delivered the opinion of the court:
Reference is made to an order of this court dated November 13,1979, consоlidating the above appeals and providing that the briefs for plaintiffs filed in сases Nos. 79-746, 79-1096 and 79-1097 shall stand and be considered as the brief for the plaintiff in cаse No. 79-747. In addition, the motion of defendant, Steven Katz, for summary affirmance оf the judgment order appealed from, filed in appeal No. 79-746 on October 18, 1979, shall stand and be considered as the brief in behalf of all defendants in the сonsolidated cases. It will not be necessary to set forth the facts in eаch case as the identical question of comparative negligenсe is involved in all cases.
In cases Nos. 79-746, 79-1096 and 79-1097, plaintiffs have presented the sole issue, “[Wjhether Illinois should adopt a comparative negligence system of jurisprudence.”
In 79-747, the same issue has been presented by the consоlidation of said cases, and all plaintiffs are represented by the samе attorney.
In case No. 79-746, defendant filed a motion for summary affirmance of the order of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing Count II of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Defendant’s motion, inter alia, stated:
“1. That on Page 8 of the Plaintiff-Appellant’s brief, it is stated that ‘the thesis of this Brief is that contributory negligence should no longer be enforced as a cоmmon law doctrine which operates as an absolute bar to recovery of damages. This is a matter oriented not to issues of law but rather oriented to jurisprudence, namely, what our system of Illinois law should be.’
2. That on Page 9 of the Plaintiff-Appellant’s brief, it is stated that the Illinois General Assembly has failed to pass legislation enacting comparative negligence as the law of this jurisdiсtion and then states that there is ‘no probability nor even a solid hint of promise that the legislature will enact a comparative negligence statute in the foreseeable future’ despite the fact that ‘almost 12 years’ have passed since the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Maki vs. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2nd 193,
3. That Plaintiff-Appellant’s brief asks this Court to substitute itself for both the legislature and the Supreme Court in adopting the doctrine оf comparative negligence where the legislature and Supreme Court have refused to do so.”
Plaintiff in case No. 79-746 has filed a response to sаid motion for summary affirmance stating that “there are three appeаls pending in the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, which involve precisely the samе issue of comparative negligence and this issue only,” and plaintiff does nоt oppose defendant’s motion if the court deems such affirmance in the best interests of justice.
Defendant has cited Maki v. Frelk (1968),
“After full consideration we think, however, that such a far-reaching chаnge, if desirable, should be made by the legislature rather than by the court. The General Assembly is the department of government to which the constitution has entrusted thе power of changing the laws.”40 Ill. 2d 193 , 196.
The Maki decision is still the controlling law and it is sufficient for our purpose to hold that while this court may find itself in sympathy with plaintiffs’ contеntion, it is not for this court to attempt to reverse the many cases and opinions of the Illinois Supreme Court in this area. (People v. Frey (1977),
Plaintiffs have also filed a motion for a Certificate of Importance under Rule 316. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, рar. 316.) That motion is denied. The Supreme Court of Illinois will decide if further review of thе issues herein is necessary.
Accordingly, the judgments dismissing each of the causes of action in the respective counts of the consolidated cases are affirmed.
The judgments appealed from are accordingly affirmed.
GOLDBERG, P. J., and McGLOON, J„ concur.