73 W. Va. 727 | W. Va. | 1914
On writ of habeas corpus petitioners seek discharge from imprisonment in the state penitentiary, where, by the judgment of the Circuit Court of McDowell County, they were committed for life on an indictment for robbery.
The indictment, made a part of the return of the warden, charges that petitioners “did, in and upon one William Creasy, feloniously make an assault, and him the said William Creasy did then and there feloniously put in bodily fear and danger of his life, and silver coin consisting of two fifty cent pieces of the value of fifty cents each, good and lawful money' of the United States of America, of the property of the said William Creasy from the person and against the will of the said William Creasy, then and there feloniously and violently did steal, take and carry away, against the peace and dignity of the State.” This is the common law form of indictment where no dangerous weapon is used. Mayo’s Guide, 596; Houston v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 257, 265-6; 1 Wharton’s Prec. of Ind. and PL, (4th Ed.) sections 410-413.
“Robbery”, at common law, “is the felonious and forcible taking from the person of another of goods or money to any value, by violence or putting in fear.” State v. McAllister, 65 W. Va. 97, 63 S. E. 758, 131 Am. St. Rep. 955; Houston v. Commonwealth, supra. Our statute, section 12, chapter 144, Code 1913, serial section 5163, which does not define robbery, but only' prescribes the punishment, provides: “If any person
The main ground, indeed the only ground, on which petitioners rely to obtain their discharge, is that our statute, which prescribes only minimum penalties, and leaves it within the power of the court to pronounce judgment of imprisonment for life, a “cruel and unusual punishment”, is void, contravening section 5, of article 3, of our Constitution, providing among other things against “cruel and unusual punishment”, and that “Penalties shall be proportioned to the character and degree of the offence. ’ ’
¥e deem it quite unnecessary to enter upon any extended discussion as to what is meant by ‘ ‘ cruel and unusual 'punishment”, interdicted by the Constitution; and by that other clause thereof respecting what penalties may be imposed. These questions were elaborately and ably gone into by Judge BRANNON in State v. Woodward, 68 W. Va. 66. As said in that ease, the clause, cruel and unusual punishment, originally occurring in the Bill of Rights of 1688, was there inserted as a provision against cruel judgments like those inflicted in the days of the tyrant Stuarts, and which found its way naturally into our Constitution, and into the constitutions of most of the states. But Judge BRAnnon says it refers only to punishments of such cruel character as he there describes, and was not intended as a limitation on the general powers of the legislature to say what are offenses and to prescribe punishments therefor.
Robbery, from the earliest times, has always been regarded a crime of the gravest character. At common law the punishment for robbery was death, with or without benefit of clergy, according to varying statutes. 4 Sharswood’s Blackstone, 243. Now by statute the punishment for robbery in England is penal servitude for life. 9 Laws of England, (Earl of Halsbury) 664, section 1333. While the punishment inflicted on petitioners in this case is the same as prescribed in the English statute, the extreme limit under our statute,
But does the statute or judgment of imprisonment contravene the provision of the Constitution that “Penalties shall be proportioned to the .character and degree of the offence”? Certainly on habeas corpus we cannot so hold. A different ease might be presented on writ of error, with all the evidence before us; but in the absence of the whole record how can we say the punishment inflicted is obnoxious to this constitutional limitation? As the statute is not void, we cannot see that the punishment is disproportioned to the offense. In State v. Woodward, supra, Judge BranNON does say, influenced by this clause of the Constitution and the recent case of Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349: “Surely under our constitution fines so excessive, imprisonment so long, looking to the offense, as to shock our feelings of humanity, conscience, justice and mercy would be branded by this clause.” But
Nor do we think our statute providing for the punishment of robbery in conflict with the fourteenth amendment or other provisions in the federal Constitution, as represented in the eighth and ninth paragraphs of plaintiffs’ petition.
If there is merit in the claim of petitioners that they have been unjustly punished, they may have a case for executive clemency, but we cannot discharge them on habeas corpus.
We, therefore, deny the writ.
Writ Refused.