672 N.E.2d 1039 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1996
Paul Franklin appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas which granted Mark Owens's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Franklin was arrested in January 1993 pursuant to outstanding warrants issued by the city of Dayton. The warrants were issued for failure to pay fines related to Dayton Municipal Court case No. 91-TRC-704 and failure to complete community service related to case No. 91-CRB-7588. In fact, Franklin had paid the fines and completed the community service, but this information was not properly reported to the court, recorded in the case file, or recorded by the clerk's office. Franklin spent three days in jail as a result of his arrest. Franklin claims that he required hospitalization following his incarceration.
Franklin filed a complaint against Mark Owens, Clerk of the Dayton Municipal Court, among others, as a result of his incarceration. Franklin alleged that Owens was "negligent in his reckless and wonton [sic] failure" to record his payment of fines. Owens answered and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings based upon his immunity as an employee of a political subdivision performing governmental functions. The trial court granted Owens's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Franklin asserts two assignments of error on appeal. We will address these assignments together. *615
"I. The trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
"II. The trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for judgment on the pleadings where appellee's conduct is specifically excepted from the cloak of immunity under O.R.C.
Franklin argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had not pleaded a cause of action regarding Owens's liability for negligence based upon exceptions to the governmental immunity statute. Franklin also claims that R.C.
Initially, we note that Franklin's argument that he was entitled to sue Owens in his personal capacity is not well founded. Franklin's alleged cause of action against Owens was for negligent performance of the duties of the clerk of court. In his argument related to R.C.
Under the common law, and subject to certain judicially created sovereign immunity, a political subdivision could be held liable for the negligent acts of its employees in the performance of their duties. The enactment of R.C. Chapter 2744, subject to delineated exceptions, abolished a political subdivision's liability for ministerial or governmental acts performed by employees. Blankenship v. Enright (1990),
R.C.
R.C.
"[A] political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to persons or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function."
This general rule granting immunity to political subdivisions for their acts and those of their employees is subject to the exceptions enumerated in R.C.
An employee of a political subdivision may be stripped of his immunity in three specific instances set forth in R.C.
Franklin claims that Owens was liable for the alleged negligence pursuant to R.C.
Civ.R. 8(A)(1) requires a complaint to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief." Civ.R. 9(B) permits "condition[s] of mind * * * [to] be averred generally." Franklin's complaint, although somewhat inartful, asserted that Owens failed to properly record and advise the municipal court that he had paid his fines, and that this failure was negligent, reckless and wanton. It may be difficult for Franklin to establish wanton or wilful conduct to the satisfaction of a factfinder, or even to withstand a motion for summary judgment directed to those conditions of mind. In our *617
judgment, however, the trial court erred in implicitly determining that Franklin had failed to plead a justiciable claim against Owens under R.C.
With regard to the exception set forth in R.C.
Because Franklin sufficiently pleaded a claim against Owens pursuant to R.C.
The first assignment of error is overruled and the second is sustained.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
FAIN, and GRADY, JJ., concur. *618