4 Denio 9 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1847
The prisoner was tried at a court of oyer and terminer, held for the county of Cayuga, and found guilty of the crime of murder; upon which verdict sentence of death was pronounced. In the course of the trials, preliminary and final, a multitude of exceptions were taken by the prisoner’s counsel, which, with the record of the conviction and sentence, have been brought into this court by writ of error. These exceptions, or such of them as the counsel for the prisoner supposed to be available, were argued at the last term of this court, and having since been examined and considered with care and deliberation, we are now prepared to dispose of them by rendering judgment on the case before us.
When the prisoner was brought before the court of oyer and terminer, to be arraigned on the indictment, a plea, that he was then insane, was interposed by counsel on his behalf, which, being denied by the public prosecutor, a jury was impannelled to try the issue so joined. On the trial of this issue, various objections were made and exceptions taken by the prisoner’s counsel, and the first question to be decided is, whether these exceptions can be re-examined on a writ of error.
The statute declares that “ no insane person can be tried, sentenced to any punishment, or punished for any crime or offence, while he continues in that state.” (2 R. S. 697, § 2.) This, although new as a legislative enactment in this state, (3 id. 832,) was not introductory of a new rule, for it is in strict conformity with the common law on the subject. “ If a man,” says Sir William Blackstone, “ in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before arraignment for it he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall
The statute is explicit that “ no insane person can be tried,” but it does not state in what manner the fact of insanity shall be ascertained. That is left as at common law: and although, in the discretion of the court, other modes than that of a trial
At common law the only regular mode of redress for errors occurring on criminal trials, was by motion for a new trial, in the court where the trial was had, unless the error was in some matter which formed a part of the record, when it might be reviewed, after judgment, by writ of error. Bills of exception, by which questions of law, made and decided on such trials, may be brought up and reviewed in a higher court, were unknown to the common law, although now allowed by a statute of this state. But the statute is limited to'exceptions taken on the trial of the main issue, and does not reach such as are made on the trial of a preliminary or collateral question. The words are, “on the trial of any indictment, exceptions to any decision of the court may be made by the defendant, in the same cases and manner provided by law in civil cases.” (2 R. S. 736, § 21. See also 3 id. 849.) A trial of the question of present insanity is not a trial of the indictment, but is preliminary to such trial. The object, in such a case, is simply to determine whether the person charged with an offence and alleged to be insane, shall be required to plead and proceed to the trial of the main issue of guilty or not guilty. The statute does not authorize exceptions to be taken on such preliminary trial; and if errors occur they must be corrected, if at all, as at common law, by the court which committed them. For this reason, none of the exceptions taken by the prisoner’s counsel on the trial of the preliminary issue in this case can be regarded as regularly before us; nor could they, if held to be well taken, constitute a ground for reversing the judgment of the court below.
This part of the case might here be dismissed; but I choose not to do so, lest an implication should be supposed to arise that, in the opinion of this court, the preliminary trial was conducted throughout with regularity and according to law.
On the preliminary trial the counsel for the prisoner claimed
Challenges for cause are allowable on the trial of preliminary as well as final issues. This was conceded, and several of this description were interposed on behalf of the prisoner. I pass by these without particular examination, as this class of challenges will again be presented for consideration before the case is closed, when such suggestions will be made as are deemed pertinent to this, as well as other parts of the case.
An objection was made to the oath as administered to some of the triers of challenges to jurors drawn for this preliminary trial. The'oath was thus: “You do solemnly swear that you will well and truly try and well and truly find, whether the juror is indifferent between the people of the state of New-York and the prisoner at the bar, upon the issue joined.” This form of oath was not administered in every instance, the qualification at its close, made by the words “ upon the issue joined,” being sometimes omitted, as it should have been throughout. The oath, as given in books of approved credit and authority, contains no such limitation, but requires the triers to find whether the juror is or is not indifferent between the parties to the controversy. (Tr. per Pais, 205; 1 Ch. C. L. 549; Bac. Ab. Juries, E. 12, note; 1 Cowen, 441, note; 1 Salk. 152.) And
In charging the jury on the preliminary issue, which, we have seen was on the fact of present insanity, the court said, “ the main question with the jury was to decide whether the prisoner knew right from wrong; if he did, then he was to be considered sane.”
The statute, before cited, is emphatic that “no insane person can be tried.” . In its terms the prohibition is broad enough to reach every possible state of insanity, so that, if the words are to be taken literally, no person while laboring under insanity in any form, however partial and limited it may be, can be put upon his trial. But this the legislature could not have intended; for, although a person totally bereft of reason cannot be a fit subject for trial or punishment, it by no means follows that one whose insanity is limited to some particular object or conceit, his mind in other respects being free from disease, can justly claim the like exemption. This clause of the statute should receive a reasonable interpretation, avoiding on the one hand what would tend to give impunity to crime, and on the other seeking to attain the humane object of the legislature in its enactment. The common law, equally with this statute, forbids the trial of any person in a state of insanity. This is clearly shown by authorities which have been referred to, and which also show the reason for the rule, to wit, the incapacity of one who is insane to make a rational defence. The statute is in affirmance of this common law principle, and the reason on which the rule rests furnishes a key to what must have been the intention of the legislature. If, therefore, a person arraigned for a crime, is capable of understanding the
By the 39 and 40 Geo. 3, ch. 94, § 2, it is enacted that “ if any person indicted for any offence shall be insane, and shall upon arraignment be found so to be by a jury lawfully impannelled for that purpose, so that such person cannot be tried upon such indictment,” “ it shall be lawful for the court .before whom any such person shall be brought to be arraigned,” “ to direct such finding to be recorded, and thereupon to order such person to be kept in strict custody till his majesty’s pleasure shall be known.” (1 Russ. on C. 15.) The question upon this statute is the same as upon ours, that is, is the alleged offender insane. Russell says (p. 15,) “ If a prisoner have not at the time of the trial, from the defect of his faculties, sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the proceedings, against him, the jury ought to find that he is not sane, and upon such finding he may be ordered to be kept in custody under this act.” For this he refers to the case of Rex. v. Dyson, (7 C. & P. 305, same case 1 Lewin’s C. C. 64,) before Mr. Justice J. Parke, in 1831. In that case the prisoner was indicted for murder, and on being. arraigned stood mute. A jury was then impannelled to try whether she. did so by malice or by the visitation of God, and they found she did so by the visitation of God. The judge thereupon examined on oath, a witness who was acquainted with the prisoner, and who swore that she could be made to understand some things by signs, and could give her answers by signs. The witness was then sworn to interpret and make known to the prisoner the indictment and charge against her, and to the court her plea and answer thereto. The witness explained to her by signs what she was charged with, and she made signs which imported a denial of the charge; whereupon
In the case of The Queen v. Goode, (7 A. & E. 536,) which occurred in 1837, the prisoner was brought into the court of queen’s bench and arraigned on an indictment for a misdemeanor. As he showed clear symptoms of insanity, a jury was immediately impannelled to try whether he was then insane or not; and upon evidence given, as well as upon his appearance in court, the jury found that he was insane. The prisoner was thereupon detained in custody under the statute.
In Ley’s case, (1 Lewin’s C. C. 239,) on the trial of a similar question, Hullock, B. said to the jury. “If there be a doubt as to the prisoner’s sanity, and the surgeon says that it is doubtful, you cannot say that he is in a fit state to be put upon his trial.”
With these lights before us, the construction of the statute, which forbids the trial of any insane person, cannot be attended with much difficulty. A state of general insanity, the mental powers being wholly perverted or obliterated, would, necessarily, preclude a trial; for a being in that deplorable condition can make no defence whatever. Not so, however, where the disease is partial, and confined to some subject, other than the imputed crime and the contemplated trial. A person in this condition may be fully competent to understand his situation in respect to the alleged offence, and to conduct his defence with discretion and reason. Of this the jury must judge ; and they should be instructed that if such is found to be his condition, it will be their duty to pronounce him sane. In the case at bar the court professed to furnish a single criterion of sanity, that is, a capacity to distinguish between right and wrong. This, as a test
Where insanity is interposed as a defence to an indictment for an alleged crime, the inquiry is always brought down to the single question of a capacity to distinguish between right and wrong at the time when the act was done. In such cases the jury should be instructed that “it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter part of the
Such is the undoubted rule of the common law on this subject. Partial insanity is not, by that law, necessarily an excuse for crime, and can only be so where it deprives the party of his reason in regard to the act charged to be criminal. Nor, in my judgment, was the statute on this subject intended to abrogate or qualify the common law rule. The words of the statute are, "No act done by a person in a state of insanity can be punished as an offence.” (2 R. S. 697, § 2.) The clause is very comprehensive in its terms, and, at first blush, might seem to exempt from punishment every act done by a person who is insane upon any subject whatever. This would, indeed, be a mighty change in the law, as it would afford absolute impunity
But to return to the trial of the preliminary question in the present case. The jury found, not as the issue required them to do, that the prisoner was or was not insane, but that he was “ sufficiently sane in mind and memory to distinguish between right and wrong.” This verdict was defective: it did not directly find any thing, and certainly not the point in issue, but evaded it'by an argumentative finding. At the utmost the jury only made an approach towards the point to be decided, but failed to reach it. They should have been required to pass directly on the question of insanity, and should not have been allowed to evade it by an argumentative verdict of any sort. Such a finding as this would be objectionable in a civil proceeding, and in a criminal case should not be allowed. (In the matter of Morgan, a lunatic, 7 Paige, 236.)
The preliminary trial being closed, a plea of not guilty was entered for the prisoner, and the court proceeded to the trial of the main issue. Numerous objections were taken in the course of the trial by the counsel for the prisoner, most of which were obviously not well founded, and were properly overruled by the court. I shall notice but few of the points excepted to, as it is
Several persons drawn as jurors were, in the first place, challenged for principal cause by the counsel for the prisoner; but the court held that these challenges were not sustained by the evidence adduced in their support. Challenges for favor were then interposed; but the jurors were found by the triers to be indifferent. Various exceptions were taken by the prisoner’s counsel to points made and decided in disposing of these challenges; and, although the several jurors thus challenged were ultimately excluded by the peremptory challenges of the prisoner, it is now urged that these exceptions are still open to examination and review in this court. I think otherwise. The prisoner had the power and the right to use his peremptory challenges as he pleased, and the court cannot judicially know for what cause or with what design he resorted to them. (The People v. Bodine, 1 Denio, 310.) He was free to use or not use them, as he thought proper; but having resorted to them they must be followed out to all their legitimate consequences. Had he omitted to make peremptory challenges, his exceptions growing out of the various challenges for cause, would have been regularly here for revision. But he chose by his own voluntary act to exclude these jurors, and thus virtually, and as I think, effectually blotted out all such errors, if any, as had previously occurred in regard to them. But the case of the juror Beach, stands on other grounds. He was first challenged, as is said, for principal cause, which, after evidence had been given, was overruled by the court. He was then challenged for favor, but the triers found him to be indifferent. No peremptory challenge was made, and he served as one of the jury. As to this juror, every exception taken by the prisoner’s counsel is now here for examination and review.
When a juror is challenged for principal cause, or for favor, the ground of the challenge should be distinctly stated; for without this the challenge is incomplete and may be wholly disregarded by the court. It is not enough to say I challenge for principal cause or for favor, and stop there; the cause
These views are sound and appropriate, and their observance would greatly promote order and convenience in the determination of challenges. I am aware that challenges are not unfrequently made in general terms, which merely indicate the supposed character of the challenge, as for principal cause or for favor, but without designating the particular grounds by which, if at all, they must be sustained. In this posture of the question, as far as a question can be said to have been made, the parties proceed to the examination of witnesses before the court or triers, as the case may be. No issue has been joined, and no matter of fact alleged by either party. What is to be tried? It can hardly be determined in such a state of things whether the question is one of fact or of law, and the proceeding is obviously inconvenient and irregular. Challenges for principal cause may become part and parcel of the record, and should therefore be made in due form. They may be demurred to, and unless some cause, sufficient of itself to raise fire legal presumption of unindifference is alleged, the challenge must of course be overruled. But the opposite party is not bound to demur; he may take issue on the facts stated as ground for the challenge, or may counterplead new matter in avoidance. Thus an issue of fact may be joined, which must
The case of Mann v. Glover, has not been referred to as containing any new doctrine, but because it presents a terse summary of the law on this subject. All challenges, except such as may be made peremptorily, are for cause ; and unless some cause is stated by the challenger, the objection cannot justly be called a challenge, nor should it be regarded as such.
The bill of exceptions does not show, in terms, what cause of challenge was alleged against the juror Beach ; it is only said he was challenged “ for principal cause.” But from the scope and character of the evidence given to maintain the challenge, the inference is plain that it was alleged the juror had formed and expressed an opinion that the prisoner was guilty of the crime for which he stood indicted. This was good cause of principal challenge, as has repeatedly been held by this court. (Ex parte Vermilyea, 6 Cowen, 555; 7 id. 108; The People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229. See also Mann v. Glover, supra; The State v. Benton, 2 Dev. & B. 196; Irvine v. Kean, 14 S. & R. 292; The Commonwealth v. Lesher, 17 id. 155.) We must then understand this cause of challenge to have been alleged, and as evidence was gone into, the fact must have been expressly or virtually denied by the public prosecutor. An issue was thus joined to be tried by the court, and if the fact alleged was found to be true, the juror was necessarily excluded. Every challenge for principal cause, must be for some matter which imports absolute bias or favor, and leaves nothing for' the discretion of the court. The truth of the fact alleged, and that alone, is in question. Its sufficiency, as ground of challenge, is conceded by omitting to demur and taking issue on the fact. It is otherwise, on a challenge for favor. That must be determined by triers, who are to pass upon the question of ac
The challenge of the juror Beach, for principal cause, wat not, in my opinion, sustained by the evidence, and was correctly overruled. He had only an impression that the prisoner was guilty, but nothing which deserved to be called an absolute opinion. He had doubts of the prisoner’s guilt, and as far as any opinion had been formed, it was contingent and hypothetical. Such impressions or opinion fall short of what is required to maintain a challenge for principal cause. (The People v. Bodine, 1 Denio, 281, 306; The People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 243, and cases there cited; Mann v. Glover, supra; Irvine v. Lumbermen's Bank, 2 W. & S. 190, 202.)
The challenge for principal cause having been overruled, or in other words, found not to be sustained by the evidence given in its support, this juror was challenged for favor, and the question of his indifference was submitted to triers on the same evidence which had been given to the court on the trial of the challenge for principal cause. As the bill of exceptions states, the court charged the triers the same as in the case of the juror Taylor, to which charge and every part and portion thereof the counsel for the prisoner excepted.
In the case of the juror Taylor, evidence was given, tending to show that he had decided impressions against the prisoner, and a pretty strong belief of his guilt; and in the case of Beach, the evidence, although less decisive, was of the same character. The court charged the triers, in the case of the juror Taylor, amongst other things, that the resort to the triers by the prisoner’s counsel, was in the nature of an appeal from the opinion of the court on the facts, and that a hypothetical opinion formed by the juror did not disqualify him, These points were distinctly stated in the charge, and, as it seems to me, are plainly reached .by the exceptions as taken. The charge embraced several distinct propositions, amongst which were those
Then, as to the legal positions laid down by the court, and which have already been stated, it seems to me they cannot be maintained. I would not be understood to bold that a hypothetical opinion, necessarily disqualifies a juror. It clearly does' not. If such was its effect it would uphold a challenge for principal cause, which it will not. Still, it is some evidence of bias, and upon which triers, in their discretion, may set a juror aside. (The People v. Bodine, supra.) The court should not instruct them, as matter of law, as was done in this case, that such an opinion does not disqualify a juror; for this, in effect, is charging them that he cannot be set aside on that ground. If the triers find that bias actually exists in the mind of the juror, although it is proved only by the formation of a hypothetical opinion, they may, and ought to, reject him. Some minds are so constituted that such an opinion would éxert a controlling influence in the jury box, while with others its influence would be neither seen or felt. All this is to be considered and passed upon by the triers. No rule can be laid down which will enable them, in every case, to determine, with unerring certainty, that the juror is or is not indifferent between the parties. It is not a question to be solved by a rule of law, but by the common sense of the triers; and if this has fair play the difficulty will rarely be found very great. The triers must find that the juror stands impartial and indifferent, or they should reject him. It is the province of the court to say what evidence is admissible on the question of indifference; but its strength and influence
I know of no sense in which a resort to triers by a challenge for favor, can be rightly regarded as an appeal from the de cisión of the court .on a challenge for principal cause. The latte * species of challenge is allowed on some ground from which the law infers partiality or bias; and where the fact is put in issue the court has only to find whether it is true or not. If true, the law adjudges unindifference, and the juror is necessarily excluded. The court is not to pass upon the question of actual bias, but simply to ascertain the truth of the alleged cause of challenge ; for if that is true, it follows that the juror is unindifferent.
But on a challenge for favor no such isolated question is presented to the triers. They are first to inquire whether the alleged cause or ground of challenge is true in fact. But this is not all, for supposing its truth to be established, they must then pass upon the effect it has produced on the mind of the juror, and find whether the consequence has been actual bias or favor. The triers must come to this conclusion before they can exclude a juror on a challenge for favor. But as no such question is to be decided by the court on a challenge for principal cause, the charge, in this case, that the resort to the triers was an appeal from the decision of the court, was erroneous. Besides, the tendency of such a charge must be to prejudice the prisoner on the question to be decided by the triers, for it virtually places them in the position of persons sitting in judgment on what had immediately before been determined by the court. It should never be lost sight of that triers are to ascertain the real state of the mind of the juror, to determine whether he is truly impartial and indifferent between the par
I proceed to another class of questions made by the prisoner’s counsel.
The verdict on the preliminary issue was rendered on the 6th of July. In the course of the trial, and shortly after the 15th of that month, several medical witnesses were sworn and examined on the part of the prisoner, with a view to establish his insanity the preceding March, when the alleged murder was perpetrated. One of these witnesses, Doctor Van Epps, had known the prisoner from his childhood, and had visited and examined him with a view to ascertain his mental condition, both before and after the 6th of July. The others had never seen the prisoner until the 15th of July; but they also had examined him, on and after that day, in order to be prepared to express an opinion on the question of his sanity or insanity.
That part of the bill of exceptions which states the questions nade and exceptions taken, in regard to these witnesses, is, perhaps, liable to some misapprehension, and it may be that I have not rightly understood what was intended to be decided by the court. I have read this part of the bill of exceptions repeatedly, with an anxious desire to collect its true meaning; and although I would not affirm positively, that its meaning may not have been misapprehended, I still think no error has been fallen into in regard to the view's of the court. As I understand the bill of exceptions, the court held that it was competent for these, or other medical witnesses, to express an opinion upon the question of the insanity of the prisoner at the time of the alleged murder, but that such opinion must be formed upon facts and circumstances which occurred, or observations made, before the 6th of July, when the verdict on the preliminary issue was rendered, and could, in no degree, rest upon any thing observed in the appearance, manner or condition of the prisoner since that time; and that the witnesses
I cannot adopt the suggestion, made on the argument, that the 6th of July may have been taken as a reasonable time by which to bound the inquiries made of these witnesses: on the contrary, I think it quite clear that the court regarded the pre liminary verdict as decisive of the question of present insanity, and therefore limited the witnesses to the time when that verdict was rendered. In giving reasons for his opinion that the prisoner was insane, Doctor Van Epps spoke of an interview with him since the 6th of July, when he “was stopped'by the court, who then remarked, (an objection having been made by the counsel for the people,) that the question of present sanity had been tried and a verdict rendered on the 6th of July instant, and that the question of the present sanity could not then be again retriedthat the question now was as to the sanity of the prisoner when the deed was done, the preceding March, “ and that the evidence of insanity must be confined to facts before and at the time of committing the act, and up to the 6th of July instant, when the verdict of sanity was rendered.” Doctor Hun, another of these witnesses, had first seen the prisoner on the fifteenth of July. The prisoner’s counsel “proposed to prove by this witness that, in his opinion, the prisoner is and was insane at the time of the commission of the crime. This was objected to by the counsel for the people, on the ground that the verdict on the preliminary issue, rendered on the sixth day of July instant, was and is conclusive that the prisoner was sane on that dayand that the same cannot be contradicted by evidence.” The court did not pass directly upon this
The views of the court upon this part of the case were, in my opinion, clearly erroneous. In strictness the verdict on the preliminary issue was not before the court and jury on the trial of the issue of guilty or not guilty, nor was it, in any respect, material to such trial. But if it should be regarded as a fact in the case, of which the court and jury, while engaged in the trial of the main issue, might take notice, no such consequence as that deduced by the court would follow from it. The only object of the preliminary trial was to ascertain the mental con
I am not about to inquire how far, or under what circumstances, the opinion of medical witnesses may be admissible on the question of insanity, although, in general, nothing is better-settled than that such evidence is competent. (1 Phil. Ev. 290; Shelford on Lun. 62, 67—73; 1 Greenf. Ev. § 440.) And I entertain no doubt that such a witness should be allowed to express an opinion in regard to the mental condition of a person alleged to be insane in the month of March, although the opinion may have been founded solely on an examination made in the succeeding July. In most cases, undoubtedly, the opinion would be more satisfactory and convincing, when based on observations made at or about the time to which the inquiry relates. But this is not decisive against the reception of such evidence, though founded on examinations made at a later period. The competency of the testimony is one question, and its effect another. The first is for the court and the latter for the jury. It will sometimes, undoubtedly, be found, and perhaps not unfrequently, that the mental malady is such that an examination would disclose beyond all peradventure to a skilful physician, what must have been the condition of the patient for months or years before. The lateness of the time when the examination was made, as well as the character of the malady, are certainly to be considered in determining the degree of consequence which should be given to the opinion of the witness, but unless the intervening time is much greater than from March to July, that can furnish no solid objection to the admissibility of the evidence. If I could, therefore, adopt
Whether the prisoner was or was not insane at the time of the homicide or the trial, is not a question before us on this bill of exceptions, and no opinion on that subject is intended to be expressed or intimated.
Judgment reversed.
See also The People v. Honeyman, (3 Denio, 121.)