MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this transferred diversity action, plaintiff brings claims under Title II of the Electronic Communication Privacy Act (“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”), Conn. Gen. St. § 42-UOa et seq., on the ground that defendant, an internet service provider (“ISP”), wrongfully disclosed plaintiffs subscriber information to a Connecticut law enforcement officer in response to a warrant application that had not been signed by a judge. At issue on cross motions for summary judgment are the following questions:
(i) whether the “knowing or intentional state of mind” necessary to establish an ISP’s liability in a civil action for an ECPA disclosure violation requires a showing of specific intent and knowledge or merely a showing that the disclosure was intentional, not inadvertent,
Or, in terms specific to this case, Whether plaintiff here must show that the AOL employee who made the disclosure did so with knowledge that the warrant was unsigned or merely that the employee intended to make the disclosure and did not do so inadvertently;
(ii) whether AOL is entitled to the statutory good faith defense where, as here, it appears that the warrant was unsigned, but AOL’s employee mistakenly thought otherwise; and
(iii) whether plaintiff may assert a Connecticut statutory claim against AOL given that this matter was transferred from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on the ground that the parties’ contract contained a forum selection clause stating that Virginia courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes between the parties and that Virginia law would govern disputes pertaining to the parties’ contract and plaintiffs AOL membership.
I.
Plaintiff Clifton Freedman, a Connecticut resident, is a subscriber of defendant America Online, Inc. (“AOL”)’s Internet service. AOL is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Dulles, Virginia. It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of AOL Time Warner, Inc., and the world’s largest Internet Service Provider (“ISP”), with more than 30 million subscribers, or “members,” worldwide.
The relationship between AOL and each of its subscribing members is governed by the Terms of Service (“TOS”), which includes the Member Agreement, the Community Guidelines, and the Privacy Policy. AOL’s Privacy Policy, distributed to each subscriber with the Member Agreement, states that AOL will not disclose a subscriber’s telephone numbers, credit information, or screen names, unless authorized by the subscriber to do so, except in response to “valid legal process such as a search warrant, subpoena or court order. ...” And while AOL alleges it makes every effort to abide by the terms of the Privacy Policy, the Member Agreement is plainly aspirational only, as it makes unmistakably clear that the Privacy Policy does not and is not intended to confer any rights and remedies upon the subscriber and that it, the Member Agreement, “represents [the subscriber’s] entire agreement with AOL.” Also of note here is that the Member Agreement contains (i) a forum selection clause stating that Virginia courts have “exclusive jurisdiction [over] any *641 claim or dispute with AOL or relating in any way to [the subscriber’s] membership or use of AOL” and (ii) a choice-of-law provision stating that “[t]he laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, excluding its conflicts-of-law rules, govern this Agreement and your membership.”
While not directly relevant to the issues at bar, it is worth noting that this dispute has its genesis in the 2001 campaign for First Selectman in the Town of Fairfield, Connecticut. During that campaign, a Fairfield fireman popularized a political slogan, “Go John Go Away,” that was widely displayed on bumper stickers, balloons, and other campaign paraphernalia throughout Fairfield and intended to encourage voters not to vote for John Metso-poulous, the Republican candidate. Mary Carol Mirylees, who was defeated by Met-sopoulous in the Republican primary, and several of her supporters, including Sandy Mulligan, Dee Dee Brandt, Kathy Siano, and Vincent Biondi, allegedly used the “Go John Go Away” slogan in their campaign to defeat Metsopoulous.
Mirylees decided to run again in the 2003 Republican primary for First Selectman. On March 31, 2003, plaintiff, an active member of the Republican party in Fairfield and a candidate for a position on the Fairfield Board of Education, sent an e-mail to approximately ten individuals, including Mulligan, Brandt, and Siano, managers of Mirylees’ 2003 campaign, under the screen name “GoMaryGoA-way@aol.com,” which stated “The end is near.” On April 1, 2003, Mulligan and Brandt, unaware that plaintiff had sent the e-mail and concerned about their security, filed a report with the Fairfield Police Department.
That same day, Detectives William Young and David Bensey of the Fairfield Police Department, concerned about the harassing nature of the e-mail, executed a State of Connecticut Superior Court Search and Seizure Warrant Application (“Warrant Application”) seeking the disclosure by AOL of the identity of the person using the “GoMaryGoAway” screen name as well as other subscriber information relating to that person. After he and Detective Bensey signed the application under oath, but without first obtaining the signature of a judge, Detective Young faxed the warrant application to AOL’s law enforcement help line.
In the five-page warrant application, Detectives Young and Bensey stated that they had probable cause to believe that the individual who had sent the allegedly harassing e-mail was responsible for harassment in the second degree in violation of Connecticut law and that they based this belief on the statements of Mulligan and Brandt. The warrant application was properly signed by both Detectives Young and Bensey on pages two, three, and four. Although Detective Bensey signed, arguably illegibly, on a line reserved for the signature of the affiant, his signature in fact appears on a line just above the words “Signed (Judge of the Superior Court).” The juxtaposition of these words and Detective Bensey’s signature might lead a reader to assume, incorrectly, that Detective Bensey’s signature is that of a judge. But careful review of the form discloses that there is a line below the words “Signed (Judge of the Superior Court)” that is meant for the judge’s signature and this line is blank. Nor is the form signed anywhere else by a judge. Moreover, no signature, including that of Detectives Young and Bensey, appears on page five, even though the warrant appears to require the signature of a judge on that page.
When AOL received the warrant application fax, it was forwarded to AOL’s legal department, which is responsible for AOL’s compliance with warrants. Worth noting in this regard, is that AOL typical *642 ly responds to approximately 1000 warrants per month from authorities all over the country. On April 7, 2003, Jennifer Sheridan, an AOL compliance and fraud investigator responsible for responding to warrants and court orders, concluded the warrant was valid and faxed plaintiffs subscriber information to Detective Young in response to the warrant application. The six-page fax included (i) one page that set forth plaintiffs name and address, phone numbers, account status and type, membership start date, software information, billing and account information, and screen names and (ii) a five-page list of plaintiffs session times and activity..
Detective Young subsequently disclosed this information to Mulligan and Brandt. Thereafter, on April 11, 2003, Biondi, a political advisor and campaign manager for Mirylees- who had become aware that plaintiff had sent the e-mail, told plaintiff that he, Biondi, would ensure that the information concerning plaintiffs e-mail would not appear in the newspaper provided plaintiff drop out of the 2003 election for a position on the Fairfield Board of Education and resign his position as the District Leader of District 7 of the Republican Town Committee. Although it is not clear from the .record whether plaintiff in fact dropped out of the' election or resigned his position, plaintiff nonetheless alleges that he has suffered public ridicule, injury to his reputation, emotional distress, and loss of business as a consequence of the release of his subscriber information.
On June 12, 2003, plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut alleging eleven counts against AOL, Detective Young, Detective Bensey, and the Town of Fairfield. Of the eleven counts, three counts were asserted against AOL: (i) violation of the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (Count I); (ii) breach of contract (Count II); and (iii) violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen. St. § 42-110a et seq. (Count III). 1 On November 20, in that district, plaintiff filed a partial motion for summary judgment as to Count I against AOL, Young, and Bensey and Counts X and XI against the Town of Fairfield and on November 21, AOL filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the parties’ Member Agreement forum selection clause provided that Virginia courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the three claims brought against AOL. On December 5, 2003, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted AOL’s motion to dismiss all claims against it on this ground. See Freedman v. America Online, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 03-1048-A (D.Conn. Dec. 5, 2003) (Order) (Dorsey, J.). Yet, the Connecticut court subsequently granted plaintiffs motion to reconsider this ruling and then vacated the dismissal order and transferred the claims against AOL to this district on the ground that “ ‘[transferring the AOL claims to the Eastern District of Virginia would prevent undue delay and avoid costs that [plaintiff] will incur if he is required, to ‘start from scratch’ by refiling his case.’ ” See Freedman v. America Online, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 03-1048- *643 A (D.Conn. Jan. 30, 2004) (Order) (Dorsey, J.) (citing PL’s Mem.). 2
At issue here are (i) AOL’s cross-motion for summary judgment with respect to all three claims brought against it and (ii) plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the ECPA claim (Count I). In his motion, plaintiff withdrew his breach of contract claim (Count II). Accordingly, only the parties’ motions with respect to the ECPA (Count I) and CUTPA (Count III) claims must be addressed here.
II.
Congress enacted the ECPA in 1986 to protect against the interception and disclosure of information related to electronic communications.
See United States v. Hambrick,
Although AOL concedes that a violation occurred, 7 it nonetheless contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs ECPA claim (i) because plaintiff offers no evidence that AOL violated the statute “with a knowing or intentional state of mind” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a), the statute’s civil enforcement provision 8 and (ii) because AOL relied in good faith on the warrant application and thus is immune from liability under § 2707(e), the statute’s good faith defense provision. 9 Plaintiff argues, to the contrary, that AOL’s motion for summary judgment must be denied and plaintiffs *645 motion for summary judgment granted on the grounds that it is undisputed (i) that AOL acted with the requisite state of mind when it disclosed plaintiffs subscriber information and (ii) that AOL did not rely in good faith on a warrant or other valid legal process. Although not addressed by the parties, also at issue is whether plaintiff establishes that AOL “knowingly divulge[d]” plaintiffs subscriber information as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3). Thus, separately addressed here are the following questions:
(i) whether on the current record plaintiff has established that AOL violated the statute with a “knowing or intentional state of mind” as required by § 2707(a);
(ii) whether on the current record plaintiff has established that AOL “knowingly divulge[d]” plaintiffs subscriber information as required by § 2702(a)(3); and
(iii) whether on the current record AOL is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the ground that it relied in good faith on the warrant application pursuant to § 2707(e).
A.
Section 2707(a) provides that an ISP may be held civilly liable for any violation “in which the conduct constituting the violation is engaged in with a knowing or intentional state of mind....” 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) (emphasis added). Thus, AOL argues that it cannot be held liable for violating the statute because Sheridan did not know that the warrant application was unsigned when she faxed plaintiffs subscriber information to Detective Young and thus did not act with a “knowing or intentional state of mind.” Plaintiff contends, however, that AOL misinterprets § 2707(a)’s state of mind requirement and argues that to establish the requisite state of mind under that provision, plaintiff must show only that Sheridan acted intentionally, and not inadvertently. Because there is no dispute that Sheridan intended the disclosure, plaintiff contends he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs argument on this point prevails as it finds firm support in the statutory language and history. By phrasing § 2707(a)’s state of mind terms in the disjunctive, Congress made clear that an ISP is liable for a prohibited disclosure if it acts either knowingly or intentionally. Thus, to establish the requisite state of mind under this provision, a plaintiff must show only that the ISP acted intentionally. And while the statute does not define “intentional” conduct, legislative history and authority interpreting Title I of the ECPA 10 offer significant guidance in this regard and make clear that an ISP acts intentionally provided its acts are not inadvertent. 11 Given this and because neither *646 party argues that Sheridan acted inadvertently when she disclosed plaintiffs subscriber information, plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue.
B.
The foregoing conclusion does not, however, end the state of mind analysis for § 2702(a)(3) requires that plaintiff prove that AOL “knowingly divulge[d]” plaintiffs subscriber information to establish a statutory violation.
See
18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3). Authority construing this language and pertinent legislative history makes clear that an ISP acts knowingly if it has knowledge of the factual circumstances that constitute the alleged offense.
12
Section 2702(a)(3)’s knowledge requirement does not, however, require that AOL understand the legal significance of these factual circumstances or that AOL have the specific intent to violate the statute.
13
In fact, to make a disclosure violation turn on whether AOL acted with a bad faith intent to violate the statute would render the statute’s good faith defense provision
14
superfluous, an impermissible result under the well-established rule “that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ ”
See TRW, Inc. v.
*647
Andrews,
C.
The parties also dispute whether even assuming Sheridan acted with the requisite state of mind, AOL is nonetheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Title II’s good faith defense provision which provides that an ISP’s “good faith reliance on a court warrant. .. is a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter....” 18 U.S.C. § 2707(e).
17
Although sparse,
18
authority interpreting this provision provides that an ISP relies in good faith on what appears to be a valid warrant provided its reliance is “objectively reasonable” under the circumstances.
19
Abundant authority interpreting Title I’s nearly
*648
identical good faith defense, 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d),
20
offers additional guidance with regard to the elements of the good faith defense under Title II. This authority teaches that a defendant may invoke the good faith defense “if he can demonstrate (1) that he had a subjective good faith belief that he acted legally pursuant to a court order; and (2) that this belief was reasonable.”
Jacobson v. Rose,
Interestingly, however, both parties here appear to agree that the good faith defense is governed not by these principles, but instead by the standard set forth in
United States v. Leon,
Analysis of the two-pronged standard set forth above compels the conclusion that neither party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue. While there is no dispute as to Sheridan’s subjective good faith belief that the warrant was valid, reasonable persons may disagree as to' whether this belief was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 24 Several aspects of the warrant *650 application and the surrounding circumstances suggest that Sheridan’s belief was objectively reasonable, including: (i) that the warrant application included two signatures on pages two, three, and four, that of Detectives Young and Bensey; (ii) that Detective Bensey’s signature is illegible; (iii) that Detective Bensey’s signature appears on the line directly above the words “Signed (Judge of Superior Court)” on pages two, three, and four; (iv) that AOL is not a law enforcement agency; (v) that AOL receives approximately one thousand warrants per month; (vi) that these warrants are sent from jurisdictions all over the country that use different forms and procedures such that it is reasonable that AOL is unfamiliar with the format of the warrant application; (vii) that Sheridan, one of only four AOL fraud and compliance investigators, is responsible for responding to a substantial portion of these warrants; and (viii) that the fax cover sheet accompanying the warrant application did not indicate that the warrant application had not been submitted to a judge. Yet, other aspects of the warrant application suggest that Sheridan’s belief was unreasonable, including: (i) that Detective Bensey’s signature, which Sheridan allegedly mistook for that of the judge, includes, although somewhat illegibly, the title “Det.”; (ii) that the text of the warrant application indicates that the warrant is signed and sworn to by both Detectives Young and Bensey such that a careful reader would expect there to be three signatures — Young’s, Bensey’s, and a judge’s; and (iii) that page five of the warrant is entirely blank, even though it requires the signature of a judge. Accordingly, because there is a genuine issue of fact as to the objective reasonableness of Sheridan’s belief, the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment on the issue of AOL’s good faith reliance must be denied.
In sum, the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment are granted in part and denied in part. On the issue of whether AOL acted knowingly and intentionally as required by § 2707(a), AOL’s motion for summary judgment is denied and plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted. On the issue of AOL’s good faith reliance, the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment are denied. On the issue of whether AOL knowingly divulged plaintiffs subscriber information as required by § 2702(a)(3), summary judgment is granted for plaintiff. Accordingly, plaintiffs ECPA claim proceeds to trial only on the issue of AOL’s good faith reliance.
III.
AOL also seeks summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs claim under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen. St. § 42-110a et seq., which asserts that AOL engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices under Connecticut law when it disclosed plaintiffs subscriber information in violation of AOL’s Privacy Policy. Specifically, AOL argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the grounds (i) that only Virginia law applies to the parties’ dispute pursuant to the Member Agreement’s choice-of-law provision 25 and (ii) that even assuming arguen-do that Connecticut law applies, AOL’s *651 one-time disclosure of plaintiffs subscriber information does not constitute an unfair or deceptive practice giving rise to liability under the CUTPA. Plaintiff argues to the contrary that AOL is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the grounds (i) that Connecticut law applies and (ii) that AOL engaged in unfair and deceptive conduct violative of that law.
Before reaching the merits of plaintiffs claim, it is necessary to determine the choice-of-law question, namely whether Virginia or Connecticut law applies. It is well-settled that a federal district court sitting in diversity and resolving a transferred matter must apply the laws of the transferor state, including its choice-ofdaw rules.
See Van Dusen v. Barrack,
Thus, the Member Agreement’s Virginia forum selection and choice-of-law clauses point persuasively to the conclusion that Virginia law applies here. To conclude otherwise and to apply Connecticut law, would not only enable plaintiff to obtain a result in federal court, namely the application of Connecticut law, that he could not have obtained in Connecticut state court in violation of the
Erie
uniformity principle, but also would enable plaintiff to avoid the consequences of the Virginia forum selection and choice-of-law clauses by filing his claims in a district without proper venue, pursuant to the fo
*653
rum selection clause, but with more favorable laws. That the Connecticut court’s order suggests that the matter was transferred on the grounds of convenience pursuant to § 1404(a), rather than for improper venue pursuant to § 1406(a),
32
does not compel a different conclusion in this regard because it is clear that the Member Agreement’s forum selection clause was the basis for the transfer.
See Iannello,
And because the Member Agreement’s choice-of-law provision states that “the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, excluding the conflicts-of-law rules, govern this Agreement and your membership,” Virginia substantive law, and not Virginia choice-of-law, applies here, provided the choice-of-law provision is sufficiently broad to encompass this dispute, ie. provided this dispute arises either from the Member Agreement or plaintiffs AOL membership. And, in this regard, authority in this and other circuits makes clear that a choice-of-law provision, like any other contractual provision, must not be applied more broadly than the parties intended. For instance, a choice-of-law provision that, by its terms, applies only to the parties’ contract or agreement must not be construed to govern the entirety of the parties’ relationship and any claim that may arise from that relationship. 34
Here, however, it is clear that the parties’ dispute arises from the Member *654 Agreement. This is so because plaintiff, by bringing the CUTPA claim, is effectively asserting his “rights” under the Privacy Policy in violation of a provision of the Member Agreement. Yet, the Agreement states that “the AOL Privacy Policy, including AOL’s enforcement of [that policy], [is] not intended to confer, and do[es] not confer, any rights and remedies upon any person.” Thus, plaintiffs CUTPA claim effectively puts this provision of the Agreement at issue. The same result obtains if the focus is shifted to the portion of the choice-of-law clause that refers to “your membership.” Surely, how AOL handles subscriber information relates to the subscriber’s “membership.” Accordingly, because the Agreement’s choice-of-law provision applies to the CUTPA claim, it follows (i) that Virginia substantive law governs that claim and (ii) that given this, plaintiff may not state a claim under Connecticut statutory law. 35
IV.
For the reasons set forth herein, the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs ECPA *655 claim are granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs motion is granted as to whether AOL acted with a “knowing or intentional state of mind.” Summary judgment is also granted for plaintiff as to whether AOL “knowingly divulge[d]” plaintiffs subscriber information. The parties’ cross motions, however, are denied as to AOL’s good faith reliance on the unsigned warrant application on the ground that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether that reliance was objectively reasonable in the circumstances. Finally, AOL’s motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs CUTPA claim is granted because the parties’ dispute is governed by Virginia substantive law. Accordingly, this matter proceeds to trial on plaintiffs ECPA claim only as to the issue of AOL’s good faith reliance.
An appropriate order will issue.
Notes
. The remaining eight counts asserted against the other three defendants were: (i) violation of the ECPA against Detectives Young and Bensey and the Town of Fairfield (Count I); (ii) violation of the Fourth and First Amendments against Detectives Young and Bensey (Counts IV and V); (iii) violation of Article First, §§ 4 and 7 of the Connecticut Constitution against Detectives Young and Bensey (Counts VI and VII); (iv) invasion of privacy against Detectives Young and Bensey (Count VIII); (v) violation of the First and Fourth Amendments against Town of Fairfield (Count .IX); (vi) indemnification pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 7-465 against Town of Fairfield (Count X); and (vii) respondeat superior as to Town of Fairfield (Count XI).
. The action proceeded in the District of Connecticut as to defendants Young, Bensey, and Fairfield and on February 4, 2004, that court granted plaintiff's partial motion for summary judgment with respect to Count I as to defendants Young and Bensey and denied the motion with respect to Counts X and XII as to defendant Fairfield.
See Freedman v. America Online, Inc.,
. The discussion in this Memorandum Opinion focuses solely on the disclosure of plaintiff's subscriber record and information and not the contents of his communications. An ISP's disclosure of the contents of a subscriber's communications is subject to different rules set forth in §§ 2702(a)(l)-(2) and 2703(a)-(b).
. It is clear that AOL is a provider of "electronic communication service" as the statute defines that term as "any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2711 ("As used in this chapter the terms defined in section 2510 of this title have, respectively, the definitions given such terms in that section.”).
.18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) provides as follows:
(1) A governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications) only when the governmental entity -
(A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under investigation or equivalent State warrant;
(B) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section;
(C) has the consent of the subscriber or customer to such disclosure; or
*644 (D) submits a formal written request relevant to a law enforcement investigation concerning telemarketing fraud for the name, address, and place of business of a subscriber or customer of such provider, which subscriber or customer is engaged in telemarketing (as such term is defined in section 2325 of this title); or
(E) seeks information under paragraph (2).
(2) A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall disclose to a governmental entity the -
(A) name;
(B) address;
(C) local and long distance telephone connection records, or records of session times and durations;
(D) length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized;
(E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned network address; and
(F) means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank account number),
of a subscriber to or customer of such service when the governmental entity uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena or any means available under paragraph (1).
.Notably, the parties do not address § 2702(a)(3)'s requirement that, to establish a violation, a plaintiff must show that an ISP "knowingly divulge[d]” a subscriber’s record or information. Because this element of the offense relates to AOL's state of mind in making the disclosure, it is discussed in greater detail in section (B) below.
. AOL did not argue, as it might have given § 2703's inartful wording, that § 2703(c) authorizes an ISP to disclose certain types of information about a subscriber in response to a mere request from a law enforcement officer. Ultimately, however, that argument is unpersuasive because the structure of the Act clearly does not support the notion that a mere request for a subscriber's information by a law enforcement officer would suffice to require AOL to disclose the information, unless that request is pursuant to a telemarketing fraud investigation.
. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a) provides for a private cause of action for "any provider of electronic communication service, subscriber, or other person aggrieved by any violation of this chapter in which the conduct constituting the violation is engaged in with a knowing or intentional state of mind...."
. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(e) provides as follows;
A good faith reliance on -
(1) a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization (including a request of a governmental entity under section 2703(f) of this title);
(2) a request of an investigative or law enforcement officer under section 2518(7) of this title; or
(3) a good faith determination that section 2511(3) of this title permitted the conduct complained of;
is a complete defense against any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law.
. Title I of the ECPA prohibits the intention- • al interception of "any wire, oral, or electronic communication'’ in the absence of judicial authorization. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510
et seq.
This portion of the Act is still commonly referred to as Title III because it amended Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act governing the use of wiretapping.
See Davis v. Gracey,
.
See
S.Rep. No. 99-541, at 23 (1986), re
printed in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3577 (stating that "[a]n 'intentional' state of mind means that one’s state of mind is intentional as to one's conduct or the result of one’s conduct if such conduct or result is one's conscious objective”);
In re Pharmatrak, Inc.,
.See
H.R.Rep. No. 99-647, at 64 (1986) ("The term knowingly [in § 2702] means that the Defendant was aware of the nature of the conduct, aware of or possessing a firm belief in the existence of the requisite circumstances and an awareness of or a firm belief about the substantial certainty of the result.”);
Muskovich
v.
Crowell,
.
See Thompson,
. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(e).
.
See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Baragosh,
AOL argues unpersuasively that the good faith defense provision would not be rendered completely superfluous even if the "knowing or intentional'’ state of mind element required proof of bad faith intent because § 2707(e) would still apply to criminal matters. See 18 U.S.C. § 2707(e) (section applies broadly to "any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law”). The obvious flaw in AOL's argument is that its interpretation of "knowing or intentional” would still render the good faith defense superfluous in civil cases, in clear contravention of Congress' intent. See id.
. When determining the factual circumstances of the offense, it is necessary to read § 2702(a)(3) in conjunction with the exceptions to that general rule set forth in § 2702(b) & (c) and § 2703.
.
See also Davis,
.
See Davis,
.
See Davis,
. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d) provides as follows:
A good faith reliance on -
(1) a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization;
(2) a request of an investigative or law enforcement officer under section 2518(7) of this title; or
(3) a good faith determination that section 2511(3) or 2511(2)(i) of this title permitted the conduct complained of;
is a complete defense against any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any other law.
.
See also Frierson v. Goetz,
.Compare Groh v. Ramirez,
Worth noting, however, is that in the cases in which the court has found an officer's reliance on an unsigned warrant reasonable, it appears that the officer had been told by the judge or magistrate prior to the search that a warrant had been approved and signed, but the warrant was in fact not signed due to an inadvertent error. Accordingly, these cases have limited relevance here where AOL had not been informed prior to the disclosure by a judge, Magistrate, or the Fairfield police that the warrant application had in fact been approved by a judge, even though it was not signed.
. Several courts have, however, relied on
Leon
in resolving good faith defense claims under the ECPA.
See Davis,
Plaintiff argues that Title I’s legislative history states that "[t]he term 'good faith' as used in this section includes the receipt of a facially valid court order,” and thus establishes that an ISP can only be found to have relied in good faith if the warrant was facially valid. See H.R.Rep. No. 99-647, at 50 (1986). This argument is unpersuasive because it is a fallacy to conclude that because "good faith” includes reliance on facially valid court orders, the phrase must also exclude reasonable reliance on a facially invalid order.
. Plaintiff mistakenly contends that Sheridan's testimony is inadmissible because she does not recall responding to the warrant at issue here, but instead testifies only that she typically makes sure that a warrant is signed *650 by a judge before releasing a subscriber’s information because Rule 406, Fed.R.Evid., makes clear that "[e]vidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization ... is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.” Rule 406, Fed. R.Evid.
. In this regard, defendant points to the choice-of-law provision in the Member Agreement which provides that "the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, excluding its con *651 flicts-of-law rules, govern this Agreement and your membership.”
.
See also Klippel v. U-Haul Co. of Northeastern Michigan,
Notably,
Van
Dusen's departure from the well-settled principle of
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,
.
See Myelle v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,
.
See Yankee Caithness Joint Venture, L.P. v. Planet Ins. Co.,
.
See Martin,
.
See Martin,
.
See Erie,
. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides as follows:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides as follows: The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.
. Although plaintiff is correct that the Ninth Circuit held in
Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., Inc.,
.
Compare Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp.,
.
See Jessup-Morgan v. America Online, Inc.,
Even assuming
arguendo
that plaintiff could state a claim under Connecticut law, plaintiff's CUTPA claim would fail on the ground that plaintiff does not offer sufficient evidence that defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice. CUTPA provides in relevant part that "[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Conn. Gen. St. Ann. § 42-110b(a). To show that an act or practice is "unfair” under the CUTPA, a plaintiff must show that the act or practice (i) "offends public policy... — whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness,” (ii) is "immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous,” or (iii) "causes substantial injury to consumers.”
Hartford Elec. Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co.,
Moreover, courts have determined that an act or practice is "deceptive,” if (i) "there is a representation, omission, or other practice likely to mislead consumers,” (ii) "the consumers ... interpret the message reasonably under the circumstances,” and (iii) "the misleading representation, omission, or practice [is] material — that is, likely to affect consumer decisions or conduct.”
Caldor v. Heslin,