[¶ 1] Jоanne Boyer appeals from an order of the Superior Court (Aroostook County, Pierson, J.) affirming a post-judgment order of the District Court (Caribou, Daigle, J.) awarding primary physical residence of her son, Michael Fraser, to her former husband, Todd Fraser. On this appeal, Bоyer argues that the District Court abused its discretion in granting primary physical residence to Fraser and in considering evidence regаrding her pre-divorce conduct as part of the evidence evaluated in reaching its decision. We disagree and affirm thе judgment of the District Court.
[¶2] The parties were married in 1990. Their son, Michael, was bom in 1991. In 1994, a judgment of divorce was entered based in part on a written agreement. In that agreement, the parties undertook to share parental rights and responsibilities, with Michael’s primary physical residence with Boyer. Fraser was permitted to “visit and be visited by the child at all reasonable and proper times, inсluding but not limited to having the child for three nights every week....”
[¶ 3] Both parties have remarried after the divorce. In September of 1995, Boyer filed a motion to amend the divorce agreement to obtain full custody of Michael to facilitate a move to Ohio with hеr new husband. Fraser filed a responding motion to amend the divorce judgment to allocate to him primary physical residencе of Michael.
[¶ 4] A hearing was held on the motions in April 1996. Over Boyer’s objections, the court admitted evidence offered by Fraser regarding Boyer’s pre-divorce conduct. The court also admitted evidence regarding Todd Fraser’s pre-divorce conduct, the post-divorce conduct of both parties and the difficulties between the parties both before and after the divorce.
[¶ 5] After hearing, the District Court found that:
Given the history of their marriage, and the history of their respective performances as parents during the course of thаt marriage and subsequent thereto, that [Fraser] is substantially the more responsible of the two parents and substantially the more stable of the two parents.
Accordingly, the court granted primary physical residence of Michael to Fraser. The court ordеred that Boyer would have visitation rights for eight weeks during the summer, ten days during Christmas vacation, and seven days during April vacation. Boyer aрpealed, and the Superior Court affirmed the order.
[¶ 6] Where, as here, the Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate court, this Court reviews directly the decision of the District Court.
Cloutier v. Lear,
[¶ 7] Either parent may move the court to modify an order regarding parental rights and responsibilities as circumstances require. 19 M.R.S.A § 752(12) (Supp.1996), repealed by P.L.1995, ch. 694, § B-l (effective October 1, 1997) and recodified as 19-A M.R.S.A § 1657(1998).
[¶ 8] Section 752(12) provided that: “The relocation, or intended relocаtion, of a child resident of this state to another state by a
[¶ 9] Boyer argues that principles of res judicata should bar the District Court from considering evidence of pre-divorce conduct in evaluating a post-divorce motion for change of parental rights and responsibilities. Because the original divorce was granted by the court рursuant to an agreement, however, the parties did not litigate issues of their pre-divorce conduct and parenting.
[¶ 10] This is not a case like
Cloutier,
where wе upheld a trial court’s excluding evidence of events before a previous custody hearing in determining if a substantial change of circumstances had occurred.
[¶ 11] In this case the court heard the motion to change the primary physical residence of the child approximately two years after the divorce. The relative quality of the parties’ parenting had not previously been litigated, and with a four night — three night split of the child’s residence, the original divorce order did not suggest thаt either parent had been assigned a dominant amount of time with Michael. In these circumstances where the court was required, for the first time, to assign one parent a dominant relationship with the child, evidence of relatively recent pre-divorcе conduct was relevant, along with all of the evidence of post-divorce conduct. Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its disсretion in admitting evidence of the parties’ pre-divorce conduct to serve as a contextual basis for evaluating post-divorce conduct.
[¶ 12] Decisions on admissibility of evidence are an area where we accord trial courts cоnsiderable discretion. A ruling excluding the evidence at issue here, considering the remoteness in time of the conduct, the potеntial to reopen old disputes that may have a detrimental effect on the child, or the risk of unduly extending the proceeding, сould also have been within the trial court’s discretion. The relevance and admissibility of such pre-divorce evidence in pоst-divorce hearings must be evaluated based on the issues and circumstances of each case.
[¶ 13] Boyer also argues that the District Court’s granting primary physical residence of Michael to Fraser is unsupported by the evidence, particularly in light of the child’s expressed preference and the guardian ad litem’s recommendation supporting primary physical residencе with Boyer. The District Court, however, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence in such cases involving difficult determinations of best interest of the child as between two competing parents. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in this case.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.