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Freeman v. Piedmont Hospital
444 S.E.2d 796
Ga.
1994
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*1 trial. bench joins in Fletcher this dis- state that Justice am authorized sent. July 11, 1994. Cody, Quigg

Kilpatrick Patton, III, Matthew H. H. Fletcher appellant. Edwards, Lisa S. Daryl Reisman, DeRieux, G. Branch, Ganz, Burt Keith J. &Pike Ashley, Bobby Tanya Cook, Palmour, Lee Clarida, Cook & M. appellee. HOSPITAL et al. FREEMAN et al. v. PIEDMONT

S93G1812. Presiding Justice. professional corporation anesthesiologist, Freeman, and his Hospital, administrator, Butler, filed Piedmont hospital’s anesthesiology department and a mem- the chairman of the committee, and intentional its credentials defamation ber of the con- relations. The basis of the suit was interference with business tent of a letter sent pursuant hospital to OCGA administrator (“the Composite Examiners State Board of Medical 31-7-8 to the Board”) voluntarily resigned from Piedmont after Freeman part, resignation, Freeman’s medical staff. The letter attributed reports concerning disparaging made Butler and physician hospital’s letter credentials committee. The another indicated that the primarily

reporting physicians’ actions were based per- hospital regarding expressed by nurses Freeman’s on concerns join a Savannah the staff at formance. When Freeman’s hospital controversy present “in was denied view of the investigation Hospital impending [Board],” and the plaintiffs’ motion to The trial court denied sent action ensued. summary judgment. discovery, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment reversing grant Butler, the Court After rely- compel discovery, Appeals upheld the denial of the motion of ing privilege against con- on the Freeman v. Piedmont tained OCGA 31-7-133 in the of the record from the current state While it is uncertain present commenced, or when case whether cor- whether the Court of we rectly certiorari to consider discovery by con- the motion to affirmed the denial of struing afforded OCGA 31-7-133 (a), provides: issue, The statute at Except proceedings alleging article, violation of this the held records of shall be subject confidence and not be shall *2 any arising in introduction into evidence otherwise civil action out of or related which matters are the sub- ject organization; of evaluation and review such and no person meeting organiza- in who was attendance at a of such permitted required testify any be in tion shall action as to or such civil any produced evidence or other matters or presented during organization of such or as any findings, opinions, recommendations, evaluations, or organization any other actions of such members thereof. However, information, documents, or records otherwise available from sources are not to be construed as discovery any merely mune from because ganization, organization in or use such civil action they presented during proceedings of such or- any person

nor should who testifies before such organization pre- or who is a member of such testifying knowledge; vented from as matters within his testimony but such witness cannot be asked about his before such sult or about formed him as a re- organization hearings. of (a) privilege discovery Enactment of 31-7-133 conferred a from upon organization’s proceedings in order to foster the peer review, candor which is an .essential ele providing quality

ment health care services. See Eubanks v. Fer 230) (1980) (construing rier, 245 Ga. 763 similar lan guage committees). OCGA 31-7-143 as to medical review This scope discovery Emory court examined the of the from Houston, Clinic v. 434-435 when scope statutory prohibitions it certiorari “to determine the produced by peer on the use of information review and medical re groups litigation.” (Emphasis supplied.) answering view that lute findings in civil question, “placed this court concluded that the statutes an abso upon embargo discovery and use of all groups

and recommendations of and medical re litigation,” thereby reinforcing view committees in civil the need to preserve the candor essential to effective review. provision However, the statute’s for the of the and records of a review committee is limited terms, own contained its second sentence. While the statute party discovering from and records of a eludes a specifically party to seek from organization, it authorizes which the ex- original sources documents amined, was a mem- anyone appeared and to examine who before or the witness is asked long of the so not ber Jove, proceedings. See Hollowell about the (b) (279 5; (1981); Eubanks v. Div. supra, Auth. v. County (1993). den. 208 cert. statutory interpretation suggested by concur- (a) 31-7-133,

rence, intertwining open with widely by the entire stripping the door of too process confidentiality. of its 31-7-132 deals OCGA § immunity liability, plaintiff from and the fact that a seeks to avoid an immunity by alleging applicability exception defense of the malice “alleging does not convert the action into one violation of [OCGA provide so as to for an to the confidenti- §§ 31-7-130-133]” ality applica- mandate. Allowing allegation trigger bility confidentiality requirement would result opportunity every full material allegation such case. The use of a bare of malice is not sufficient to *3 plaintiff’s previously- elevate a access court’s to evidence over this preference preserving stated the candor peer Eubanks v. supra. review. See petitioners sought

To the extent the find- ings, peer and recommendations of the review the trial However, in denying compel. court was correct the motion not all to discovery sought by petitioners prod- the can be classified as the work peer pro- uct of the review or be considered as records or Therefore, ceedings organization. Appeals’ the Court of affirm- reversed, ance of the trial court’s denial of the motion to is and the case remanded with direction that it be further remanded to the trial court for in light reconsideration of the motion to guidelines expounded upon the set forth 31-7-133 and herein.1 § concur, Hunstein, J., Judgment reversed. All the except Justices specially. who concurs Justice, specially. concurring

Hunstein, I agree majority Appeals While with the the Court of erred by affirming compel, I the trial court’s denial of the motion to cannot by concur with the majority rationale set forth the to the extent majority’s opinion can be read to hold that an tions, As the is not privilege prohibiting applicable where review has not occurred. is particular to review organiza triggered review is not that an individual this article” “violation of group activity. motivated member was give meaning as to these statutes so must construe This Court “exception” language including every phrase, in OCGA 31-7-133 (a). (1968). Boyles generally Steine, 392, agree on certain individuals the statute bestows perform- liability arising munity out of their and civil from criminal activities, an the statute also contains ance created adversely persons legislature af- those to accommodate activity by peer § 31- motivated malice. See OCGA fected “proceedings alleging article,” [a] violation of this 7-132 i.e., such process, shielded the otherwise malicious abuse of discoverable. OCGA 31-7-133 information is rendered purpose is to “ensure effectiveness of OCGA 31-7-133 by providing atmosphere competence organizations of health organization,” purpose within the candor and constructive criticism “by peers’ accomplished protecting professional which can competence performance findings of mem- as to County (430 employees.” Auth. v. Mar- bers and tin, It does not serve goal encouraging candor,” id., the dis- “the covery medical staff asserting those claims malicious bar OCGA 31-7-133 to very organization’s peer review activities as to the use of a health members and competence employees such whose organizations designed are oversee. Accordingly, majority’s implicit holding agree I can with the that pro- evidence ceeding related to the matters raised (as evidence) opposed source is not discoverable holding applies individuals, insofar as that practice plaintiffs, such as medical mal- upon damages

whose claims are not based by maliciously occasioned motivated review activities. Because jury infer that Court of found sufficient evidence for a maliciously “positional privilege” person charged Butler with peer used his as a reporting nurses’ concerns about doctors to Piedmont intentionally appellants’ to interfere App. relations, business Freeman *4 (434 SE2d OCGA 31-7- appellants 133 find that were enti- instant case and would discovery sought. tled to the July 11, 1994.

Jerry appellants. Hatcher, B. for

347 Long, Weinberg, Ansley Wheeler, Wheeler, & Sidney F. M. B. III, appellees. Satcher for

S93G1551. GEORGIA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE

COMPANY v. MARTIN et al. (444 739) SE2d Presiding Justice. bicycle riding his June Bernard Martin was struck by Larry Day, Delk, a truck owned driven David and insured by petitioner Georgia Farm Company Bureau Mutual Insurance (“GFB”). mother, individually Martin’s acting and as her son’s next friend, filed against Day. Delk and A judgment default was en- against 1990,1 tered Delk in Day voluntarily December and was dis- Respondents missed. filed the against instant action GFB October 1992, alleging that legally obligated it was under its contract of insur- pay respondents ance to the amount of the default judgment en- tered against Delk. The trial summary court denied GFB’s motion for judgment which the insurer obligation asserted that its financial was ($15,000), limited to the amount of minimum coverage policy ($25,000). or to the limits Appeals granted The Court of GFB’s application and, interlocutory relying on Leader Nat. Ins. Kemp Son, (380 458) Co. v. (1989), SE2d Starnes and (2) (390 Co., 419) Cotton States Mut. Ins. App. 320 (1990), decision, affirmed the trial court’s concluding that the extent of damages incurred respondent payable by GFB was for de- by jury. termination Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. (433 App.

Ga. We GFB’s for a writ of certiorari liability determine whether the insurer’s was statutorily contractually limited.

1. While the Court of recognized respondents not automatically entitled to recover from GFB the full amount of the judgment App. entered Delk it also stated the insurer respondents was not insulated from payment any judgment oper- obtained them based on Delk’s ation of the App. insured vehicle. Id. See also 209 Ga. Div. 4. Relying on language Co., from Mahone v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 809) (1988), Berryhill State Co., Farm Fire (1985), &c. respon- judgment The default $789.52 authorized Martin to recover from Delk as dam $22,000 ages, general damages, $100,000 punitive damages, as addition to interest and costs.

Case Details

Case Name: Freeman v. Piedmont Hospital
Court Name: Supreme Court of Georgia
Date Published: Jul 11, 1994
Citation: 444 S.E.2d 796
Docket Number: S93G1812
Court Abbreviation: Ga.
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