cases that uphold the right to proceed in equity in aid of an execution levy upon land which has been conveyed by the judgment debtor in fraud of his creditors but deny the right in the absence of such levy, because, while the judgment of itself is not a lien upon the property, a lien thereon may be acquired by seizure thereof under the execution issued on the judgment.
In Cornell v. Radway, 22 Wis. 260, the sheriff had levied upon the property and advertised it for sale under an execution issued on the judgment. The court said the case belonged to that class where one is compelled J;o resort to a court of equity for the purpose of removing some obstruction fraudulently or inequitably interposed to prevent a sale on execution, and not to the class where a person resorts to equity as a general creditor to obtain satisfaction of his debt; that, while in the latter class of cases all legal remedies must be exhausted as a condition precedent to the maintenance of the action, in the former the party has a right, under the established rules of equity jurisprudence, to invoke equity to remove a cloud upon an existing interest in real property. True, the court based its decision on Gates v. Boomer, 17 Wis. 455, remarking that such case was “ an action by the judgment creditors of one of the defendants to have a deed executed by him to his codefendant set aside as a fraudulent obstruction to the proceedings of the plaintiffs to enforce the lien of their judgment, so that they might sell the property upon execution,” and said, arguendo and partly outside the facts of the case, that, “ The judgment of
It will be found that there is nothing in Gates v. Boomer to call for or justify the remark made in Cornell v. Radway, so far as such remark was outside the facts of the case. In the former case the facts were that while there was no execution levy, an execution had been issued and returned unsatisfied, and all the legal remedies of the judgment creditor to collect his debt had been exhausted without his being-able to obtain any satisfaction thereof. In that situation the court held that the creditor, as to property fraudulently transferred by the judgment debtor, and upon which the creditor would, but for such transfer, have had an unclouded specific lien, was entitled to invoke" the aid of equity to eov-foree his right to a lien by removing the fraudulent obstruction thereto. “ The case,” said the court, “ belongs to the class where the issue of the execution gives the plaintiff a specific lien upon the property, but he is compelled to go to a court of equity for the purpose of removing some obstruc
In Galloway v. Hamilton, 68 Wis. 651, the maintenance of an action in equity by a judgment creditor circumstanced somewhat different than respondent is, turned on the fact that a lien had been obtained by a levy upon the property under an execution, the prior cases in this court being referred to as in harmony with the decision. The court said, “ If it be true that the real estate seized on the execution belonged to the judgment debtor, and a deed has been put. upon record which purports to convey the legal title to another, which will have the effect to defeat or greatly impair the lien unless the deed is canceled, we suppose it is well settled that a court of equity will interfere and remove the inequitable obstruction. ‘ The equitable relief sought rests upon the fact that the execution has issued, and a specific lien has been acquired upon the property of the debtor by its levy, but that the obstruction interposed prevents a sale of the property at a fair valuation.’ ” After thus disposing of the point under consideration it is probably unfortunate-that the court said arguendo, and, as will be plainly seen, somewhat outside the case, quoting the obiter remark in Cornell v. Radway, 22 Wis. 260, heretofore referred to, “Where the judgment of the plaintiff is by statute a specific lien upon the land without the issue or levy of an execution,, it would seem that the plaintiff is entitled to the aid of the court, whether execution has been issued and returned unsatisfied or not,” thus in a measure keeping up the uncertainty as to whether a judgment, standing alone, is a specific-lien upon the real property of the judgment debtor which he fraudulently conveyed prior to its rendition, instead of its being a mere right to acquire a lien, which requires the issuance of an execution and an actual seizure of the property thereunder in order to ripen into such an interest in the res as will be recognized by a court of equity in an action to
In Evans v. Laughton, 69 Wis. 138, the property was seized under a writ of attachment. This proposition among other things was sufficiently involved to receive the attention of the court: Was the conveyance made to hinder and defraud creditors ? the idea being that if such was its character no lien was acquired thereon by the attachment. On such proposition the court said, in effect, that, if it were to be decided in the affirmative, the judgment creditor would be at liberty, notwithstanding the conveyance, to seize the land on execution or attachment as the property of his debtor, and thereby acquire a specific lien at law which equity would lend its aid to protect.
In Ahlhauser v. Doud, 74 Wis. 400, an action in equity, by a judgment creditor to remove a cloud from his lien upon property fraudulently mortgaged and conveyed by the judgment debtor, was sustained solely upon the ground that the plaintiff had in fact acquired a specific lien on such property by a seizure thereof under an execution issued on his judgment. True it was there said that, “ The fraudulent deeds and mortgages are absolutely void, and conveyed no' estate to the grantees and mortgagee as against the claim of the plaintiff, and so the lien of the judgment and execution is perfect;” but it will be observed that the lien was spoken ■of as being created, not by the judgment, but as being ■single and created by the judgment and execution; and bjr ■a careful reading of the opinion it will be clearly seen that it proceeded to a conclusion on the theory that the fraudulent instruments were absolutely void only in the sense that they were void at the election of the judgment cred
We have now reviewed the more important cases preceding Gilbert v. Stockman, 81 Wis. 602, and shown, it would seem, as regards anything actually decided therein, that, they are all in harmony with the decision in that case and with what is here decided,— that is, that a judgment against a fraudulent vendor of real property, which has been duly docketed in the county where such real estate is located,, does not of itself create a lien on such property, because the conveyance vests, in the fraudulent vendee, the title of his. vendor, subject to the right of the defrauded creditors at. their election to avoid it; that such creditor can only avoid the fraudulent transfer and obtain a specific lien upon the-property covered by it by a seizure thereof under a writ of' attachment or execution, or, after the exhaustion of all legal remedies to collect the debt without success, by an appeal to a court of equity to remove the impediment to the judgment attaching to the property; that in the absence of such seizure the judgment creditor has only the right to a lien upon the property fraudn’ently conveyed and to enforce such lien for the satisfaction of his debt, which right, being strictly legal, cannot be prole .-ted in equity till the creditor has first exhausted all his legal remedies to that end, as indicated ; that when the right to a lien upon the property fraudulently conveyed ripens into a lien in fact by an actual.
Having disposed, adversely to the respondent, of the contention that its judgment and the docketing thereof in the county where the land in controversy lay created a specific lien upon the property, assuming that the prior conveyance thereof was void as to the creditors of the grantor because tainted with fraud, under sec. 2320, Stats. 1898, it is not necessary to decide the question, argued in the briefs of counsel, of whether the facts alleged in the complaint are ■sufficient to show that the deed was so tainted.
The only question left for consideration is this: Is the deed of an insane person, who has not been adjudged insane and placed under guardianship, merely voidable ? If it is absolutely void, then, according to the complaint, the title to the property in question did not pass to Theriault by the conveyance under which he claims. In that event the'respondent’s judgment became a lien upon the property and the complaint shows a good cause of action in equity to remove the cloud upon such lien.
There is some conflict of authority in this country, and between the courts of this country and those of England, regarding the character of an insane person’s deed. In England it is held that such a deed is absolutely void. Ball v. Mannin, 1 Dow & C. 380. There are a few authorities to the same effect in this country, most or all of which, upon careful examination, will be found to be quite undecisive and unsatisfactory. The text writers are in substantial accord-thatan insane person’s deed conveys title to the grantee and is voidable only. Devlin, Deeds, § 73; 1 Washb. Real Prop. (5th ed.), 486; 2 Kent, Comm. 452; Kerr, Real Prop. § 2316; Pingree, Real Prop. § 1281; 1 Jones, Real Prop. § 52; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 222, 228; 11 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (1st ed.), 133. The only text writer that is out of line
It is deemed proper to call special attention here' to the careless manner in which the text above referred to was prepared, lest the profession be misled by it. It illustrates the danger of placing any great reliance on some of the modern text-books, and the importance of more care being exercised in their preparation.
In Devlin-on Deeds [§ 73] the law is stated thus: “The deed of a person non compos mentis who is not tinder guardianship transfers a seisin and is merely voidable.” That is supported by a large collection of cases from many states of the Union. In Washburn on Real Property [(5th ed.), vol. 1, p. 486] it is said that infants and insane persons not under .guardianship are in the same class, substantially, in respect to their acts being voidable and not void. Both of the text writers specially referred to cite Van Deusen v. Sweet, supra, and Farley v. Parker, 6 Oreg. 105, which is based on the New York case, as exceptions to the great array of authority to which they call attention.
In Van Deusen v. Sweet, the court did not go to the extent
There is strong reason for the idea that, if a person is SO' utterly devoid of mental power as to be totally incapable of comprehending the nature of his act in making a deed, or knowing that he is engaged in such a transaction, the instrument should be held to have no legal existence for any purpose. That is as far as the New York court has gone.
If we were to hold in accordance with Van Deusen v. Sweet, it would not save the complaint from condemnation as not stating a cause of action, for there is no allegation in it in regard to Lavoie’s condition at the time he made the deed, except that he was insane. The degree of his insanity is not alleged. In Aldrich v. Bailey, 132 N. Y. 85, a complaint, held by the lower court, on the strength of Van Deusen v. Sweet, to state a good cause of action to avoid certain deeds as absolutely void, was condemned, without affirming the rule laid down in the Van Deusen Case, for want of allegations showing that the grantor of the deed was wholly without mental capacity, Though some twenty years had elapsed since the decision in that case, the court declined to say it was correctly decided, but said that, assuming its correctness, a complaint to annul the deed of an insane person not under guardianship is insufficient unless it shows that such person was absolutely and completely unable to understand
Valpey v. Rea, 130 Mass. 384, is cited to our attention as holding that the deed of an insane person is absolutely void unless ratified by the grantor on recovering his reason. Brigham v. Fayerweather, 144 Mass. 48, should be added. However, they do not go to the length contended for. In the one case it is said that the deed of an insane person is ineffectual to convey the title to land “ against the grantor or against his heirs and devisees unless it is confirmed by the grantor himself when of sound mind, or by his legally constituted guardian, or by his heirs or devisees.” That language was repeated in the second case in connection with the following: “Such deed may be disaffirmed, without returning the consideration money or placing the other party in statu quo.” A careful analysis of the quoted language must lead to the conclusion that the Massachusetts court came far short of holding what respondent contends. A thing that “ may be made good by ratification,” or is not so binding but that it may be “disaffirmed,” it would seem, must be said to be voidable only. That such was the sense in which those terms were used appears conclusively by the fact that numerous early Massachusetts cases were referred to as having established the doctrine declared, in all of which it was distinctly held that the deed or contractual act of an insane person is merely voidable. For example, in Carrier v. Secvrs, 4 Allen, 336, it was said: “ The contract of an insane person, or one obtained by fraud or duress, is voidable and not void.” In Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray, 279, after some other not very well considered remarks, it was said, arguendo, speaking of the insane person as the de-mandant, “The estate is still in the demandant; for if it passed, it passed by the deed of an insane man never ratified or confirmed. That, in law, is impossible.” The court, how-
If any further support were needed for the view that the late Massachusetts cases do not change the rule early laid down and affirmed in that court, it is furnished by Hovey v. Hobson, 53 Me. 451, where language is used similar to that in Valpey v. Rea, 130 Mass. 384, as regards ratification or confirmation being necessary to render an insane man’s deed valid. What was meant by such language is clearly shown by the language of the decision, as follows: “The deed of an insane man not under guardianship is not void, but voidable,” etc. “ If under guardianship, the deed is absolutely void.” A multitude of cases to the same effect might be cited. We will refer to only a few of them. Castro v. Geil, 110 Cal. 292; Boyer v. Berryman, 123 Ind. 451; Nichol v. Thomas, 53 Ind. 42; Eaton v. Eaton, 37 N. J. Law, 108; Elston v. Jasper, 45 Tex. 409; Odom v. Riddick, 104 N. C. 515; Burnham v. Kidwell, 113 Ill. 425; Crawford v. Scovell, 94 Pa. St. 48; Gribben v. Maxwell, 34 Kan. 8; Allen v. Berryhill, 27 Iowa, 534; Burke v. Allen, 29 N. H. 106.
Our attention is called to Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. 9, as holding to the contrary of the cases above cited. If counsel were right as to that case, we should hesitate before running counter to it on a new question in this court, unless there is such an overwhelming weight of authority against it as to clearly show that it is wrong. What is in fact decided in Dexter v. Hall is that a power of attorney made by an insane person is absolutely void. Reference is made to the doctrine of the English courts, that the deed of an in
There are cases where courts have reached the same conclusion, as to the scope of Dexter v. Hall, as that urged by respondent’s counsel. For example, in German S. & L. Soc. v. De Lashmutt, 67 Fed. Rep. 399, decided in the circuit court for the district of Oregon, the following language is used: “ Whatever difference of opinion once existed as to whether the deed of an insane person was void or voidable, the question is authoritatively settled that such deed is absolutely void,” citing Dexter v. Hall, and Farley v. Parker, 6 Oreg. 105. The latter case, it will be remembered, merely followed Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378, to the effect that the deed of a person so insane as to be wholly bereft of reason is absolutely void, and Dexter v. Hall does not attempt to decide the question at all. In Parker v. Marco, 76 Fed. Rep. 510, decided in the United States circuit court for the district of South Carolina, Mr. J ustice Simonton, who delivered the opinion, said that in Dexter v. Hall “ the question before the court was whether the deed of an insane person was void or voidable. To that question the court directed its attention, and solved the doubts created by con
We have now carried the discussion of the subjects presented by this appeal to a considerable length, though no greater, probably, than their importance warrants. We received much assistance from the able briefs of counsel on both sides of the 'controversy, and have pursued our investigations to a satisfactory conclusion. On the first branch of the case we have shown, as it seems, that there is a substantial harmony in the decisions of this court, from the beginning, on the lines laid down in Gilbert v. Stockman, 81 Wis. 602, which are tied to the idea expressed in that case that the word “void” in sec. 2320, Stats. 1898, means void-able, and that the title to lands conveyed in fraud of creditors actually passes to the vendee, subject, however, to be divested at the election of any such creditor. On the second branch of the case we have shown that there is substantial harmony in the decisions of this country contrary to the law as held by, the English courts, that the deed of an insane person is .voidable, not void; that the exceptions to that doctrine are few in number and are either based on a misconception of the authorities on which they are grounded, or follow the lead of Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378, which goes no further, as we have shown, than to hold that
By the Court.— The order appealed from is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.