delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant Franklin was convicted by the court sitting without a jury of unlawfully possessing heroin in violation of Maryland Code, Article 27, Section 277 1 and sentenced to one year in the Baltimore County Jail. On this appeal he contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction.
There was evidence showing that on the night of July 22, 1968 appellant was, in some manner not disclosed by the record, brought into the emergency room at City Hospitals in a semi-conscious state.and unable to talk. The hospital physician then in attendance, Dr. Martin Levinson, testified that several hours after appellant’s admission to the hospital he took a medical history from him; that appellant was then “essentially fully conscious, but very sleepy”; and that appellant told him at that time “that he had taken an overdose of heroin intravenously and that he had passed out following taking this overdose.” Levinson testified:
“Given the information that he gave us that he’d taken heroin, his condition was entirely compatible with having had an overdose of heroin.”
Dr. Levinson mentioned specifically the fact that appellant was “bluish in color with some blue tinges around his mouth and extremeties,” and that his eyes “were remarkable for the constricted pupils.” Dr. Levinson testified that many patients “do have constricted pupils following an overdose of heroin.” On cross-examination the doctor testified that the symptoms exhibited by ap *137 pellant could have been the result of extreme alcoholism but that he did not smell any odor of alcohol on the appellant. Levinson treated appellant for having taken an overdose of narcotics, after which appellant was arrested and charged with the present offense.
Appellant testified that he had been drinking heavily on the night in question; that he didn’t remember being brought to the hospital and had no recollection of making any statements to the hospital physician. Asked on cross-examination if he took any kind of narcotics that night, he stated: “If I did it was not to my knowledge.”
On this evidence, the trial judge, in finding appellant guilty of unlawful possession of narcotics, reasoned that his incriminatory statements to the hospital physician were tantamount to a confession of guilt, and that the confession was sufficiently corroborated by the medical findings so as to show that appellant “did have an overdose of heroin.” 2
In maintaining that the evidence was insufficient to show that he unlawfully possessed heroin, as charged in the indictment, appellant argues that it is not a crime to be under the influence of narcotics; that appellant’s statement to the physician that he had taken the overdose of heroin cannot, without more, establish the fact that he “possessed” the heroin within the meaning of Section 277; that the evidence was just as consistent with a medical determination of extreme alcoholism as it was with a finding of heroin overdosage, particularly since there was no evidence of needle marks, nor was it shown by either direct or circumstantial evidence that he administered the drug to himself. Appellant points out that to sustain a conviction of possessing narcotics based on his own statement to the physician, coupled with medical findings compatible therewith, “would substantially deter a user or addict from voluntarily submitting himself to a doctor or hospital for medical help, for it would mean that such person could be subjected to in *138 'dictment, trial and a finding of guilty, because he was under the influence of narcotics at the time he submitted himself for this medical attention.”
In
Haley v. State, 7
Md. App. 18, we held on authority of
Bryant v. State,
• But evidence showing that a person has. a prohibited narcotic drug within his system, while not
per se
constituting possession or control under Section 277, would tend to show circumstantially that he was in possession and/or control of the drug prior to taking it. In
Peachie v. State,
*139 “* * * The evidence that Peachie had a hypodermic needle in his hand and threw it away, along with a handkerchief containing fresh blood stains, and that he had fresh needle marks on his arm, would permit the inference that he had taken an injection of the drug just prior to the entry of the officers. This circumstantial evidence points clearly to the fact that he had administered the drug to himself. Of course, if that fact is assumed, it necessarily follotvs that he had possession and control of the instrument and its contents at the time of the injection, as well as an intent and purpose to administer the drug. * * *” (Emphasis supplied.)
In
McCuen v. State,
Unlike the facts in either
Peachie
or
McCtien,
the primary evidence in the present case of appellant’s possession of narcotics stems, by way of an inference, from his own statement. As Section 277 does not by its terms purport to proscribe the “use” of prohibited narcotics, appellant’s statement that he took an overdose of heroin was not literally a confession; rather, it is more in the nature of a significantly incriminating admission.
3
But whether appellant’s statement constituted a confession
*140
or admission is immaterial, for the ride is the same in either case, namely that an ^extrajudicial confession or incriminatory admission of the accused does not warrant a conviction unless there is also independent evidence to establish the
corpus delicti, i.e.,
the facts that are necessary to show that a crime has been committed.
Miller v. State,
We think appellant’s statement “that he had taken an overdose of heroin intravenously,” after which he had “passed out,” justifies not only the inference that prior to taking such drug, he necessarily was in possession of it, but also the inference, absent affirmative contrary *141 evidence, that the drug was self-administered, or administered by another at his direction (thus placing him in constructive possession of the drug) . 4 That appellant’s physical condition was consistent with his having taken an overdose of heroin is clear from Dr. Levinson’s testimony. Although his medical conclusions appear based, in part, upon information given by the appellant, we think the doctor’s testimony, considered in its totality, shows sufficiently that appellant’s symptomatology, particularly his “bluish” and unconscious condition, and the constriction of the pupils of his eyes, provides the requisite quantum of corroborative independent evidence to establish, circumstantially, that he did indeed possess narcotics in violation of Section 277. We are, of course, mindful of the doctor’s admission that appellant’s symptoms could also have indicated a state of extreme alcoholism; we note, however, that no odor of alcohol was detected upon the appellant by the attending physician, and that appellant was treated for an overdose of heroin.
That this decision will likely deter drug addicts and users from seeking medical aid when they need it is, unfortunately, the all too plain result of this case. Communications made to a physician in his professional capacity are not privileged under the common law of Maryland, nor, with some exceptions in the case of psychiatrists, have they been made so by statute.
See Robinson v.
State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. “It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, possess, have under his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense or compound any narcotic drug, except as authorized in this subtitle.”
. Appellant was acquitted of the second and third counts of the indictment charging, respectively, control and sale of heroin.
. That there is a real, and not a fanciful, difference between a confession and an admission in a criminal case is clear,
viz.,
a confession is a direct acknowledgment of guilt on the part of the accused and, by the very force of the definition, excludes an admission, which, of itself, as applied in criminal law, is a statement by the accused direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove guilt, but of itself insufficient to authorize a conviction.
Stewart v. State,
. The duration of the possession is immaterial in determining guilt. See Haley v. State, supra, at page 32.