RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT [DOC. # 30]
Plaintiffs bring this securities fraud action against VitalWorks, Inc. (“Vital-Works”) and three individual defendants: Joseph M. Walsh, Chief Executive Officer and President of VitalWorks; Michael A. Manto, Chief Financial Officer and Executive Vice President; and Stephen N. Ka-hane, Chief Strategy Officer and Vice Chairman. Consolidated Class Action Complaint (Compl.) [Doc. # 23] ¶¶ 22-24. Plaintiffs allege that between January 24, 2002, and October 23, 2002 (“class period”), VitalWorks violated Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, promulgated thereunder, by making false and misleading statements about certain software products and contracts, as well as VitalWorks’ financial future. The complaint further alleges that the individual defendants are liable for these statements as controlling persons under Section 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). Defendants move to dismiss the complaint under
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Consolidated Class Action Complaint alleges the following facts, which the Court accepts as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss.
Scheuer v. Rhodes,
VitalWorks sells information management software and services to healthcare organizations. Compl. [Doc. # 23] ¶ 38. VitalWorks’ programs “are designed to automate the administrative, financial, and clinical information management functions of office-based physician practices, hospital-based physician practices, and large healthcare enterprises, clinics, and organizations.” Id. During the class period, Vi-talWorks marketed two types of practice management software, “core” products and “classic” products. Core products were those that VitalWorks was actively developing for the latest generation of computer hardware and operating systems, including a radiology program called RadConnect RIS. Id. at ¶¶ 39-40. The company also continued to service and support its older classic products for previous purchasers. Id. at ¶ 55.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants misrepresented three aspects 1 of their business during the relevant time. First, with respect to core products, they allege that defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that RadConnect RIS 2 had technical glitches and did not perform properly, but nonetheless “touted” the software. Id. at ¶ 40-53. Second, plaintiffs allege that the company misrepresented the amount of revenue to be gained from upgrading their classic products for current customers to comply with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub.L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat 1936. Id. at ¶ 71-76. Third, plaintiffs allege that the company issued misleading revenue projections based on RadCon-nect’s marketability and the effect of HI-PAA on expected revenue. Id. at ¶ 77-98. The specific statements alleged to be misleading are as follows.
A. RadConnect RIS
Regarding RadConnect RIS, plaintiffs allege VitalWorks made nine false or misleading statements regarding the technological viability, marketability, and profitability of the software.
• On March 29, 2002, VitalWorks filed a Form 10-K report with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The form was signed by defendantsWalsh, Manto and Kahane. The report stated: “VitalWorks believes that there is a significant opportunity to provide system upgrades to those clients using classic and other non-core' products by providing a migration path to VitalWorks’ core products.... The Company is actively promoting the migration of these clients to newer products and intends to retire these products at the earliest possible opportunity.” Compl. [Doc. # 23] ¶ 81.
• On April 11, 2002, VitalWorks issued a press release on PR Newswire am nouncing the commercial release of RadConnect RIS. The release stated, in part, that “RadConnect RIS is one of the most significant product offerings in recent year’s, not just for Vital-Works but for the specialty as a whole, redefining the standards of speed, productivity, and workflow.” Id. at ¶ 83.
• In the same press release, VitalWorks, claimed that it “is presently the leading provider of RIS systems in the country. RadConnect RIS underlines' our commitment to radiology and our ' role as the industry leader, and helps - secure our leadership for the years to come.” Id.
• On May 6, 2002, defendant Walsh sent a letter to shareholders, attaching a copy of the Company’s 2001 Annual ‘ Report. In this letter, Walsh stated,' “Today, I am pleased to report that we. have commercially released two next- - generation radiology products... Rad-Connect RIS and RadConnect Results [the web-based sister program to Rad-Connect RIS].... We believe that., these products will be very attractive' to our considerable radiology customer base as well as to the entire ambulatory radiology market....” Id. at ¶ 88.
• In the same letter, defendant Walsh " wrote, “I believe that 2002 will be another very exciting year for Vital-Works; we’re already off to a good start.” Id.
• On July 23, 2002, VitalWorks issued a press release over PR Newswire announcing its second quarter earnings. The press release stated, in part, “We continue to win in the markets we serve by bringing great software and service solutions to both new and existing clients. The remainder of the year looks promising for us.... ” Id. at ¶ 91.
• On the same date, defendant Walsh conducted a conference call with stock analysts and investors. Discussing the second quarter earnings report, he stated, “And I also, I think, said that on the other hand, our software licenses we were seeing greater sales than we anticipated and because of that, as you know, we raised guidance in the last quarter, mainly because when you mix in more software sales on recurring side, the margins on the software are much higher. So that would, hopefully, explain those numbers.” Id. at ¶ 93.
• In the same conference call, defendant Walsh stated, “again, radiology, I think we got pretty good visibility over the upgrades and the business that we’re doing.” Id. at ¶ 94.
• On September 16, an analyst named A. Draper from Sun Trust Robinson Humphrey issued a report concerning VitalWorks. Prior to the report, the analyst had met with VitalWorks’ management. The analyst wrote, “In our conversations with the company, management stated that their latest product, RadConnect RIS, has been very well received.” Id. at ¶ 97.
Plaintiffs allege that all of these statements were misleading because Vital-
B. HIPAA Compliance
The second set of allegations concerns representations about the effect of HIPAA on VitalWorks’ revenue. The statute, in relevant part, sets standards governing the electronic data transfer of health care information. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq. Covered health care entities were originally required to comply with certain portions of HIPAA by October 16, 2002, shortly before the end of the class period in this case, although the deadline was later extended by a year. Compl. [Doc. #23] ¶ 76. Plaintiffs allege that defendants represented to investors that VitalWorks would increase its revenues because current customers would have to pay for upgrades or modifications to existing software in order to comply with HIPAA. However, plaintiffs allege, these revenues never materialized.
Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the following statements were false or misleading:
• On April 23, 2002, VitalWorks issued a press release (reissued April 24) announcing its first quarter earnings. The press release stated, among other things, ‘We are continuing to achieve growth in our software license sales across every division of the company, a result of both core product upgrades revolving around HIPAA compliance as well as an increased rate of competitive wins.” Compl. [Doc. # 23] ¶ 85.
• On July 23, 2002, VitalWorks announced its second quarter earnings and conducted a conference call. During that call, defendant Walsh stated to an analyst from Wells Fargo Security, “Bud, I think we spoke earlier that we expect to continue to invest in the Company and especially in the marketing and sales arena related around pushing our DDI (ph) with HIPAA. So we have cost built into our internal models related to those, including building our EDI [electronic data interchange] gateway, which is underway, and some costs associated to that. So, at this point, I think our guidance-we feel comfortable with our guidance for the third quarter, where it is right now.” Id. at ¶ 94.
• The analyst asked a follow-up question at the conference call asking defendant Walsh to compare HIPAA revenues expected in the third quarter with those seen during the first quarter. Walsh replied, “I think that we’ll see expanding revenues related to upgrades, getting people the current versions. But I also believe that that process, we’ll be seeing revenues from that, certainly through the second quarter, but I also think it will probably go into the third, fourth quarter”, Id.
• In response to a third question from the same analyst, asking whether there would be a “break-out quarter” for HIPAA revenues, Walsh replied, in part, “...we’re seeing some of those impacts at HIPAA now in our license revenue, I certainly can see where we’ve built, over the past several quarters, people moving to standardized versions of the software that’s HIPAA compliant. I would expect, you know] again, you see our models, you see our revenues that we expected over the next several quarters will continue to grow at the rate we projected in our revenue guidance.” Id.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants knew during the class period that few customers ' would be paying for HIPAA-related software upgrades, and therefore the state- ' ments above were false and misleading. Plaintiffs point to defendant Walsh’s statement in a conference call on October 23, 2002, that fewer than 200,000 out of two > million health care entities required to comply with HIPAA had filed for an extension before the October 16, 2002, deadline. Compl. [Doc. # 23] ¶ 76. From this admission, plaintiffs infer that the majority of' covered entities had already complied before the deadline. Plaintiffs also assert that entities were waiting until the new deadline to comply, and therefore revenues should not have been expected in fall 2002. Id. at ¶ 75. Additionally, plaintiffs allege VitalWorks’ customer service was so poor that clients refused to hire VitalWorks to complete upgrades. Id. at ¶ 74.
C. Financial Projections
Plaintiffs also allege separately that Vi-talWorks’ financial projections for the fourth quarter of 2001 through the third quarter of 2002, as well as their projections of 2002 and 2003 total revenue, were false and misleading because they were based upon false information about the profitability of RadConnect RIS and HI-PAA- Plaintiffs specify the following seven financial statements as false and misleading:
• On January 24, 2002, the first day of the class period, VitalWorks announced in a press release over PR Newswire that for “the year 2002, the company estimates revenues of approximately $120 million and net income of approximately $12 million, or $0.24 per diluted share.” Compl. [Doc. #23] ¶77.
• On April 23, 2003 and April 24, .2002, the company issued a press release stating, “Looking forward, VitalWorks expects to have second quarter revenues of approximately $29 million.... For the year 2002, the company estimates revenues of approximately $120 million, and has raised its guidance for net income to $18.5 million to $19.5 million... and EBITDA [earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization] as adjusted, to $21 million to $22 million. For 2003, Vital-Works estimates revenues of $132 million to $138 million.” Id. at ¶ 85.
• On May 15, 2002, Vital Works filed its first quarter report on Form 10-Q. The form repeated the revenue estimates above, announced April 23-24. It further stated that “management believes that these forward-looking statements are reasonable and that the projections contained in this report are based on reasonable assumptions and forecasts....” Id. at ¶ 89.
• On July 23, 2002, VitalWorks issued a press release over PR Newswire stating, in part, “Looking forward, Vital-Works expects to have third quarter revenues of approximately $30 million.... For the year 2002, the company estimates revenues of approximately $120 million, and has raised its guidance for net income to $23 million to $24.5 million.... For 2003, Vital-Works estimates revenues of $132 million to $138 million and net income of $20 million to $24 million, or $0.37 to $0.45 per share.” Id. at ¶ 91.
• Plaintiffs also re-allege as misleading defendant Walsh’s comments during the July 23, 2002, conference call: “Bud, I think we spoke earlier that we expect to continue to invest in the Company and especially in the marketing and sales arena related around pushing our DDI (ph) with HIPAA. So we have cost built into our internal models related to those, including building our EDI [electronic data interchange] gateway, which is underway, and some costs associated to that. So, at this point, I think our guidance-we feel comfortable with our guidance for the third quarter, where it is right now.” Id. at ¶ 94.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard
When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Scheuer v. Rhodes,
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) refines that standard. “To state a cause of action for securities fraud under section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b), a plaintiff must plead that in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, the defendant, acting with scien-ter, made a false material representation or omitted to disclose material information and that plaintiffs reliance on defendant’s action caused plaintiff injury.”
Rothman v. Gregor,
B. Sufficiency of Fraud Allegations
With one exception, plaintiffs adequately identify the allegedly fraudulent statements, including the date, the speaker, and the substance. They point to the following documents: PR Newswire press release (Jan. 24, 2002); Form 10-K (March 29, 2002); PR Newswire press release (April 11, 2002); PR Newswire press release (April 23-24, 2002); Letter to shareholders attached to annual report (May 6, 2002); Form 10-Q (May 15, 2002); PR Newswire press release (July 23, 2002), Transcript of conference call (July 23, 2002). All of these documents identify
1. Sun Trust Robinson Humphrey Report
With respect to the Sun Trust Robinson Humphrey report (Sept. 16, 2002), the complaint does not include that information. “Plaintiffs may state a claim, against corporate officials for false and misleading information disseminated through analysts’ reports by alleging that the officials either (1) ‘intentionally foster[ed] a mistaken belief concerning a material fact’ that was incorporated into reports; or (2) adopted or placed their ‘imprimatur’ on the reports.”
Novak,
The Sun Trust report at issue relies on “conversations with the company,” and says that “management stated that... RadConnect RIS has been very well received.” Compl. [Doc. # 23] ¶ 97. The complaint does not identify “the circumstances of the statements — including dates and participants.”
Novak,
2. VitalWorks’ Statements Concerning RadConnect RIS
? greater deficiency in the First Amended Complaint is that it “alleges only in a most sketchy' fashion- circumstances which would give rise to an inference of fraud.”
Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc.,
First, plaintiffs flag a statement in Form 10-K, dated March 29, 2002,' that “Vital-Works believes that there is significant opportunity to provide system upgrades ... ‘ [and] is actively promoting the migration of... clients to newer products.” Compl. [Doe. # 23] ¶ 81. A statement that the company “believes” its business may go in a particular direction, or that it is “promoting” a particular business plan, would not be interpreted by a reasonable investor as a promise that the plan will be -successful.
See San Leandro Emerg. Medical Group v. Philip Morris Co.,
The Second Circuit has held that where a company previously announced a particular business strategy, it may have a duty to disclose a new strategy “whenever secret information renders prior public statements materially misleading.... ”
Time Warner,
The Second Circuit arguably narrowed
Time Warner
in
San Leandro,
Here, plaintiffs complain that Vital-Works committed fraud when it stated that it was “actively promoting the migration of... clients to newer products.” Compl. [Doc. # 23] ¶ 81. However, plaintiffs do not allege that VitalWorks was actually changing its marketing strategy with respect to RadConnect RIS. They do not allege that VitalWorks failed to promote “migration” to new products while publicly announcing that it would do so. They do not allege that VitalWorks was secretly considering another business strategy that it refused to disclose to investors. Rather, plaintiffs merely allege that RadConnect did not work very well and therefore customers did not want to
Plaintiffs next complain of a series of statements that they describe as “touting” RadConnect RIS. Compl. [Doc. # 23] ¶¶ 5, 46, 83, 88. VitalWorks called its software “one of the most significant product offerings in recent years;” said that “we believe [it] will be very attractive to our considerable radiology customer base as well as to the entire ambulatory radiology market;” and “RadConnect RIS underlines our commitment to radiology and our role as the industry leader...” Id. at ¶¶ 83, 88. Another press release called its products “great software and service solutions.” Id. at ¶ 91. VitalWorks also made optimistic statements about its corporate future, predicting that “2002 will be another very exciting year... we’re already off to a good start,” and “the remainder of the year looks promising for us.” Id. at ¶¶ 88, 91.
Such positive labels and generalized statements of corporate optimism do not amount to materially false and misleading statements. “People in charge of an enterprise are not required to take a gloomy, fearful or defeatist view of the future; subject to what current data indicates, they can be expected to be confident about their stewardship and the prospects of the business that they manage.”
Rothman,
Saying that a product is “significant,” “attractive” or “great” is merely “puffery,” not actionable securities fraud.
See San Leandro,
Additionally, there can be no fraud in a generalized statement such as Vital-Works’ announcement that it expected to have an “exciting year” or that they were “off to a good start.” The Second Circuit has made very clear that generalized, optimistic statements of business performance, short of “definite positive projections,” are not actionable.
Time Warner,
This case is very similar to
Time Warner,
Cheerleading only becomes fraud if “defendants had access to contrary facts” and plaintiffs can specifically identify “reports or statements” containing contrary information.
Novak,
216 F.3d at. 309. For instance, plaintiffs in
In re Scholastic Corp. Securities Litigation,
Here, by contrast, plaintiffs include no data about sales of RadConnect RIS. They do not state how many units of the software VitalWorks expected to sell, how many it would need to sell to recoup its research and development costs, or even how many units of its new products Vital-Works- usually sells. Moreover, they do not state how much of the allegedly fraudulent financial projections for 2002 were based on expected sales of RadConnect RIS, nor do they point to the existence of internal, documents that might contain such information. Plaintiffs do allege that, of twenty-eight units originally sold, only three RadConnect RIS units are still functioning. Compl. [Doc. # 23] ¶ 51. Drawing inferences favorable to the plaintiff, this fact could show that the software had problems causing customers to abandon it after only a few years. But it does not necessarily show that customers refused to buy the software initially.
4
Without other sales data for comparison, there is no reason to believe that the existence of some bugs in RadConnect RIS influenced sales of the product, during or after the class period. And without such information, plaintiffs fail to meet their burden of pleading why any financial projections that included sales estimates for RadConnect RIS were fraudulent.
See Novak,
The element of timing also is missing. The complaint alleges that RadConnect had bugs and did not sell as well as Vital-Works apparently would have liked, but it fails to allege how or when defendants learned that product defects existed. The complaint cites a “former Senior Software Specialist” who stated that the “code was not ‘solid,’ ” and that testing during the winter and spring of 2002 revealed “bugs that prevented the product from performing as advertised.” Compl. [Doc. #23] ¶¶ 48-49. The complaint does not allege that the Senior Software Specialist ever shared this knowledge with the named defendants and, if so, whether he/she did so
In Ross, plaintiffs brought suit against A.EL Robbins Co., the pharmaceutical company responsible for developing the now-notorious Daikon Shield intrauterine birth control device. Id. at 547. Similar to the allegations in this case, the Ross plaintiffs alleged that A.H. Robbins artificially inflated the price of its stock by disseminating false and misleading information about the safety and effectiveness of the Daikon Shield, and failing to reveal that the device was less effective and more dangerous than the company’s earlier public statements had indicated. Id. Plaintiffs did not allege that the named defendants actually knew of the product defects. Rather, they alleged that an unpublished report from 1972, two years before A.H. Robbins notified physicians of safety and efficacy problems with the Daikon Shield, had indicated that the device could be dangerous. Id. at 558. Plaintiffs did not allege any relationship between the author of the report and the defendants, nor whether there was “any reason to believe that the defendants were even aware of the report’s existence.” Id. Plaintiffs also failed to allege the point in time when the defendants became aware of the IUD’s safety problems. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), holding that “it is reasonable to require that the plaintiffs specifically plead those events which they assert give rise to a strong inference that the defendants had knowledge.... And, of course, plaintiffs must fix the time when these particular events occurred.” Id. 5
It is critical that plaintiffs in the present case allege that defendants knew of the problems with RadConnect RIS, and knew of them before the end of the class period. If the “Senior Software Specialist” never informed defendants of the problems with RadConnect RIS, then defendants could not have known of the nature, magnitude, or implications of the defects, and could not have intentionally misled investors regarding the prospects for the product. Even if defendants knew, there can be no fraud unless defendants failed to act upon the information when they received it.
Ross,
Moreover, defendants do not allege any facts concerning the type of bugs Rad-Connect RIS experienced. Despite having interviewed a Senior Software Specialist involved with developing the product, plaintiffs do not allege anything tending to show that the bugs in the program were fatal (or even seriously detrimental) to the program’s commercial success. The plaintiffs do not, for example, allege that the bugs prevented customers from accessing data, caused errors in data that would be medically dangerous to patients, caused computers to crash, infected other programs or machines, etc. They merely allege that the code was not “solid” or “ready for commercial release.” Compl. [Doc. # 23] ¶ 48. This stands in stark contrast to other cases in which plaintiffs at least alleged some information tending
Essentially, plaintiffs complain that Rad-Connect RIS was not a good or successful product, despite defendants’ hopes, intentions, and projections that it would be. The securities laws are not intended to compensate investors when a product fails in a competitive marketplace; only if plaintiffs can adequately allege that defendants were aware of substantial problems with RadConnect RIS that would significantly impact revenues, and deliberately concealed those product defects, would the complaint state a claim for fraud.
See Rothman,
3. VitalWorks’ Statements Concerning HIPAA
The second category of fraud allegations concerns anticipated revenue from current VitalWorks clients who needed to update their software to comply with HI-PAA. On April 23-24, VitalWorks issued a press release announcing that it was “continuing to achieve growth ... revolving around HIPAA compliance as well as an increased rate of competitive wins.” Compl. [Doc. # 23] ¶ 85. In July, defendant Walsh projected that “well see expanding revenues related to [HIPAA] upgrades,” and said he “believe[d]” that those revenues would arrive in the second, third and fourth quarters. Id. at ¶ 94.
As with the statements concerning Rad-Connect RIS, defendants’ statements concerning goals for HIPAA revenue do not amount to materially false or misleading statements of a sufficiently definite character as to be actionable under the securities laws.
See Time Warner,
Likewise, there is nothing materially misleading about saying that the company was “getting people the current versions” of software, Compl. ¶ 94, unless the company was claiming to have sold software that it did not sell, and there is no such allegation in the complaint. This case can be contrasted with
Rothman,
The same principle is stated in
Novak v. Kasaks,
There is no such allegation against Vital-Works. Plaintiffs do not allege that Vital-Works reported HIPAA revenues that it did not earn. They do not allege that VitalWorks reported sales of software that did not actually occur.
Plaintiffs give four reasons why the listed statements were false or misleading. First, according to a “former Senior Sales Executive,” VitalWorks alienated “many” of its customers because it “saw HIPAA as an opportunity to make a cash killing,” and overcharged customers for software modifications. Compl. [Doc. # 23] ¶ 74. Second, the federal government extended the relevant HIPAA compliance deadline from October 16, 2002 to the same date in 2003, and therefore there was no pressure on customers to upgrade their software during the class period in 2002. Id. at ¶ 75. Plaintiffs cite defendants’ statement (during an October 23, 2002, conference call) that fewer than 200,000 of 2 million entities subject to HIPAA had actually filed for the extension, “a fact suggesting that the vast majority had already complied with the requirement.” Id. at ¶ 76. Fourth, plaintiffs cite “a former VitalWorks sales executive and account manager” who worked at the company until May, 2002 as saying that the market for HIPAA compliance was fully saturated, and VitalWorks did not have a competitive advantage because it only held a small share of the market for practice management software. Id. at ¶ 75.
Plaintiffs’ explanations for why the statements are fraudulent are not logical. Plaintiffs allege that VitalWorks alienated some of its customers by charging them a great deal for software modifications, but if VitalWorks were overcharging, its HI-PAA-related revenues should have been greater than otherwise expected, not less. Next, the arguments concerning prior HI-PAA compliance are contradictory. On one hand, plaintiffs allege that most covered entities already had complied with HIPAA. On the other hand, they allege that defendants knew the deadline was extended and there was no reason for entities to comply before 2003. Either way, the market for HIPAA-compliant software in October 2002 could be smaller than defendants thought. But it is plaintiffs’ burden to explain why defendants’ HI-PAA-related statements were fraudulent,
Novak,
The essence of plaintiffs’ claim is that defendants made less money in the third quarter from HIPAA than they originally thought they might. Plaintiffs do not point to anything suggesting defendants knew that their predictions, when made, were false or based on incorrect data.
Cf. Rothman,
4. VitalWorks’ Financial Projections
In addition to alleging that various VitalWorks statements regarding Rad-Connect RIS and HIPAA were fraudulent, plaintiffs also allege that fiscal year 2002 and 2003 projections issued by the company were fraudulent because they were based upon fraudulent projections concerning RadConnect RIS and HIPAA. As explained below, since plaintiffs do not adequately allege that the underlying statements concerning growth in sales of Vital-Works’ software were fraudulent, they do not state a cognizable claim that financial projections based upon these assumptions are fraudulent.
“[M]ere opinions and predictions of future performance are not actionable under the securities laws unless ‘they are worded as guarantees or are supported by specific statements of fact, or if the speaker does not genuinely or reasonably believe them.’ ”
Faulkner v. Verizon Communs., Inc.,
However, unless there is an underlying misstatement of current fact, forward-looking financial projections, if accompanied by proper risk disclosures, are protected by the safe harbor provision in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(e)(l).
6
Plaintiffs argue
Not only do plaintiffs fail to allege facts showing that the underlying statements were false, they fail to allege a nexus between any shortcomings in VitalWorks’ products and the company’s financial results. The fact that RadConnect RIS did not sell as well as hoped (or even failed completely), or that HIPAA revenues were lower than expected, does not mean that the company’s subsequent downward revision was due to those factors alone. As plaintiffs themselves assert [Compl. ¶ 52-53], in 2002-2003 VitalWorks sold and supported many other software programs, which also had technical difficulties that may have frustrated customers. Plaintiffs need not show exactly which items caused which losses, but there must be some basis to infer causation. For example, plaintiffs in
In re Scholastic,
By contrast, plaintiffs here do not allege how much of VitalWorks’ financial projections were based upon expected sales of RadConnect RIS. They do not allege that the revised financial projections announced in October, 2002, were of an amount that can be correlated to any financial losses attributable to RadConnect RIS. Therefore there is no nexus alleged between VitalWorks’ revised financial projections and bugs in the software. For the same reason, the allegations of fraud in financial projections fall short to the extent they are based on expected HIPAA revenue. There is no allegation of how much HI-PAA revenue VitalWorks expected, how much was reasonable to expect, or how those expectations factored into the overall financial projections that plaintiffs say are fraudulent. Without any alleged causal connection, plaintiffs’ complaint fails to provide a sufficient basis from which to infer an intent to defraud.
C. Circumstantial Evidence of Scien-ter
Plaintiffs argue that, although they do not have any direct evidence of fraud—
1. Standard
The PSLRA requires a complaint to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). The required state of mind in an action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is “an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.”
Kalnit v. Eichler,
“The motive and opportunity element is generally met when corporate insiders misrepresent material facts to keep the price of stock high while selling their own shares at a profit. ‘Unusual’ insider sales at the time of the alleged withholding of negative corporate news may permit an inference of bad faith and scienter.”
In re Scholastic,
2. Alleged Insider Trading at Vi-talWorks
Plaintiffs allege that all three named defendants sold large numbers of shares during the class period. These sales came in two waves: one in late April/ May 2002, four to six weeks after Vital-Works introduced RadConneet RIS onto the market on April 11; and one in August/September 2002, before VitalWorks announced its downward revisions to financial projections on October 23. The complaint alleges that during the class period defendants collectively sold 703,926 Vital-Works shares.
On May 31, 2002, Defendant Walsh sold 58,736 shares, 7 realizing approximately $510,000. [Compl. ¶ 107]. On May 30, 2002, Defendant Manto sold about 200,000 shares, realizing around $1,600,000 in proceeds. Id. at ¶ 108. On April 26, 2002, Defendant Kahane sold about 50,690 shares, for $380,000, and on May 30, 2002, he sold another 300,000 shares, realizing $2,430,000. Id. at ¶ 109.
On August 20, Defendant Walsh sold 90,000 shares for $723,000. Id. at ¶ 107. Defendant Kahane sold 4,500 shares for $38,000 on September 5.
Id.
at ¶ 109. The complaint also alleges that other members of VitalWorks’ upper management, not defendants in this case, engaged in heavy trading of VitalWorks stock in May/June 2002 and August 2002, during the class
The decisions in which courts have considered whether insider trading was suspicious are highly fact-specific. This case does not fit easily within any of them. In
In re Scholastic,
In
San Leandro,
Acito,
The main factor distinguishing the present case from those discussed above is timing. The cases above all contained allegations that the defendants sold off large quantities of stock within a matter of days before they announced disappointing news about their businesses. Even if other factors rendered the sales not suspicious, at least the timing suggested that the defendants were selling stock on the basis of insider information shortly before the market received the bad news. Here, in contrast, the timing is the opposite. Defendants sold much more stock in the spring than the fall. If defendants really intended to sell off their stock to avoid the negative reaction to the October 23, 2002, announcement, one would expect that the fall sales would be much larger than the spring sales. Instead, only two defendants are alleged to have sold anything at all, and those sales were relatively small in comparison to the spring sales: $723,000 in mid-August and $38,000 in early September. Moreover, these sales occurred nine weeks and seven weeks, respectively, before VitalWorks’ October press release and conference call. This timing is not such as to raise a “strong inference,” 15
Plaintiffs allege that the spring sales were suspicious because defendants were attempting to take advantage of artificially inflated stock prices that were based upon their announcements concerning RadCon-nect RIS and HIPAA revenues. RadCon-nect RIS was introduced on April 11, 2002. VitalWorks’ stock price appears not to have reacted to that announcement. 9 On April 23-24, VitalWorks issued a press release announcing first quarter earnings and projections for the year of 2002. The market did react positively. VitalWorks’ stock jumped from a high of $6.23/share on April 22, to a high of $7.50/share on April 24 and a high of $8.40/share on April 25. Then defendant Kahane sold $380,000 worth of shares on April 26, 2002 (that day’s high price was $8.20; the closing price was $7.33).
However, the bulk of the spring sales occurred on May 30-31, 2002, over a month after the press release. Vital-Works’ stock did reach historically high prices on those dates (closing at $8.30 and $8.60, respectively). But plaintiffs do not allege that defendants did anything in May that would have caused these high prices. Indeed, VitalWorks’ average stock price continued to rise throughout the spring and summer, but there is no specific connection alleged between those increases and any statements by management. The higher stock prices on August 20, 2002 (closing at $8.02) and September 5, 2002 (closing at $8.17), when the fall sales occurred, do not seem to correlate at all with any particular announcements that plaintiffs claim were fraudulent. Overall, this timing does not suggest a concerted effort to take advantage of artificially inflated stock prices, or to dump the stock just before the investing public discovered a fraud.
Looking at the other elements, it is possible that the fact that all the named defendants sold their stock could be deemed suspicious.
In re Scholastic,
The change in volume of insider sales might be considered unusual because none of the defendants sold any VitalWorks stock before or after the class period. One could argue that this is evidence that the defendants deliberately deceived the market so they could sell off their shares while the price was high. One could also interpret these circumstances simply as stockholders selling when VitalWorks stock was
As for the fourth factor, it is unclear whether the dollar amount of sales is significant. Neither party has put the numbers in context; the Court has no basis for inferring whether the stock sales could be considered large by VitalWorks or American corporate standards. During April and May 2002, Defendants Walsh, Manto and Kahane engaged in trades of about $0.5 million, $1.6 million and $2.8 million, respectively, for a total of $4.92 million. The trades in September and October totaled $761,000. In
San Leandro,
The lesson from these cases is that dollar amounts “cannot be considered in isolation.”
In re Scholastic,
As discussed
supra,
§§ II.B.2-II.B.3, plaintiffs also fail to allege any direct evidence that defendants knew about the alleged shortfalls in revenue from RadCon-nect RIS or HIPAA before their October 23, 2002, announcement. Without sufficient allegations of scienter, the Section 10(b) claims must be dismissed under Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(b) and 12(b)(6).
San Leandro,
D. Controlling Person Liability
A person who either directly or indirectly controls another who violates the Exchange Act may be held jointly and severally liable for the violation.
See
15
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss the consolidated class action complaint is GRANTED, and the complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Plaintiffs have abandoned their claims regarding the contract between VitalWorks and FUJIFILM. see Compl. [Doc. # 16] ¶¶ 66-70; Lead Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Class Action Complaint [Doc. # 33] at 2 n. 3.
. Plaintiffs also include information regarding other core products, including programs called Chart Station and Prism. See Compl. [Doc. # 23] ¶¶ 52-53, 60-62. The Court does not see the relevance of this information.
. The Second Circuit further held that "whether consideration
of the
alternate approach constitutes material information, and whether nondisclosure of the alternate approach renders the original disclosure misleading, remain questions for the
trier of
fact....”
Time Warner,
. Customers often buy software with bugs. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find a software program on the market without at least some technical glitches. As defendants point out, even Microsoft regularly releases patches and service packages designed to cor-! rect bugs in its products. See http://www.mi-croSoft.com/downloads/search.aspx7dis-playlang — en.
. In
Rothman,
. Under the Exchange Act, a written forward-looking statement is protected by the safe harbor provision if:
(A) the forward-looking statement is-
(i) identified as a forward-looking statement, and is accompanied by meaningful
(B) the plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-looking statement-
(i) if made by a natural person, was made with actual knowledge by that person that the statement was false or misleading; or
(ii) if made by a business entity; was-
(I) made by or with the approval of an executive officer of that entity; and
(II) made or approved by such officer with actual knowledge by that officer that the statement was false or misleading
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(l). Oral statements are protected by similar provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(2).
. Defendants argue that these shares belonged to Sarah Walsh, Mr. Walsh's wife. For purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, the Court assumes plaintiffs' version of the facts to be true.
. IMCERA Group, the corporate defendant in the case, manufactured animal medications.
Acito,
. The Court takes judicial notice of Vital-Works' published stock prices.
See Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co.,
. Though plaintiffs allege that all three named defendants sold shares during the class period, they do not allege how many officers or directors sold shares, or how many shares were sold.
. In their motion to dismiss, defendants assert that Walsh, Manto and Kahane retained 97%, 84% and 84% of their stock respectively. Plaintiffs assert in their opposition that the numbers are lower, and specifically that Ka-hane retained only about 75% of his stock. Plaintiffs also state that they need discovery to make accurate calculations. None of this information is contained within the complaint or any public documents referenced in the complaint, and therefore the Court cannot and does not consider it.
Brass
v.
American Film Techs., Inc.,
