459 U.S. 891 | SCOTUS | 1982
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I continue to adhere to my view that the death penalty is unconstitutional in all circumstances. I would therefore grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences on this basis alone. However, even if I believed that the death penalty could constitutionally be imposed under certain circumstances, I would grant certiorari in these cases to resolve a substantial question left open by this Court’s decision in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981): whether, on re-sentencing, the prosecution may be given a second chance to prove a statutory aggravating circumstance that it failed to prove in the prior capital sentencing proceeding.
We held in Bullington that the Double Jeopardy Clause is fully applicable to capital sentencing proceedings that are patterned after trials on the question of guilt or innocence.
In the instant cases, petitioners were convicted of capital murder and were then sentenced to death following separate sentencing hearings authorized by state statutes similar to the one involved in Bullington. In each case, the prosecution failed to prove one or more statutory aggravating circumstances,
The conclusion of the state courts in these cases is at odds with that of another state court of last resort. In State v. Silhan, 302 N. C. 223, 267-271, 275 S. E. 2d 450, 480-483 (1981), the North Carolina Supreme Court noted that the prosecution’s effort to prove the existence of statutory aggravating circumstances at the sentencing proceeding is, for double jeopardy purposes, analogous to the prosecution’s effort to prove the crimes charged at the guilt-innocence phase of a criminal trial. Moreover, the court observed, a determination that an aggravating circumstance does not apply is analogous to a determination that the accused is not guilty of an offense. Since the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a de
In Bullington this Court made clear that double jeopardy principles which apply to determinations of guilt or innocence also apply to capital sentencing proceedings at which the prosecution must prove the existence of statutory aggravating circumstances. Bullington did not address whether and to what extent the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second effort to prove an aggravating circumstance that the State failed to prove in a prior proceeding. There is disagreement on this question in the state courts, and the question is sufficiently important to warrant this Court’s review.
In No. 81-6891, the sentencing judge found that two of the aggravating circumstances alleged by the prosecution were not supported by the evidence. In No. 81-6854, the sentencing judge’s failure to submit to the jury an aggravating circumstance rested on finding that it was not supported by the evidence. Under Ga. Code Ann. §§ 17-10-30(b) and (c) (1982), the sentencing judge “shall” submit to the jury any statutory aggravating circumstance “supported” and “warranted by the evidence.” Because such a submission is required where the evidence is sufficient, see Williams v. State, 237 Ga. 399, 228 S. E. 2d 806 (1976), the trial judge’s decision not to submit a particular aggravating circumstance to the jury
In No. 81-6854, petitioner Davis’ conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, but his death sentence was vacated because of the trial court’s failure to make clear to the jury that it might in its discretion recommend a life sentence even if it found the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance. 240 Ga. 763, 243 S. E. 2d 12 (1978). In No. 81-6891, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed petitioner Jones’ conviction because of the trial court’s error in denying the defense’s motion for a psychiatric examination to determine Jones’ sanity at the time of the alleged offense. 362 So. 2d 1334 (1978).
Lead Opinion
Sup. Ct. Ga.; and
Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio-rari denied. Reported below: No. 81-6891, 411 So. 2d 165.