Dеfendant, White Pine Copper Division, Copper Range Company, appeals from the February 18, 1982, determination of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board that defendant is liable for payment of partial disability benefits to plaintiff, Larry J. Franks, in the weekly amount of $79 during periods of wage loss from May 24, 1971, until further order of the Workers’ Compensation Bureau. MCL 418.361(1); MSA 17.237(361)(1).
Plaintiff’s employment with defendant mining company began in 1970. On March 7, 1971, he sustained a work-related injury to his right hand, which resulted in the amputation of four fingers.
Following his accident, plaintiff received 215 weeks of specific loss benefits pursuant to MCL 418.361(2)(h); MSA 17.237(361)(2)(h). He returned to work on May 24, 1971. Because of his injury, he was never again able to perform all of the jobs associated with his former position. With the exception of lay-off periods extending from January *181 4, 1976, to April 26, 1976, and November 13, 1976, to May 31, 1977, plaintiff worked for defendant until August 1, 1977, when he was permanently laid off. During all periods of lay-off, he received unemployment compensation benefits.
On appeal, defendant’s principal challenge to the appeal board’s decision concerns the board’s refusal to reduce dеfendant’s liability for workers’ compensation benefits by the amount of unemployment compensation benefits which plaintiff had received. Defendant argues, inter alia, that the setoff was required because the unemployment benefits "constituted an earning capacity”. MCL 418.371(1); MSA 17.237(371X1). The appeal board responded to this claim as follows:
"Credit for unemployment benefits received by plaintiff is requested by defendant * * * on the theory that such benefits represent a wage earning capacity that requires reimbursement by plaintiff. That plaintiff retains some residual capacity within the field of his skill does not diminish defendant’s liability for payment of its entire obligation for partial disability benefits, despite plaintiff’s corollary receipt of unemployment compensation while he remained willing and able to perform any available work, limited by his post-injury capacity.”
We agree with the appeal board and further observe that the Legislature expressed an intent directly contrary to defendant’s suggestion in MCL 418.811; MSA 17.237(811), which, prior to 1982, provided in part:
"[B]enefits derived from any other source than those paid or caused to be paid by the employer as provided in [the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, shall not] *182 be considered in fixing the compensation under this act * * * » 1
Defendant also argues that MCL 418.358; MSA 17.237(358) (hereinafter referred to as § 358), applies to the instant fact situаtion. That statute, effective January 1, 1982, provides:
"Net weekly benefits payable under section 351, 361, or lump sum benefits under section 835, shall be reduced by 100% of the amount of benefits paid or payable to the injured employee under the Michigan employment security act, Act No. 1 of the Public Acts of the Extra Session of 1936, as amended, being sections 421.1 to 421.67a of the Michigan Compiled Laws, for identical periods of time and chargeable to the samе employer.”
The issue presented is whether this setoff provision applies to awards made to compensate employees for injuries predating the provision’s effective date. The appeal board concluded that "the lack of any expressed retroactive effect for section 358’s statutory adjustments renders its operation prospective only, thus inapplicable to plaintiffs 1971 injury. See
Briggs v Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry,
Defendant first suggests that thе statute clearly and unambiguously provides for the requested setoff. If this were so, further interpretation of the statute would be unnecessary.
Owendale-Gagetown School Dist v State Bd of Ed,
We disagree with defendant’s characterization of the statute. The statute does not clearly and unambiguously require setoff for unemployment compensation benefits when work-related injury predates the statute’s effective date. The statutory language is significantly distinguishable from that in MCL 418.801(5); MSA 17.237(801X5), which provides for 12% interest оn workers’ compensation awards and which this Court has ruled applicable to awards due prior to that statute’s effective date. Selk v Detroit Plastic Products, supra.
Defendant next argues that adherence to established principles of statutory intеrpretation requires retroactive application of the statute.
The primary object of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. All other rules of construction and interpretation "serve but as guides to assist the courts in determining such intent with a greater degree of certainty”.
Grand Rapids v Crocker,
The statute was part of
In addition, § 358 cannot be considered in isolation from
Our holding comports with the general rule that statutes are to be applied only prospectively unless the Legislature expressly or impliedly indicates its intention to give retroactive effect.
Hughes v Judges’ Retirement Bd,
Exclusively prospective application of § 358 does not violate the principle that purely "remеdial” or "procedural” statutes are to be given retroactive effect.
Ballog v Knight Newspapers, Inc,
While § 358 is "remedial” in the sense that it was adopted to effect a reform which, in the eyes of many, will correct cеrtain injustices in the system, it will also significantly and detrimentally affect the substantive right of certain injured employees to receipt of workers’ compensation benefits. We are persuaded, therefore, that the Legislaturе’s failure to provide clearly and unequivocally for applicability to cases of injuries predating its effective date mandates prospective application. The appeal board’s ruling to that еffect is affirmed.
Defendant also argues that the appeal board has impermissibly ordered defendant "to pay wage loss benefits for partial disability for the same time periods that it paid full compensation for the *187 specific loss of the hand”. Plaintiff concedes that such "double payment” is not permissible and states that "defendant is clearly entitled to credit for specific loss payments already paid”. The relevant provisiоns of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act support the parties’ assessment of defendant’s liability. MCL 418.361, subds (1) and (2); MSA 17.237(361), subds (1) and (2).
Defendant next claims that the appeal board exceeded its powers of review in ordering payment of bеnefits for the period preceding August 2, 1977. The hearing referee had directed payment of benefits from August 2, 1977, and plaintiff did not file an application for review on that issue. Defendant’s argument is without merit; the appeal boаrd was obliged to conduct a
de novo
review of the hearing referee’s decision.
Kostamo v Marquette Iron Mining Co,
Defendant’s challenge to the test applied by the appeal board in determining disability is also without merit. The record indicates that the appeal board properly considerеd plaintiff’s inability to perform the work he was doing at the time of his injury.
Powell v Casco Nelmor Corp,
Defendant’s remaining challenge to the appeal board’s decision has been waived.
Kleinschrodt v General Motors Corp,
Affirmed.
Notes
Defendаnt’s suggestion that the setoff was required under MCL 418.371(1); MSA 17.237(371X1) is further belied by defendant’s observation that: "Employers and industry had for years objected to being required to pay both unemployment and disability benefits for the same time periods. After much discussiоn and negotiation the Legislature passed [MCL 418.358; MSA 17.237(358)] to remedy that situation.”
"A prospective statute, as its name implies, operates on conduct, events, and circumstances which occur after its enactment.” 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 41.01, p 245.