Monte K. FREEMAN, o/b/o himself and all others similarly situated, Appellant v. MML BAY STATE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.
No. 11-1144
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
Argued Sept. 13, 2011. Filed: Sept. 21, 2011.
577
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Monte K. FREEMAN, o/b/o himself and all others similarly situated, Appellant v. MML BAY STATE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY. No. 11-1144. United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. Argued Sept. 13, 2011. Filed: Sept. 21, 2011.
Min‘s injuries, it is far from clear that such policies exist. Although our case law requires a showing of practices “so permanent and well settled as to virtually constitute law” in order for a custom to rise tо the level of a policy, Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), Min failed to point to any other health inspector besides Morris who was hired with a criminal record.
Joel S. Feldman, Esq., Robert B. Hochman, Esq., (Argued), David B. Johnson, Esq., Jason M. Adler, Esq., Sidley Austin, Chicago, IL, Steven P. Del Mauro, Esq., Robert L. Ghelli, Esq., McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, Newark, NJ, Attorneys for Appellee.
Before: SLOVITER, SCIRICA, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Monte Freeman appeals from the District Court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of MML Bay State Life Insurance Company (“MML“). We will affirm.1
In 2005, the United States District Court fоr the District of New Jersey approved a settlement agreement between MML and a nationwide class of its policy owners that included Freeman.2 See Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207 (D.N.J.2005). In exchange for significant compensation (valued by the District Court at about $700 million), class members consented to a broad Release. The Release bars Varacallo class members from bringing any claim “on the basis оf, connected with, arising out of, or in any way related to, in whole or in part,” inter alia, the following transactions: “the expenses and/or costs (including all expenses, charges, and other deductions) charged or to be charged against the Policy or Policies,” the “terms, and operation of any Policy, including ... the amount or method of calculation of fees, chаrges, commissions, distribution costs, administrative expenses, and/or taxes in connection with the sale of, as part of the premiums for ... a Policy,” the “cost of insurance, and administrative chаrge practices whether past present or future,” and “the Company‘s Policy or premium charges and monthly deductions.” App. at 136-39.
The Release also states that class members “acknowledge that they are aware that they may hereafter discover claims presently unknown or unsuspected, or facts in addition to or different from those which they now know or believe to be true with respect to the Released Transactions or with respect to their Policies.” App. at 143. Nevertheless, the Release continues, “it is the intention of ... the Class Members in executing this Release fully, finally, and forever [to] settle, release, discharge, and hold harmless all such matters, and all claims relating thereto, which exist, hereafter may exist, or might have еxisted ... with respect to their Policies....” Id. It is difficult to imagine a more comprehensive release. However, the Release cautions that “nothing in [the] Release shall
On January 15, 2010, Freeman filed the instant complaint in the District of Connecticut, alleging that MML “[b]eginning at or after the commenсement of the Policy term [in Freeman‘s case, 1999] ... began breaching the terms of the Policy on a monthly basis by deducting as mortality charges, amounts unrelated to mortality,” which is “inconsistent with its internal mortality tables.” App. at 6. On MML‘s motion, the Connecticut court transferred the action to the District of New Jersey to determine whether the claims are barred by the Varacallo release because that court, having overseen the Varacallo settlement, “is best equipped to undertake that assessment.” Freeman v. MML Bay State Life Ins. Co., No. 3:10-cv-66 (D.Conn. July 15, 2010). MML filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Freeman‘s clаims are barred by the Varacallo Release, and the District Court granted the same.
Freeman argues that the present claim is not barred by the Varacallo Release becаuse the present claim is not based on the same factual predicate as the claims in the Varacallo litigation. The present claim, Freeman contends, involves MML‘s breaсh of the express terms of the Policy whereas the Varacallo litigation involved deceptive sales practices. Moreover, the present claim includes only actions that fall after the Varacallo class period (defined as January 1, 1983 to December 31, 2003). Freeman‘s arguments are unavailing.
It is settled in this circuit that a class representative can enter into a settlement that bars future claims by class members “even though the precluded claim was not presented, and could not have been presented, in the class action itself.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 366 (3d Cir.2001) (сitations omitted). This rule promotes judicial economy by preventing the relitigation of settled questions resolved in comprehensive settlement agreements. Id. The key inquiry is whether the factual predicate for future claims is identical to the factual predicate underlying the settlement agreement. See TBK Partners Ltd. v. Western Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir.1982), cited with approval in In re Prudential, 261 F.3d at 366.
In its analysis of that issue, the District Court noted that Freeman‘s claim “arisеs out of the same policy that made him a member of the Varacallo class.” Freeman v. MML Bay State Life Ins. Co., No. 10-4019 (D.N.J. Jan 4, 2011). The plaintiffs’ claims in Varacallo included challenges to the administration of policies and the calculation of policy charges. The fact that the plaintiffs in Varacallo were challenging different MML practices with respect to the policies does not meаn that the factual predicates are different.4 The settlement does not define the scope of the Release by reference to the claims alleged in the Va-
It is of no moment that Freeman seeks relief only for charges applied after the Varacallo class period. The Releаse covers claims that could have been alleged at the time provided they arise out of, or are in any way related to, the covered transactions. Freeman‘s comрlaint alleges that the actions presently complained of (i.e. monthly breaches of contract with respect to mortality charges) were occurring as early as 1999, which was during thе Varacallo class period. Therefore, the instant claim does not fall within the Release‘s exception that allows class members to assert future claims for acts “arising exclusively after the end of the Class Period.” App. at 142. It follows that Freeman cannot plead around the broad Release negotiated in the comprehensive settlement merely by asserting that some facts associated with his claim occurred outside of the class period.5 Freeman has provided no compelling reason to reverse the District Court, the samе court that oversaw the comprehensive settlement and that is therefore in the best position to interpret the scope of the Release.
For the foregoing reasons, wе will affirm the order of the District Court.