(Aftеr stating the foregoing facts.) The plaintiffs contend that the defendant cannot question the constitutionality of the Voters’ Registration Act, in that .in the enforcement of said law no interest or right of the latter is affected. Under the provisions of the act,, the Board of County Registrars, charged with enforcement of the act, are to be compensated out of county funds, and the defendant, a member of the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues, by virtue of his office is charged with the duty of paying out such funds only for purposes provided by law. If a chаirman of such board issues a warrant for an unlawful purpose upon which public funds are paid, he would be personally liable. If the Voters’ Registration Act is unconstitutional, though in the form and name of law, it “is in reality no law, and confers no authority upon, and affords no protection to, an officer acting thereunder.”
Dennison Mfg. Co.
v.
Wright,
156
Ga.
789 (4a) (
We therefore hold that the defendant had such an interest as would authorize him to question the validity of the Voters’ Reg *785 istration Act under which, the plaintiffs claim they are acting and contend that the dеfendant is under a duty to sign warrants for their compensation fixed by virtue of said act.
By general demurrers the defendant makes a general attack on the Voters’ Registration Act of 1949 as a whole, and does not attack any specific portion thereof; charging that the. act is violative of certain specified provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. We therefore turn to the act itself as a whole, to ascertain if it is subject to the attacks made.
Section 55 declares that the intent of the General Assembly is to provide by this act “for a new and exclusive method of qualifying voters, such revision being necessary in order to make the laws of this State conform to the requirements of the Constitution of Georgia adopted in the year 1945.” Section 1 provides that from and after the effective date of the act no-person shall be permitted to vote in any election in this State for presidential electors, members of Congress, United States. Senators, Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, State House officers, members of the General Assembly, county officers, justices of the-pеace, or members of county boards of education, unless such, person has been registered and qualified as provided in this act. Section 3 provides that the first registration list shall be prepared in 1950, and that the process of registration shall start immediately. It is provided in section 4 that the registration shall be permanent, but electors are required- to maintain their status as qualified voters by the exercise of their franchise once every two years. Section 6 provides that the judge of the superior court of each county shall quadrenially аppoint three upright and intelligent citizens of the county as a Board of Registrars from a list of six names recommended by the grand jury; the judge having the right to remove a member of the board on recommendation of the grand jury or upon proof of failure to discharge his duties, or because of unfitness of any member of the board. The act provides that the registrars shall take an oath; and under section 9 the tax commissioner or tax collector of the county shall be a deputy to the Board of Registrars. Section 11 provides a form of registratiоn card whereby the applicant under oath is required to state that he is a citizen of the United States; state his age; that he has resided for six *786 months in the county; that he possesses the qualifications of an elector required, by the Constitution; and that he is not disfranchised by reason of any offense committed against the State. On this card the deputy or registrar certifies: (1) that the applicant could or could not intelligibly read a specified paragraph of the Constitution of Georgia or the United States; (2) that the applicant wrote or could not write a specified paragraph of the Constitution legibly; (3) that the applicant stated that due solely to physical infirmity he could not read, and a specified paragraph of the Constitution was read to him, and he explained it intelligibly, or could not explain it intelligibly; (4) that the applicant was served with notice to appear before the Board of Registrars on a stated date:
Sections 15, 16, and 17 provide how the applicant shall apply for registration, and the manner of filling out the cards and entry of the answers by the deputy or registrar. If the applicant states that he cannot read, and his inability to do so “is not due to physical infirmity but that he desires to qualify as a voter by reason of his good character and his understanding of the duties and obligations of citizenship under a republican form of government, the fact that he cannot read and write should be noted on the card.” The registration cards are then turned over to the registrars for their consideration. Section 18 provides that a failure on the part of the applicant to disclose information sought -by direct questions in cоnnection with his application, or the giving of false information, shall be cause for the rejection of the application by the registrars on their own motion. Section 19 provides that all decisions of the registrars are appealable to the superior court.
Section 20 provides that, as the cards are turned over to the registrars, they shall proceed to a consideration of the application in the following manner: (1) Where the application is on the basis of literacy, and it appears, that the appliсant read the selected portion of the Constitution intelligibly, and wrote it legibly, or that by reason of physical disability he could not read it, but was able to interpret it reasonably when read to him, and the card shows no reason for disqualifying him for noncompliance with the law, the registrars shall pass an order declaring the applicant prima facie qualified. “The interpre *787 tation in this case shall be in the applicant’s own words, giving words the significance ordinarily attached to them by laymen of average intellect and attainments.” (2) In those cases where the applicant applies for qualification solely on the basis of his good character and his understanding of the duties of citizenship under a republican form of government, he shall be notified in writing to appear before the full Board of Registrars, and shall at that time be subjected to an examination as to his or her qualifications, to be conducted in accordance with the procedure hereinafter prescribed (in section 21). (3) In cases arising under the preceding paragraph and in all cases arising under this act where thе applicant is required to be served with a notice of a hearing, unless otherwise provided, said notice shall specify a day not less than one, nor more than ten days, after the date of the notice. The notice may be served by mailing same to applicant at the address given on his application card. (4) Failure to appear at the time specified for the hearing of an application is declared to be cause for denying the application. However, the applicant .may be reinstated on motion by him, if he can prove that he was in fact not served with notice.
Section 21 provides that the examination which the registrars shall submit to those persons who claim the right to register and vote on the basis of good character and understanding of the duties of citizenship under a republican form of government shall be based upon a standard list of questions. The registrars shall orally propound to the applicant the thirty questions on the standard list set forth in section 22. If the applicant correctly answers ten of these questions the registrars shall enter an ordеr declaring him to be prima facie qualified; if he cannot correctly answer ten of the thirty questions, an order shall be entered rejecting his application.
Section 22 provides a standard list of questions, to be propounded only to those applicants who claim the right to qualify on the basis of good character and understanding of the duties of citizenship. Some of these questions are: Who is President of the United States? What is the President’s term of office? If the President dies, who succeeds him? How many Senators are there from Georgia? Who is the Gоvernor of Georgia? Who is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia? and other questions of like import dealing with civics and government.
*788 Sections 24 to 46 inclusive of the act deal with the revision of registration lists; how persons becoming disqualified subsequent to registration may be dropped from the list; preparation of lists of those prima facie qualified to vote; use of lists at elections; procedure for having names placed on lists; provision that lists are open to public inspection. Section 47 provides for compensation of registrars, to be fixed by the judge of the superior court, and paid by the "county commissioners, or that person, or those persons, exercising the functions of county commissioners, from the county treasury. All payments hereunder shall be made in the usual manner county bills are paid.” Sections 49 through 51 prescribe penalties for specified violations of the act.
The rule which governs us in the consideration of this question is succinctly and plainly stated in
Miller
v.
Head,
186
Ga.
694, 708 (
Though no cоntention is made that this .act or any section thereof contravenes the provisions of the Constitution relative to the qualification of voters, reference to those provisions indicates that the legislative purpose is to provide the necessary machinery to carry out these provisions, which are as follows: •“Every citizen of this State shall be entitled to register as an elector, and to vote in all elections in said State, who is not disqualified under the provisions of Section II of Article II of this Constitution, and who possesses the qualificаtions prescribed in Paragraphs II and III of this section or who will possess them .at the date of the election occurring next after his registration, *789 and who in addition thereto comes within either of the classes provided for in the two following subdivisions of this paragraph:
“1. All persons who are of good character and understand the duties and obligations of citizenship under a republican form of government; or
“2. All persons who can correctly read in the English language any paragraph of the Constitution of the United States or of this State and correсtly write the same in the English language when read to them by any one of the registrars, and all persons who solely because of physical disability are unable to comply with the above requirements but who can understand and give a reasonable interpretation of any paragraph of the Constitution of the United States or of this State that may be read to them by any one of the registrars.” Constitution of 1945, art. 2, sec. 1, par. 4 (Code, Ann., § 2-704).
The right of suffrage is a political right, as compared with a property or civil right. In the absence of an express constitutionаl grant of suffrage, it is not a vested, absolute, or natural right such as it is deemed a citizen cannot be deprived of except by due process of law. The right to vote is not granted to a citizen by the United States Constitution. Nor is it a privilege of a citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Nor does the Fifteenth Amendment to that Constitution abridge a State’s power over suffrage, but only denies to the States any action which discriminates against citizens of the United States to qualify or vote, by reason of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Though the Constitution of this State guarantees the right of suffrage to those who meet its qualifications, and they are entitled to register, and this right cannot be absolutely denied or taken away by legislative enactment, the legislature has the right to prescribe reasonable regulations as to how these qualifications shall be determined. The fact that a citizen who meets one of several tests provided by the Constitution has to register or reregister does not deprive him of his constitutional right of suffrage, but is only a reasonablе regulation under which the right may be exercised. For authorities supporting the foregoing, see:
Stewart
v.
Cartwright,
156
Ga.
192 (
The legislature, even in the absence of express constitutional power, can provide for the registration of voters; but where the State Constitution provides who shall be entitled to vote, the legislature cannot take from or add to the qualification unless the power is granted expressly or by necessary implication.
Tolbert
v.
Long,
134
Ga.
298 (
Every presumption favors the constitutionality of a regularly enacted statute. Only where it manifestly impinges upon the Constitution or violates rights of citizens will it be declared unconstitutional. The alleged conflict with the Constitution must
*791
be plain and palpable.
Coy
v.
Linder,
183
Ga.
583, 585 (
The defendant asserts that the Voters’ Registration Act as a whole violates certain specified provisions of the State Constitution because: (1) the act discriminates against the right of one to exercise his franchise, and therefore tends to take away the liberties of the voters of the State of Georgia without due process of law; (2) it impinges upon his duty to conserve the money of Richmond County under his control; (3) the act sets up a system of censorship contrary to a democratic form of government. His contentions as summed up in his brief are that thе Voters’ Registration Act, while requiring all persons who have previously registered to register again, has for its purpose to hamper and defeat the right of “a great class of the citizens of Georgia from voting.” We know of no constitutional right possessed by a registered voter which prevents the legislature from requiring him to qualify as a voter in future elections. Counsel for the defendant have cited no authority, and we have found none, to support his contention that a voter who was on the registration list of qualified voters at the time of the passage of this act has a vested right to stay on the list.
The only time in the history of the registration laws of Georgia we have found in which a voter could claim a constitutional right to remain on the voters’ list without being required to re-register was by virtue of the amendment of 1908 (Ga. L. 1908, p. 27, Civil Code (1910), §§ 6395-6403 inclusive). This amendment provided that, where one registered between October 7, 1908, and January 1, 1915, as a qualified voter under subsection 1 or 2 of paragraph 4, section 1, article 2, he “shall thereafter be permitted to vote; provided he meets the requirements of paragraphs 2 and 3 of this sеction.” This guarantee of permanence of registration to this class of registered voters does not now exist. The Constitution of 1945 did not carry forward paragraph 5 or subsections 1 and 2 of paragraph 4 of section 1 of article 2 of the Constitution of 1877 as amended. The minutes of the constitutional commission show that these provisions were considered and deliberately eliminated. The provisions of paragraph 1, section 1, and paragraph 1, section 2, of article 2 of
*792
the Constitution of 1945 ■ clearly indicate that the General Assembly was authorized to enact laws “from time to- time for the registration of all electors,” and “only those persons shall be allowed to vote who have been first registered in accordance with the requirements of law.” Though section 3 of the act of 1913 (Ga. L. 1913, p. 115, Code, § 34-115), did provide that “the electors who have qualified and have signed the permanent qualification book, shall not thereafter be required to register or further qualify, except as may be required by the Board of Registrars,” one who was on the permanent voters’ list at the time the Voters’ Registration Act of 1949 was passed did not possess such a status or “vested right” as prevented the General Assembly from changing or repealing previous registration laws and requirements as to qualifications of electors. The legislature having power to enact registration laws, ,the fact that one obtains a status under the provisions of one law does not amount to a contract or create a vested right that prevents a subsequent legislature from repealing the old law and passing a new one.
Hamrick
v.
Rouse,
17
Ga.
56;
Swindle
v.
Brooks,
34
Ga.
67;
Hardeman
v.
Downer,
39
Ga.
425; Munn
v.
Illinois,
The main purpose of the Voters’ Registration Act is to require all persons who are qualified to vote under the Constitu
*793
tion to register before voting. “If the legislature had other or additional purposes, which, considered apart, it had no constitutional power to make effective, that would not have the result of making the act invalid.” Stephenson
v.
Binford,
We are therefore of the opinion that the Voters’ Registration Act of 1949 is not invalid in every part, for the reasons asserted by the defendant, as being violative of specified provisions of the Constitution of this State; and therefore hold that the trial court did not err in overruling the grounds of demurrer which asserted the invalidity of the аct as being in violation of art. 1, sec. 1, par. 3, or art. 1, sec. 1, par. 1, or art. 1, sec. 1, par. 2, of the State Constitution.
It is asserted that the act as a whole violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, because it abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens, and deprives them of liberty without due process of law, since the right to vote is the very foundation of a democratic form of government, and said act sets up a board “which has power to discriminate and censor the right of citizens to vote.” In substance, the defendant says that the act denies, (a) persons liberty without due process of law, (b) a citizen of the equal protection of the law, because it sets up a board with power to censor the right of a citizen to vote; but it is not pointed out how or in what manner the act denies to him without due process of law a right or liberty which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. He asserts that the act denies to citizens the liberty of voting. As we have shown, the Fourteenth Amendment does not confer upon a citizen of this State the right to vote. United States
v.
Cruikshank,
As to the charge that the act as a- whole sets up a board of censors “which has power to discriminate and censor the right of citizens to vote,” we take it that the plaintiff attempts to assert that the act violates the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However,, he does not show how or in what manner the act operates to his hurt or to the hurt of others. There is no assertion that he or anyone else who is qualified under the Constitution to vote has sought to register and been unlawfully denied the right to register. Nor does he point out how or in what manner the act empowers the Board of Registrars to discriminate against his right or that of any other citizen. See, in this connection,
Cooper Company of Gainesville
v.
State,
187
Ga.
497, 501 (6) (
So we are of the opinion that the ground of demurrer which attacks the Voters’ Registration Act as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution was properly overruled.
It is next asserted that the Voters’ Registration Act violates the Fifteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, because it abridges the right of citizens to vote because of rac' or color, and leaves to three men unlimited and arbitrary power to declare them ineligible to vote. This amendment only denies to the States the authority to discriminate on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. United States
v.
Reese,
In support of his contention that the act violates this amendment, counsel for the plaintiff cite the cases of Davis
v.
Schnell, 81 Fed. Supp. 872, and Smith
v.
Allwright,
The mere possibility that the Board of Registrars may under this statute act arbitrarily or recklessly in administering the law and thereby violate constitutional rights is not a ground for declaring the act as a whole unconstitutional. Monongahela Bridge Cо.
v.
United States,
We are therefore of the opinion that the ground of demurrer that the Voters’ Registration Act in its entirety violates the Fifteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution was properly overruled.
Another ground of demurrer asserts that the plaintiffs have an ample remedy at law and can sue at law to recover their salaries, and further, that the petition does not show that, if the defendant signed the warrants, this alone would cause the treasurer of the county to pay the same, because it does not appear from the petition that the defеndant has any funds in his hands out of which the court could compel payment of the salaries claimed, and that to grant the writ of mandamus would be fruitless. It appears from the allegations of the petition that the plaintiffs are seeking to require the defendant to sign warrants
for
the payment of their respective salaries, and not to require the defendant to
pay
their salaries from public funds. The question as to whether a county officer in charge of its fiscal affairs can be required by mandamus to sign warrants for the payment of county warrants under a statute creating such Board of Registrars, out of county funds, we think is settled by the case of
Howell
v.
Bankston,
181
Ga.
59 (1) (
The assignments of error on overruling certain specified grounds of demurrer, which are not argued in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error, will not be considered by this court.
It appearing from the evidence before the trial judge that the plaintiffs had been duly appointed and qualified as the Board of Registrars, and their salaries fixed by the court under the provisions of the Voters’ Registration Act, and that they were entitled to be compensated for their services, and it further appearing that it was the duty of the defendant, as Chairman of the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues, to sign the warrants for their compensation when presented to him, the lower court did not err in making the writ absolute.
Judgment affirmed.