| Mass. | Jan 6, 1894
These cases come before us on motions of the defendant bank, made under St. 1883, c. 223, § 6, to annul orders of a single justice of this court suspending, after appeal, decrees of the Superior Court. Those decrees dissolved preliminary injunctions which had been issued in the suits, and the injunctions now have been reinstated. They prohibit the bank from disposing of certain notes pledged to it, but, it is alleged, without right and with notice. The only question before us is whether a State court has power to issue such injunctions before filial judgment.
In U. S. Rev. Sts. § .5242, after provisions avoiding payments made in contemplation of insolvency, etc., the section continues, “ and no attachment, injunction, or execution shall be issued against such association or its property before final judgment in
But such arguments are a very doubtful ground for giving words an unnatural construction. The words used are of unlimited scope. The limited interpretation gives them an unusual meaning. The prohibition, whether reasonable or not, is intelligible when we consider that at the time when the prohibition first was passed any plaintiff was at liberty to sue in the United States courts, and could obtain an injunction there. The fact that this power has been taken away cannot change the construction of the words. Pacific National Bank v. Mixter, 124 U.S. 721" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1888-02-20" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/pacific-national-bank-v-mixter-92167?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="92167">124 U. S. 721, 727, 728. The jurisdiction and the extent of the power to be exercised by State courts depend on the permission of the United States. The wrongs likely to be done by national banks are of a pecuniary nature, and- the banks usually are amply able to make good any such damage which they may do, so that there is not the same necessity for preventive remedies that there is with individuals or with corporations, for whose solvency less stringent precautions are taken. We ate'of opinion that the language of the statute must be read in its natural sense, in accordance with what we understand to have been the view of the Supreme Court of the United States in Pacific National Rank v. Mixter, 124 U.S. 721" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1888-02-20" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/pacific-national-bank-v-mixter-92167?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="92167">124 U. S. 721.
But then it is said that this provision qf § 5242 has been
The principal one is U. S. St. July 12, 1882, § 4 (22 U. S. Sts. at Large, 162, 163). The section of the acts of 1864 above referred to, giving jurisdiction to United States and State courts, was omitted by mistake from the Revised Statutes, although, as has been seen, the proviso as to State courts issuing injunctions was retained. This omission was corrected by U. S. St. February 18, 1875 (18 U. S. Sts. at Large, 320). Then a proviso in U. S. St. July 12, 1882, § 4, enacts that “ the jurisdiction for suits ” by or against the banks, with certain exceptions not material, “shall be the same as, and not other than, the jurisdiction for suits by or against banks not organized under any law of the United States which do or might do banking business where such national banking associations may be doing business when such suits may be begun,” and repeals inconsistent laws.
It is true that one result of this act is to put an end to the special jurisdiction of the United States courts over national banks, and thus to end the power of citizens of the same State as the bank to get an injunction anywhere, while it leaves that power to citizens of another State, who have a right to sue in the Circuit Court by virtue of their citizenship. Pacific National Bank v. Mixter, 124 U.S. 721" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1888-02-20" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/pacific-national-bank-v-mixter-92167?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="92167">124 U. S. 721, 727. Petri v. Commercial National Bank, 142 U.S. 644" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1892-01-18" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/petri-v-commercial-nat-bank-of-chicago-93242?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="93242">142 U. S. 644, 649. But this accidental advantage is not sufficient ground to affect our construction of the act. Obviously, the purpose of the law is to limit the jurisdiction of the United States courts, and to do away with the limitations of venue imposed by the earlier statutes on the State courts. Petri v. Commercial National Bank, 142 U.S. 644" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1892-01-18" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/petri-v-commercial-nat-bank-of-chicago-93242?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="93242">142 U. S. 644, 648, 649. By the earlier acts, suits might be begun “in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases.” U. S. St. June 3, 1864, § 57 (13 U. S. Sts. at Large, 116, 117). U. S. St. February 18, 1875 (18 U. S. Sts. at Large, 320). We
In view of the intimation in Petri v. Commercial National Bank, 142 U. S. 644, 651, and the language of the statutes, it does not seem necessary to argue that U. S. St. March 3, 1887, § 4, (24 U. S. Sts. at Large, 552, 554,) and U. S. St. August 13,1888, § 4, (25 U. S. Sts. at Large, 433, 436,) have no greater effect. ' Orders annulled.