60 Minn. 337 | Minn. | 1895
Lead Opinion
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages which he claims that he has sustained by reason of the defendant defaming his character. In the complaint it is alleged that at the city of Minneapolis on July 13, 1893, the defendant “did, in the presence and hearing of a large number of persons and citizens, falsely and maliciously speak and publish of and concerning the plaintiff the false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory words following, that is to say: ‘You (meaning the plaintiff) are a damned robber. You (meaning the plaintiff) are a damned thief. You (meaning the plaintiff) and Dennis (meaning one W. H. Dennis) stole from me (meaning the defendant). You (meaning the plaintiff) and Dennis robbed me (meaning the defendant). You (meaning the plaintiff) and Dennis planned together to rob me, and did rob me (meaning the defendant),’ — thereby then and there meaning and intending to charge that plaintiff was a common thief, and that the plaintiff and the said W. H. Dennis had feloniously robbed, stolen from, and otherwise defrauded the defendant.” The defendant, in his answer, alleges that in the year 1887 and 1888 he was having constructed for himself, in the city of Minneapolis, a brick building of great value, known as the “Oneida Building”; and that one W. H. Dennis was the architect and superintendent of construction;
1. It is contended that it was not competent for the plaintiff to introduce evidence of prior conversations between the parties to show a malicious publication of the slander charged in the complaint. “Slander is defamation without legal excuse published
2. The appellant also assigns as error the fact that the court below, in his charge to the jury, gave the definition of “larceny” and “robbery” as defined in the Penal Code. The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the defendant called him a “robber” and a “thief.” These words, applied.maliciously by one person to another, in the presence and hearing of third persons, are defamatory and actionable of themselves. Their meaning is apparent on the face of the defamation, and such meaning was neither altered, enlarged, nor restricted by the allegations of the complaint that by such language the defendant intended to charge that plaintiff was a common thief. If the plaintiff intended the latter words as an innuendo to define the meaning of the words “robber” and “thief,” they should be regarded simply as surplusage. It was proper, therefore, for the trial court to give to the jury the definition of “robber” and “thief” as defined by the Penal Code.
It is claimed that the verdict should be set aside for excessive damages. In cases of this kind there are no fixed rules or mathematical standard for measuring damages, and the amount thereof' must necessarily be confided to the sound, careful, deliberate, and reasonable discretion of the jury, but as it has been well said in reference to the jury in such cases: “The law leaves the liberty to find and return such damages as they think right and just; but this
While the jury found a verdict in favor of the plaintiff upon the question of defamation, there is ample evidence to show that the defendant, at and prior to the time of the speaking of the defamatory words, thought that he had reliable information that plaintiff and one Dennis had cheated him in the construction of the Oneida block, of which plaintiff was the contractor in doing the brickwork for the defendant. The words complained of had reference to and were intended to characterize this transaction between the parties, which transaction' if true, would not have constituted a crime. Plaintiff himself understood this perfectly well, and testified that he and the defendant had quarreled several times about the matter. He fur
Upon the whole case, we are of the opinion that, in estimating the damages, the jury must have failed to take into consideration some of the mitigating elements to which we have briefly referred, and that the verdict, under the evidence and attending circumstances of the case, is greater than it should have been. The order of the district court denying the motion for a new trial will be reversed, and a new trial granted, unless the respondent file in the district court a remittitur of the sum of $2,000 within 30 days after the mandate from this court shall be filed in said district court. In case such remittitur is filed, the plaintiff may recover judgment upon said ver
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent from the foregoing opinion so far as it holds that the verdict is excessive. The uncontradicted evidence shows that plaintiff is, and for 15 years has been, a contractor of brickwork in the construction of buildings, and has been doing a business of from $50,000 to $250,000 per year. There was ample evidence from which the jury were justified in finding that the slanderous words ■complained of were intended to injure, and did injure, plaintiff in Ms said business, and that defendant had repeatedly uttered and published these slanders for the purpose and with the intent of so injuring plaintiff in Ms business. It is impossible to determine the exact amount of this injury; but, where the business was so large, the jury were justified in finding that the damage amounted to $5,000.
The opinion of the majority holds that defendant did not intend to charge plaintiff with the commission of a crime. The three witnesses for plaintiff who heard the slander uttered knew the parties, had previous information concerning the controversy between them, and did not understand that defendant intended to charge plaintiff with actual theft or robbery. For this reason the majority hold that it should be presumed that none of the many strangers who must have heard the slander uttered understood the defendant to mean what he said, or to charge the commission of a crime. The plaintiff testified that he was at his work, constructing a certain bank building, when defendant came along and uttered this slander; that, during the altercation which followed, there must have been about 1,000 people present, and defendant repeated the charge several times. The witness Clayton testified: “We were just going to •start away. * * * Johnson came along, and shook hands with me, and looked around to Mr. Fredrickson, and said, ‘I don’t shake hands with a damned robber like you.’ He said that to Fredrickson. That was the first conversation between these men. We walked .along, and Johnson followed. He walked by the side of Fredrick-son, and kept talking with him. When we got to the corner of the old National Bank building, Johnson began to talk pretty loud, «calling plaintiff a thief and liar and robber, and brought up about
In my opinion, the verdict is not excessive. •