ORDER
Thе memorandum disposition filed January 7, 1991, is redesignated as an authored opinion by Judge Sneed.
OPINION
Plaintiff seeks an order reversing the final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) denying his claim for social security retirement insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Appellant’s sole contention is that the administrative law judge (AU) wrongly concluded that his date of birth was November 21, 1928 rather than May 25, 1925. The district court upheld the Secretary’s finding. We affirm.
The deсision of a district judge granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo.
See Kruso v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
Appеllant filed an application for social security retirement insurance benefits on November 30, 1987. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied appellant’s claim initially, and again after reconsideration, on the ground that appellant was born on November 21, 1928 and at the time of application had not yet reached the age of 62. Plaintiff appeаled the denial and the AU heard the case de novo. Appellant testified before the AU on January 1, 1989. On March 21, 1989, the AU issued hеr decision and concluded that appellant was born on November 21, 1928. This determination became the “final decisiоn” of the Secretary when the Appeals Council denied appellant’s request for review of the AU’s decision on August 10, 1989.
Appellant filed this action in district court on September 28, 1989. On April 2, 1990, upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court, as already indicated, ruled in favor of the Secretary after concluding that appellant’s date of birth was November 21, 1928.
The appellant produced an entire series of documents indicating numerous birth dates between 1925 and 1930. A table detailing the variоus records, the birth dates they indicate, and the time they were recorded, can be found below. Appellant admitted in his hеaring before the AU that he had listed the various birth dates. He testified that he never intended to defraud anyone but that he simply wanted to appear younger.
Appellant argued that he was born in 1925. He placed great emphasis on his religious birth record obtained from Iraq in 1981. This record shows a baptismal date of November 21, 1925 and a birth date of May 21, 1925. The document was rеcorded on February 16, 1981. Normally, a birth record is classified as “preferred evidence.” The regulations on preferrеd evidence provide that:
The best evidence of your age, if you can obtain it, is either: a birth certificate or hospital birth record recorded before age 5; or a religious record which shows your date of birth and was recorded before age 5.
20 C.F.R. § 404.716(a) (1990). If a birth record meets these criteria, it is generally considered convincing. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.709 (1990).
The AU and district court bоth concluded that the Iraqi birth record was not preferred evidence. We agree. The birth record was not recоrded within five years of appellant’s birth. Moreover, § 00307.540 of the Social Security Administration’s Operations Manual System (POMS) cautiоns against the use of religious records from Iraq.
Religious records from all sources within Iraq are highly suspect. This includes religious records secured by or through churches in the U.S. from religious authorities in Iraq. Many Iraqi churches do not have records for older persons, or where such records do exist, they are in such poor condition as to be unusable. Experience hаs shown that religious authorities have issued certificates for events which occurred in other parishes or countries, fоr events for which there are no records, based on the statements of interested parties even where they conflicted with existing records, or because the individual appeared old and/or in need. 1
See Certified Record at 111-12. The AU and distriсt court, doubting the reliability of this record, were entitled to examine the additional evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.709 (1990).
The AU carefully reviewed the other evidence. The court concluded that the oldest evidence of the appellant’s age or dаte of birth, which could be corroborated, would have the greatest probative value. In determining the probative value of documents submitted as proof of age “consideration will be given to when such other documents were established or recorded, and the circumstances attending their establishment or recordation.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.803 (1990).
The oldest evidence, the SSA rеcord of December 1953, contained a birth date that
The five pieces of evidence that support a birth date in 1925 were recorded just previous to, or after, appellant filed his applicаtion for benefits. This is too recent to overcome the force of the older evidence. The AU and the Secrеtary clearly were entitled to accord greater weight to the documentation that was recorded many yeаrs earlier.
Although the evidence supports several possible birth dates, an examination of this evidence in its entirety demonstrates that the Secretary’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was free of legal error. Where there is substantial evidence to support the decision made by the AU, as well as evidence to support a сontrary determination, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the AU.
See Key v. Heckler,
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. POMS is a policy manual and, therefore, does not have the force and effect of law. It is, nevertheless, persuasive.
See Evelyn v. Schweiker,