Franklin v. RidleyFranklin v. Ridley
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Ferren
Appellant was convicted of distribution of a controlled substance, and the trial court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum four years of incarceration,
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I.
On November 11, 1986, the trial court sentenced appellant to four to twelve years in prison for distribution of a controlled substance. The four year term was a mandatory minimum sentence.
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On November 9, 1989, appellant was arrested on new charges and released to a third party custodian. Six days later, on November 15, appellant again was arrested on still other charges and was held without bond. On May 24, 1990, appellant was convicted of unlawful entry and sentenced to 120 days of incarceration. A month later, on June 26, appellant was convicted of receiving stolen property and sentenced to prison for one year.
Between the imposition of these two prison sentences, on June 6, 1990, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation on the charge of distribution of a controlled substance and reimposed the original four to twelve year sentence. The Department of Corrections adjusted appellant’s Judgment and Commitment Order to reflect that appellant had not yet served the full four year mandatory minimum sentence and, therefore, was not eligible for parole until May 10, 1991. The Department of Corrections did not credit appellant with any of the time between his release from federal prison on April 30,1989 and his subsequent arrest on November 15, 1989.
On August 6, 1990, appellant filed a petition for writ of mandamus, which the court treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Appellant claimed that he was entitled to credit against his four year mandatory minimum sentence for the time he had spent on release from April 30, 1989, through November 14, 1989. Pursuant to an order to show cause dated August 8,1990, the District responded that appellant’s petition should be dismissed because he was required to serve his mandatory minimum sentence without reduction. The trial court agreed and “discharged” appellant’s petition. Appellant filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied on November 20, 1990. The trial court reasoned that (1) the trial judge had jurisdiction to revoke appellant’s parole on June 6, 1990, and (2) appellant was not entitled to credit for time on parole because only persons who are District of Columbia — not federal — prisoners at the time of their parole are entitled to credit under
II.
Appellant contends that he is entitled to credit against the mandatory minimum four year sentence for the approximately six and one-half months between his release from federal prison on April 30, 1989, and his subsequent arrest on November 15, 1989. He argues, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, that the District of Columbia Good Time Credits Act of 1986,
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We agree with appellant, and the District concedes — contrary to the trial court’s ruling — that the Good Time Credits Act, as amended in 1991, applies to all D.C.Code offenders, irrespective of where they are incarcerated.
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The District also concedes that,
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if appellant in fact had been on parole between his release from federal prison and his subsequent arrest, he would have been entitled to credit for that time pursuant to
We agree with the District that the federal prison released appellant on probation, rather than on parole, and that, as a result, in accordance with
The D.C.Code clearly provides that a prisoner may receive credit to his or her sentence for time spent on “parole” but not for time on “probation” if probation is subsequently revoked: “Every person shall be given credit on the maximum and the minimum term of imprisonment for
time spent in custody or on parole
as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed.”
In light of the fact that appellant must have been on probation, rather than on parole, during the six and one-half months between his release from the federal prison and his subsequent arrest, we must conclude that appellant is not entitled to credit against his sentence for his time on release. We therefore affirm the trial court’s “discharge” (ie dismissal) of appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 635-36 (D.C.1979) (appellate court may affirm trial court ruling when court gave wrong reason, or no reason at all, if ruling is correct).
So ordered.
Notes
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. The District’s Good Time Credits Act .was amended in 1991 to extend the application of institutional good time credits to all D.C.Code offenders incarcerated in any prison. Before the 1991 amendment,
(a) Every person who is convicted of a District of Columbia (“District”) criminal law by a court in the District of Columbia, imprisoned in a District Correctional facility, and whose conduct is in conformity with all applicable institutional rules is entitled to institutional good time credits in accordance with the provisions of this section. [Emphasis added.]
The statute, as amended, does not specify that the prisoner must have been imprisoned in a District correctional facility in order to be eligible for the credits.
(a) Every person who is convicted of a violation of the District of Columbia (“District“) criminal law by a court in the District of Columbia and whose conduct is in conformity with all applicable institutional rules is entitled *358 to institutional good time credits in accordance with the provisions of this section.