Frеd M. ANDERSON and Wayne Nelson, Plaintiffs, v. Fred M. Anderson, Appellant, v. Thomas COUGHLIN, Commissioner, New York State Department of Corrections, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 85, Docket 81-2429.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 3, 1982. Decided Jan. 26, 1983.
700 F.2d 37
We hold that under all the circumstances of this case—particularly in the light of appellant‘s previously decorous behavior during incarceration and a prior trial, as well as the prospect of a trial involving much testimony concerning conduct of appellant over a substantial period—it was constitutional error for the trial court, without any finding that restraint was necessary, over appellant‘s constitutional objection, to deny appellant‘s motion to allow him to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner‘s dock. Nor can we say that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. at 506-08, 96 S.Ct. at 1694-95; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The first jury was unable to agree upon a verdict, and the second jury, after deliberating for a day and a half, returned second degree murder verdicts despite the fact that, based on the prosecutor‘s theory of the case, the murders for which appellant was tried could only have been the result of cold-blooded planning and premeditation. As argued persuasively by counsel on appeal,
“Any suggestion that [appellant] was a dangerous person, implanted in the minds of the jurors through observation of [appellant] confined in the dock day after day, may have tipped the scales of justice.... [A]ny implication that [appellant] was the type of person whom it was necessary to segregate from jurors, spectators, court personnel, and even his own counsel—cannot fail to impact upon juror deliberation.”
Appellant may have been additionally prejudiced by the burden which placement in the prisoner‘s dock put upon effective consultation with counsel during the course of the trial.
Our holding is a narrow one. We do not announce a per se rule. We do find that in all the circumstances of this case appellant‘s confinement to the prisoner‘s dock unconstitutionally impaired his right to a fair trial.
Reversed and remanded with instructions that a writ of habeas corpus shall issue unless the Commonwealth makes arrangements for a new trial within ninety days.
Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of the State of N.Y., Albany, N.Y. (William J. Kogan, Asst. Sol. Gen., Wayne L. Benjamin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Albany, N.Y., of counsel), filed a brief for defendant-appellee.
CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge:
While the issue before us—did a 12-hour “keeplock” in a maximum security state prison violate plaintiff-inmates’ civil rights—is simply stated, its resolution is more complex and requires detailed analysis. Plaintiffs Fred M. Anderson and Wayne Nelson instituted this action against defendant Thomas Coughlin, Commissioner of the New York State Dеpartment of Corrections, for defendant‘s alleged violation of plaintiffs’ civil rights in having ordered plaintiff-prisoners confined to their cells in the Great Meadow Correctional Facility on May 21, 1981 for “no reason” and without affording them “equal protection or procedural due process.” Anderson appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Munson, J.) dated October 19, 1981 which dismissed the complaint. We affirm the district court‘s dismissal.
I
In May 1981 New York State Correction Officer Donna Payant became the first female prison guard murdered while on duty. Her death occasioned extensive publicity within the State. Commissioner Coughlin issued a directive calling for a statewide cell confinement of inmates (known as a “keeplock” or “lockdown“) so that correction officers throughout the State1 could attend Payant‘s funeral on May 21, 1981.
On May 20, 1981 suit was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by an inmate seeking to prevent the confinеments authorized by Coughlin. Flaherty v. Coughlin, (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1981). Late that afternoon District Judge Sweet held a hearing at which he enjoined the Commissioner “from instituting a keeplock except on an institution-by-institution basis arising out of emergency conditions or jeopardy to the safety or security of the [particular] institution” resulting from lack of sufficient personnel. He also ordered that officials attempt to minimize the necessity for general lockdowns. Accordingly, on the day of the funeral inmates were confined to their cells at only three of the State‘s 33 correctional facilities—the maximum security prison at Green Haven (site of the murder), the maximum security prison at Great Meadow and the medium security prison at Bayview.
For having been confined to their cells during the 12-hour keeplock at Great Meadow on May 21st plaintiffs instituted a pro se action each seeking $1000 in damages for violation of their civil rights, presumably under
On July 21 defendant made a motion to dismiss the complaint under
The Magistrate‘s Report-Recommendation was delivered to plaintiffs on September 28, 1981. Nelson filed an Affirmation in Opposition to the Report on October 2, along with a Demand for Jury Trial. Nelson‘s objections to the Report amounted to a conclusory denial of “each and every justification given” for dismissal, and repetition of the basis of his complaint, i.e., that plaintiffs were not afforded due process before being locked-down for the day. On October 8 Anderson filed a motion to compel the defendant to answer proffered interrogatories; his papers did not contain objections to the Magistrate‘s Report. Chief Judge Munson reviewed the entire record and issued an order on October 20 approving the Magistrate‘s Report-Recommendation, granting defendant‘s motion to dismiss the complaint and dismissing all other motions as moot. Anderson timely filed a notice of appeal and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel on appeal. In the latter document he alleged that he was unable to respond to the Magistrate‘s Report because he was ” ‘in transit’ as a Federal Prisoner.”
II
The only lеgal issue is whether the district court properly dismissed the complaint. A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim under
Looking just at the allegations of the complaint we cannot say that plaintiffs could under no circumstances prove that their constitutional rights were violated. If the Commissioner had personally singled plaintiffs out and for no reason whatever locked them in their cells for a day, they might be ablе to sustain their claim. The district court did not, however, view the complaint in a vacuum when it issued its dismissal order. Even though the October 20 order approves the Magistrate‘s Report which cites
Due to substantial recent increases in the volume of prisoner civil rights cases filed in
The preferred practice is for the Magistrate first to consider the petitioner‘s economic status and decide whether to grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis. FJC Report, supra at 54, 57-58. If leave is granted, the Court/Magistrate should then determine whether dismissal is appropriate under
While it is proper, see Fries v. Barnes, 618 F.2d 988, 989 (2d Cir.1980); FJC Report, supra at 73, and even recommended that a decision to dismiss under
III
Title
Many cases have expressed the view that the federal district courts are vested with especially broad discretion to deny state prisoners the privilege of proceeding IFP in civil actions against officials of the institution in which they are incarcerated. See, e.g., Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir.1979) (per curiam); Milton v. Nelson, 527 F.2d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir.1976); Daye v. Bounds, 509 F.2d 66, 68 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1002, 95 S.Ct. 2404, 44 L.Ed.2d 671 (1975); Conway v. Fugge, 439 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir.1971) (per curiam); Williams v. Field, 394 F.2d at 330-32; Shobe v. California, 362 F.2d 545, 546 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 887, 87 S.Ct. 185, 17 L.Ed.2d 115 (1966); Holsey v. Bass, 519 F.Supp. 395, 406 (D.Md.1981); Boston v. Stanton, 450 F.Supp. at 1053. One often-quoted case discusses the rationale for this conclusion:
Persons proceeding in forma pauperis are immune from imposition of costs if they are unsuccessful; and because of their poverty, they are practically immune from lаter tort actions for “malicious prosecution” or abuse of process. Thus indigents, unlike other litigants, approach the courts in a context where they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. The temptation to file complaints that contain facts which cannot be proved is obviously stronger in such a situation. For convicted prisoners with much idle time and free paper, ink, law books, and mail privileges the temptation is especially strong. As Justice Rehnquist has noted, “Though [an inmate] may be denied legal relief, he will nonetheless have obtained a short sabbatical in the nearest federal courthouse.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 327, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1084, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972) (dissenting).
It is plain to this Court that courts need an extra measure of authority when faced with actions proceeding in forma pauperis—particularly where the action is brought by a prisoner seeking damages. And it is this court‘s conclusion that Congress has granted that extra authority by enacting
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) .
Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. at 463-64. Prisoners proceeding IFP are not bound by the usual financial restraint on unwarranted litigation, and their expenditure of time in preparation for a lawsuit is often a relief from the tedium of prison life.4 FJC Report, supra at 2. We keep firmly in mind the fact that the benefit of
In light of these special considerations we must analyze what is meant by “frivolous”
We think that those cases which adopt the Anders or
In light of these distinctions we reject the notion that the
IV
We consider the entire record in this case,5 including defenses which have been or could be raised, see Urbano v. Sondern, 370 F.2d at 14; Holsey v. Bass, 519 F.Supp. at 408-11; Clark v. Zimmerman, 394 F.Supp. at 1178; Louisiana ex rel. Purkey v. Ciolino, 393 F.Supp. at 108, 109-10; Boruski v. Stewart, 381 F.Supp. at 533-35, in order to assess appellant‘s chances of success and to determine whether the district court abused its discretion, see Van Meter v. Morgan, 518 F.2d 366, 368 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896, 96 S.Ct. 198, 46 L.Ed.2d 129 (1975), in dismissing the complaint. We note that leniency accorded pro se plaintiffs when attempting to understand the claims raised in often inartfully
To begin, plaintiffs have not alleged any facts which might give rise to an equal protection claim; all inmates were keep-locked on an institution-wide basis. Second, prisoners need not be afforded “procedural due process“—notice and a hearing—in every situation in which they are locked in their cells. For example, N.Y. Admin.Code tit. 7, § 251.6(f) (1979) provides that “all inmates... in a facility may... be confined in their cells... for the duration of any period in which the safety or security of the facility is in jeopardy.” In Gilliard v. Oswald, 552 F.2d 456, 459 (2d Cir.1977), we ruled that where security is in doubt, the determination of what measures to pursue must be entrusted to the discretion and judgment of the prison superintendent. In the same vein, the Supreme Court recently remarked that “[t]he wide range of ‘judgment calls’ that meet constitutional and statutory requirements are confided to officials outside the Judicial Branch of Government.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1886, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). See generally id. at 544-48, 99 S.Ct. at 1876-78.
The standard of review where there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the basis for an emergency response must give the benefit of the doubt to the responsible administrative officials because it is unfair if not simply impossible for persons foreign to day-to-day involvеment with the prison community later to reconstruct the conditions present at the time the emergency arose. Gilliard, 552 F.2d at 458 & n. 2. Prison authorities necessarily must be allowed wide discretion in the use of confinement for the purpose of protecting the safety and security of the prison and its general population. Id. at 459; United States ex rel. Walker v. Mancusi, 467 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1972). Thus, the prison superintendent‘s judgment in ordering confinement should prevail “absent a clear showing of gross abuse.” Gilliard, 552 F.2d at 459.
No gross or even minimal abuse is present in this case. The facts reveal that a substantial number of guards intended to be absent from duty on the day of the funeral. Consequently, defendant was faced with balancing the potential for danger due to insufficient staffing at the Great Meadow facility against the inconvenience caused to plaintiffs by being confined to their cells for 12 hours on a single day. Whatever deprivation plaintiffs may have suffered does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. A practice may be undesirablе, yet still not so abusive as to violate a constitutional right. Sweet v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 859 (4th Cir.1975); Scellato v. Department of Corrections, 438 F.Supp. 1206, 1207 (W.D.Va.), appeal dismissed sub nom, Scellato v. Zahradnick, 565 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.1977).
Anderson‘s appellate brief seems to imply that the Commissioner created the emergency situation in question by issuing a directive which gave all correction officers paid time off to attend the funeral. Government counsel argue that emotions were running at such a high pitch that the officers would have taken the day off with or without permission. We note that the defendant as an administrative officer is protected by the qualified defense of immunity available to officers of the executive branch of government who carry out the responsibilities of their office in good faith. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1691-1692, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The dual subjective-objective test of good faith in this context requires that in order to be immune from damage actions the executive official must have had a good faith belief that he was acting properly and there must have been reasonable grounds for that belief in light of all the circumstancеs as they reasonably appeared at the time. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1000, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 247-48, 94 S.Ct. at 1691-1692; McKinnon v.
Plaintiffs’ reasonable chance of ultimate success on the merits of their claim is slight. This action is therefore frivolous under
WINTER, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result:
I concur in Part IV of Judge Cardamone‘s decision. Because I disagree with a legal conclusion he draws in Part II and believe that much of the discussion in Parts II and III is unnecessary, I state my reasons for affirmance separately.
First, I do not agree that the complaint is sufficient to survive a
Defendant is responsible for having petitioners illegally confined to their cells on May 21, 1981. He had no reason for action, did not charge plaintiff with any violations of NY State Law or afford them equal protection in procedural due process of the 14th Amendment US Constitution.
I believe this conclusory allegation is not adequate as a matter of law. Apart from the word “illegally” and references to the Constitution, the complaint simply states that appellant was placed in his cell “for no reason.” There are no factual allegations that he was singled out for special punishment, was subjected to inhumane or specifically unreasonable trеatment, or was the victim of defective procedures. Compare Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (pro se allegations of solitary confinement for disciplinary purposes in conditions which aggravated a pre-existing foot injury and circulatory ailment).
The almost infinitely malleable nature of the complaint is demonstrated by the widely contrasting descriptions offered by my colleagues. On the one hand, Judge Cardamone hypothesizes that it may allege that “the Commissioner had personally singled plaintiffs out and for no reason whatever locked them in their cells....” On the other hand, Judge Kearse describes it as alleging a general “keeplock.” In the case of the former, the hypothesis arrived at is at variance with the actual issue, while in the case of the latter, the conclusion that a “keeplock” was alleged is drawn, not from the four corners of the complaint, but from the action of the district court and papers filed with us.
In truth, there is almost no limit to the sets of facts which might be proven under Anderson‘s complaint if we are simply to let our imaginations run free. Indeed, claims of singling out for purposes of racial discrimination or punishment for the exercise of first amendment rights fit more comfortably within its language than the actual fact of a general “keeplock.”
The complaint thus does not give notice of Anderson‘s claim. Judge Kearse is mistaken in viewing my position as requiring the plaintiff to anticipate and refute reasons which the defendant may offer to justify his actions. A federal constitutional claim relating to correctional decisions must allege a procedural defect, a “cruel and unusual” impact, or an impermissible motive. Anderson gives no notice as to which of these claims, if any, he is pursuing. In this situation, a defendant is not informed of what actions he or she must justify. The
My colleagues’ opinions cite only very general authority to support their view of the sufficiency of the notice given by the complaint. I conclude, therefore, that on the facts the holding goes beyond any prior decision, a result at odds with Judge Cardamone‘s critical description of the problems arising from the extensive use and misuse of the privileges accorded by
At this stage, however, I see no such prejudice arising out of the failure to give appellant notice in the district court that the
On the 21st day of May, 1981, appellant was confined to his cell, as were the approximate one thousand prisoners in Great Meadow Correctional Facility, hereafter ‘G.M.C.F.‘, Comstock, New York. This confinement was pre-planned by appellee to facilitate and promote an obsequy for a recently slain guard, see p. 14 as Indexed. This pre-planned ‘General Lockdown’ was formulated at least 72 hours in advance, see appellants Exhibit A.
Exhibit A is a newspaper account of the “keeplock.” With the parties in essential agreement as to the underlying facts,1 the failure to give notice under
In my view, the “keeplock” does not amount to a violation of the Constitution. Appellant was not singled out for individualized disciplinary action and, therefore, notice and a hearing were not required. A one-day “keeplock” does not impose inhumane conditions such as to foreclose prison authorities from allowing guards to attend the funeral of a colleague who has been murdered by inmates. Attending the funeral may be a serious matter so far as the morale of the guards is concerned, and the decision taken was within the range of prison officials’ discretion. I see no serious federal constitutional issue. See Gilliard v. Oswald, 552 F.2d 456 (2d Cir.1977). Whether other circumstances may justify a “keeplock” is not before us.
I concur in the affirmance of the judgment.
KEARSE, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
With all due respect for the majority‘s views, I cannot concur in its judgment. In my view, the complaint could not properly be dismissed pursuant to
A. Inappropriateness of Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal
Plaintiff-appellant Fred M. Anderson is appealing from a judgment of the United
Judge Winter finds the complaint insufficiеnt on its face, apparently because Anderson does not allege that he was “singled out” for the action alleged to have been irrational.1 In my view if the keeplock was imposed for no reason, as alleged, the prisoner would have an arguable constitutional claim, whether he were the only prisoner so confined, or one of 22,000 so confined (as Coughlin originally ordered, see Part C infra), or one of some intermediate number so confined, as was actually the case.
I therefore agree with Judge Cardamone that one cannot conclude, looking solely at the complaint, that it is “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief,” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), and agree that Anderson‘s complaint could not properly be dismissed pursuant to
B. Inappropriateness of Summary Judgment
Although Coughlin‘s motion to dismiss was styled a
The United States Magistrate to whom the matter was referred accepted Coughlin‘s representation, found that “the keeplock was a one-time occurrance [sic] that was prompted by the guards attending a funeral service...,” and concluded that “a sufficient justification existed for the administrative decision of this limited keeplock.”2 Magistrate‘s Report dated Sept.
The district court, after reviewing “all of the papers” in the record, District Court Order dated Oct. 19, 1981, at 1 (“Order“), approved the Magistrate‘s Report and dismissed the complaint, id. at 2. Thus, it clearly appears that the grounds for the dismissal were not found within the four corners of the complaint, and that the court instead rejected on the merits Anderson‘s contention that there was no reason for the keeplock, because it accepted Coughlin‘s assertion that he had a valid reason, namely a shortage of guards.
Given the state of the record, this was an inappropriate use of the summary judgment device. As a general matter, issues as to the motive and intent with which actions were taken are not appropriate for determination on summary judgment. E.g., EEOC v. Home Insurance Co., 672 F.2d 252, 257 (2d Cir.1982); Schmidt v. McKay, 555 F.2d 30, 37 (2d Cir.1977). While complaints charging public officials with violation of a plaintiff‘s civil rights have been made more amenable than others to a summary and early determination where a defense of absolute or qualified (“good faith“) immunity is available, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2737-39, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507-08, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911-2912, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978),3 this hardly means that such a plaintiff should bе denied all discovery, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. at 2740 (Brennan, J., concurring). A plaintiff normally should at least be permitted to obtain disclosure as to, for example, the existence vel non of the facts that the defendants claim motivated them.
In the present case, so far as appears from the record before us, the court did not inform Anderson, pursuant to
On the present record, therefore, the district court could not properly grant summary judgment.
C. Inappropriateness of a Finding of Frivolity
Judge Cardamone imputes to the district court not an intention to grant summary judgment, but rather an intention to dismiss Anderson‘s complaint as frivolous under
First, I take issue with Judge Cardamone‘s conception of the nature of frivolity: it seems very nearly to equate frivolity with lack of merit.8 Thus, he states, ante at 41, that “[a]t whatever point it is clear that merit is lacking, the [in forma pauperis] action should be dismissеd as frivolous under
Second, although I would agree with Judge Cardamone that there are cases in which the complaint is sufficiently well drafted to withstand a
Finally, while I express no opinion as to the likelihood that Anderson would have succeedеd on the merits, I view the proceedings in the related case of Flaherty v. Coughlin, supra, as demonstrating that claims within the ambit of Anderson‘s complaint raise legal points that are arguable on their merits.
The events leading to the keeplock began on or about May 16, 1981, with the slaying of Donna Payant, a guard at the Green Haven Correctional Facility. On May 20, Coughlin issued a directive that on May 21, the day of the funeral, all prisoners in all major state correctional facilities (totaling some 22,000 inmates) would be confined to their cells for 12-15 hours (in addition to the normal 10-hour confinement to their cells for sleeping purposes), and that all guards who so desired would be given the day off with pay so that they could attend the funeral. Flaherty v. Coughlin was commenced on May 20 by an inmate at the Clinton Correctional Facility on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, seeking a temporary restraining order against implementation of the keeplock directive.
Flaherty, like Anderson in the presеnt case, see note 5 supra, suggested that Coughlin‘s directive was not in fact responsive to an anticipated shortage of guards but rather was the cause of any anticipated shortage. Flaherty also contended that even with Coughlin‘s guarantee of pay for guards who took the day off to attend the funeral, Coughlin did not know how many guards would take advantage of the guarantee, and hence could not know that at any particular institution there would be a shortage of guards and a need for a keeplock.
During the hearing on the motion, Judge Sweet suggested that Coughlin rescind his across-the-board order and instead assess the need for a keeplock on an institution-by-institution basis. Coughlin, through his counsel, opposed the suggestion. The court also suggested that Coughlin might rescind the directive insofar as it promised pay to absent guards, on the ground that the guarantee of pay would tend to encourage the guards’ absence. Coughlin rejected the suggestion on the ground that, with the correctional officers’ emotions running so high, it would be counterproductive to withdraw his promise of pay. Coughlin‘s counsel argued that the keeplock was not intended to punish the 22,000 inmates for Mrs. Payant‘s death, but the court found that “it certainly has that implication.” (May 20, 1981 hearing at 20.) The court suggested that Coughlin might be carrying out the collective intent of the correction officers to punish the inmates. (Id.)
Litigation arising out of Coughlin‘s order of the May 21 keeplock thus encompasses a fundamental question as to whether the Commissioner of Corrections has the unfettered discretion to punish all inmates at all of New York‘s major prisons by a one-day
Ultimately, in Flaherty v. Coughlin, Judge Sweet granted a limited injunction. Having found, inter alia, that a keeplock without reason would deprive the prisoners of their rights (id. at 13)10 and that there were substantial questions going to the merits (id.; id. at 24), the court granted the following injunctive order:
That the Commissioner is enjoined from instituting a keeplock except on an institution-by-institution basis arising out of emergency conditions or jeopardy to the safety or security of the institution; and further, he is directed to take all necessary action to minimize any conditions which might result in the imposition of a keeplock.
(Id. at 26.) Coughlin‘s counsel‘s immediate response was, “I can tell you that this is not acceptable to the Department ....” (Id. at 27.)
Notwithstanding his initial opposition, Coughlin apparently did make some sort of an institution-by-institution decision, with Great Meadow being one of three institutions in which the keeplock was imposed. It may well be demonstrable that the keeplock at Great Meadow was for nonpunitive reasons and was occasioned by the lack of security personnel, as Coughlin‘s counsel‘s affidavit in the present case has asserted. Or it may be that the punitive “implication” seen by Judge Sweet would be borne out if, for example, Coughlin failed to provide any facts to substantiate his assertion that there was a shortage of guards at Great Meadow. But in any event, it seems to me that Anderson‘s claim that the keeplock at Great Meadow was unreasonable presents arguable issues and hence cannot be considered frivolous.
I would reverse the judgment dismissing Anderson‘s complaint and remand for appropriate further proceedings.
AMALYA LYLE KEARSE
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE