Franklin v. BergerFranklin v. Berger
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Callahan
Lead Opinion
Certification was granted in this case limited to the question: “Did the state violate the guarantees of equal protection contained in the Connecticut and United States constitutions by declining to credit pretrial jail time against the length of an insanity acquittee’s commitment to a mental hospital?” Franklin v. Berger, 208 Conn. 816, 546 A.2d 282 (1988). The Appellate Court answered this question in the affirmative. Franklin v. Berger, 15 Conn. App. 74, 544 A.2d 650 (1988). We disagree.
The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute and have been set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court; id.; but can be briefly summarized as follows. On March 5, 1976, the petitioner was arrested and charged with manslaughter in the first degree in violation of
On January 5, 1978, a criminal court adjudged the petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity. Pursuant to
On March 24,1987, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the refusal to grant him credit for his pretrial jail time was violative of the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.3 The habeas court denied his peti*594tion finding no equal protection violation. On appeal,* **4 the Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the habeas court and held that the state’s practice of denying jail time credits to insanity acquittees violated the petitioner’s equal protection rights. Franklin v. Berger, 15 Conn. App. 74, 544 A.2d 650 (1988).
At this point we note that “the concept of equal protection [under both the state and federal constitutions5 6] has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cen*595ter, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 578, 512 A. 2d 893 (1986). The “equal protection clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.” Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., supra, 577-78. Rather, a state may make classifications when enacting or carrying out legislation, but in order to satisfy the equal protection clause the classifications made must be based on some reasonable ground. Ross v. Moffitt, supra; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283,18 S. Ct. 594, 42 L. Ed. 1037 (1898); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., supra; State v. Reed, 192 Conn. 520, 531, 473 A. 2d 775 (1984). To determine whether a particular classification violates the guarantees of equal protection, the court must consider “the character of the classification; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1972). Where the classification impinges upon a fundamental right or impacts upon an “inherently suspect” group, it will be subjected to strict scrutiny and will be set aside unless it is justified by a compelling state interest. Id., 342; Bruno v. Civil Service Commission, 192 Conn. 335, 345, 472 A.2d 328 (1984); Laden v. Warden, 169 Conn. 540, 542, 363 A. 2d 1063 (1975). On the other hand, where the classification at issue neither impinges upon a fundamental right nor affects a suspect group “it will withstand constitutional attack if the distinction is founded on a rational basis.” Laden v. Warden, supra, 543; see also McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270, 93 S. Ct. 1055, 35 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1970).
*596To implicate the equal protection clauses under the state and federal constitutions, therefore, it is necessary that the state statute in question, either on its face or in practice, treat persons standing in the same relation to it differently. The petitioner in the instant case argues that by refusing to credit the. time he spent in jail prior to his trial against the fixed maximum term of his commitment, the state is treating wealthy and poor insanity acquittees differently. Based on the premise that all acquittees are discharged at the expiration of the fixed maximum term of confinement set by the court at the commencement of commitment to a mental hospital under
If the acquittee is confined, he is under the sole jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board (board).
Under
The date of discharge of an acquittee from confinement is, therefore, not calculated by counting days as if the acquittee were sentenced to prison, but rather, is indeterminate, being totally dependant on the acquit-tee’s personal mental health. Since the fixed maximum term set by the court does not determine the date an acquittee will be discharged from confinement, the petitioner’s argument that the refusal of the state to credit his jail time against the fixed maximum term creates distinctions in the calculation of confinement time based on wealth is not valid. Subtracting an indigent acquit-tee’s pretrial jail time from the fixed maximum term will not secure his discharge from confinement any sooner than if he were not credited with jail time. Jail time credit is irrelevant in calculating the release of an insanity acquittee because he is confined or released based on his dangerousness. There is, therefore, no difference in the treatment of wealthy and indigent acquittees under
In addition to arguing that the fixed maximum term set by the court at the commencement of an acquittee’s commitment is significant in calculating his discharge *602date, the petitioner maintains that the expiration of said term is important because it shifts the burden to prove dangerousness under
Accordingly, because confinement of all acquittees under
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed.
In this opinion Covello and Hull, Js., concurred.
Notes
“[General Statutes] Sec. 53a-55. manslaughter in the first degree: class b felony, (a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or (2) with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as provided in subsection (a) of section 53a-54a, except that the fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subsection; or (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person.
“(b) Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.”
Although the petitioner was originally committed under
In addition, the petitioner asserted in his petition for habeas corpus that he was statutorily entitled to have the time he spent in confinement in a *594mental institution prior to trial credited against the maximum term of his commitment. The habeas court rejected this argument and the petitioner did not raise it in the Appellate Court.
While his appeal was pending before the Appellate Court, the petitioner’s maximum term of commitment expired. Finding that the petitioner’s claim was not moot on the basis of the principle of capable of repetition, yet evading review; Delevieleuse v. Manson, 184 Conn. 434, 437, 439 A. 2d 1055 (1981); the Appellate Court determined that it had the authority to hear the claim. Franklin v. Berger, 15 Conn. App. 74,77-78, 554 A. 2d 650 (1988). We agree with the Appellate Court and base our jurisdiction on the same reasoning.
The constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 20, provides: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry or national origin.”
The constitution of the United States, amendment fourteen, § 1, provides: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
We discuss the state and federal clauses simultaneously as “ ‘[t]he equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions have the same meaning and limitations.’ Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53, 66, 444 A.2d 225 (1982).” Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 577, 512 A.2d 893 (1986).
The petitioner recognizes that there could be an “indeterminate confinement [period] based solely on [an acquittee’s] mental health” but *597attempts to distinguish it as a totally different type of confinement than the “sentence like” fixed maximum term set by the court under
“[General Statutes] Sec. 53a-13. lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect as affirmative defense, (a) In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time he committed the proscribed act or acts, lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect, either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.
“(b) It shall not be a defense under this section if such mental disease or defect was proximately caused by the voluntary ingestion, inhalation or injection of intoxicating liquor or any drug or substance, or any combination thereof, unless such drug was prescribed for the defendant by a licensed practitioner, as defined in section 20-184a, and was used in accordance with the directions of such prescription.
“(c) As used in this section, the terms mental disease or defect do not include (1) an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct or (2) pathological or compulsive gambling.”
After a psychiatric examination by a state psychiatrist, the acquittee may request an examination by an independent psychiatrist.
The procedures at such hearings are set forth at
The board is required to “conduct a hearing to review the status of the acquittee within ninety days of an order committing the acquittee to the jurisdiction of the board . . . .”
“Person who should be discharged” is defined in
The board acts under
“(1) If the board finds that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged, it shall recommend such discharge and, pursuant to
*600“(2) If the board finds that the acquittee is a person who should be conditionally released, the board shall order the acquittee conditionally released subject to such conditions as are necessary to prevent the acquittee from constituting a danger to himself or others.
“(3) If the board finds that the acquittee is a person who should be confined, the board shall order the person confined in a hospital for mental illness for custody, care and treatment.”
Under
“ ‘Danger to himself or others’ includes danger to the property of others.”
Assuming that the equal protection clauses were implicated, the Appellate Court held that it was unfair to deny indigent acquittees their pretrial jail time because the state’s interest of protecting society would be better served by petitioning for continued confinement under
Arguing that the Appellate Court erred in finding that the state’s burden under
See footnote 2, supra.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring. Although I agree with the result, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that, under
The construction given by the majority is, I believe, at variance with the language of
*606Because the version of
It seems to me that, once an acquittee completes the fixed maximum term, he becomes entitled to the same rights as anyone else respecting involuntary commitment to a mental health facility. Those rights include the right not to be committed unless the party seeking the commitment proves the necessity of commitment by clear and convincing evidence.
*607Despite these considerations, I concur in the result reached by the majority. Under our statutory scheme, the acquittee’s confinement in a mental health facility “rests on his continuing illness and dangerousness.” Id., 369. The statutes contemplate that these two considerations must guide the trial court in establishing a maximum commitment term.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring. I write separately because, in my view, our resolution of this appeal requires us to address directly the issue upon which we granted certification: “Did the state violate the guarantees of equal protection contained in the Connecticut and United States constitutions by declining to credit pretrial jail time against the length of an insanity acquittee’s commitment to a mental hospital?” Franklin v. Berger, 208 Conn. 816, 546 A.2d 282 (1988). I believe that we must address this issue regardless of whether the burden of proof is on the acquittee or the state when the state files a petition for continued commitment. Upon analysis, I conclude that the state did *608not violate the equal protection clause by declining to reduce the acquittee’s maximum term of commitment.1
Equal protection of the laws requires that similarly situated persons be treated similarly or if persons or classes are treated disparately, that there be a justification for such disparate treatment. Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 321-22 n.12, 493 A.2d 846 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063,106 S. Ct. 813, 88 L. Ed. 2d 787, reh. denied, 475 U.S. 1061, 106 S. Ct. 1290, 89 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1986), citing Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 551, 74 S. Ct. 280, 98 L. Ed. 281 (1954), Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 112, 86 S. Ct. 760, 15 L. Ed. 2d 620 (1966), and Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31, 25 L. Ed. 989 (1880).“ ‘Equal protection analysis must commence with a determination of whether a legislative classification is invidious, or “inherently suspect,” or whether the legislation impinges upon a fundamental right. Where the legislation impinges upon a fundamental right or creates a suspect classification then it must be struck down unless justified by a compelling state interest. . . . Where the statute does not involve fundamental rights *609or suspect classifications, the legislation will withstand constitutional attack if the distinction is founded on a rational basis.” (Citations omitted.) Frazier v. Manson, 176 Conn. 638, 645, 410 A.2d 475 (1979).
Although I agree with the majority opinion insofar as it says that it is often impossible to reduce commitment periods by jail time because most acquittees are committed to a mental health facility for an indefinite period of time depending on their mental health, this argument does not seem to hold true for those acquit-tees who serve the definite maximum commitment term as set by the trial court and who are released upon the expiration of that term. This is precisely the claim that the petitioner asserts. For this group of individuals that serves no more or no less than the maximum term of commitment, there necessarily are disparate periods of total confinement (jail time and commitment time) between those who can and those who cannot afford bail. The question presented to this court must be whether this disparate treatment violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.2
As stated earlier, we must determine whether the classification of the two groups, i.e., (1) those individuals who are confined in jail before trial and for the maximum term of commitment in a mental health facility, and (2) those who are confined only for the maximum term of commitment in a mental health facility, is “inherently suspect” or whether the legislative scheme impinges on a fundamental right. I conclude that this case involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right.
*610According to the parties, the acquittee in this case was indigent and therefore unable to post the pretrial bond and, consequently, spent 293 days in jail prior to trial. Accordingly, the petitioner alleges a classification based on indigency for purposes of equal protection analysis.
Although the petitioner argues that the court’s analysis of this equal protection issue must be guided by the strict scrutiny standard, he does not allege, nor would I find, that his status as an indigent makes him a member of a suspect class. See Petitioner’s Brief, p. 15; San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-29, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973); Moscone v. Manson, 185 Conn. 124, 130, 440 A.2d 848 (1981); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law (2d Ed. 1983) p. 731. Rather, the petitioner claims, as the Appellate Court found, that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review based on the infringement of a fundamental right. The petitioner claims that “[hjere the refusal to credit petitioner with jail time affects the period of his confinement under the fixed maximum term. His liberty right is impinged upon by the additional 293 days he is confined before the expiration of that term triggers a discharge or a shifting of the burden of proof at a court hearing.”
I disagree with the petitioner’s contention. I am inclined to follow the reasoning of those cases that hold jail time credit to be a matter of legislative grace rather than a constitutional requirement. See, e.g., Lewis v. Cardwell, 609 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1979); Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231, 1237 (5th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Manson, supra, 321 n.12; People v. Turman, 659 P.2d 1368, 1373-74 (Colo. 1983); cf. Johnson v. Prast, 548 F.2d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1977); King v. *611Wyrick, 516 F.2d 321, 323 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143, 144 (2d Cir. 1971).3
Because I consider jail time credit as a matter of legislative grace, and I do not view the denial of such credit as implicating fundamental rights or, in this case, *612affecting a suspect class, the standard of review in an equal protection challenge such as this is whether the denial of jail time credit is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See Ryszkiewicz v. New Britain, 193 Conn. 589, 597, 479 A.2d 793 (1984). I con-elude that the statute satisfies this rational basis standard.
Without doubt, the state has a legitimate interest in protecting society from individuals who are mentally disabled and pose a danger to others. Similarly, the state has an interest in protecting mentally disabled persons from harm that they might inflict upon themselves.
As Justice Glass states in his concurring opinion, there is no such mental health treatment during pretrial jail time. Accordingly, it is rational not to reduce *613an insanity acquittee’s maximum term of commitment, during which he or she receives such treatment, by the acquittee’s pretrial jail time, during which no such treatment is provided. The goals of each form of confinement are vastly different. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270-71, 93 S. Ct. 1055, 35 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1973). Therefore, the habeas court did not err in refusing to reduce the petitioner’s maximum commitment term by the amount of time that he spent in jail before sentencing.
Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
I agree with Justice Glass’s analysis of
Whether the burden of proof shifts to the acquittee at the expiration of the definite maximum term in the event that the state files a petition for continued commitment does not obviate the disparate treatment between those persons who have spent time in jail prior to their commitment and those who have not spent time in jail prior to their commitment. The former group necessarily has been confined for a longer period of time than the latter.
While I recognize that our discussion in Laden v. Warden, 169 Conn. 540, 544, 363 A.2d 1063 (1975), which we reiterated in Payton v. Albert, 209 Conn. 23, 33, 547 A.2d 1 (1988), where we said that “[t]he refusal to credit the plaintiff with jail time affects the period of his confinement and directly impinges on his fundamental right of liberty,” is inconsistent with our statement in Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 321 n.12, 493 A.2d 846 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063,106 S. Ct. 813, 88 L. Ed. 2d 787, reh. denied, 475 U.S. 1061,106 S. Ct. 1290, 89 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1986), I agree with the state’s argument that the statement in Laden is too broad. The overbroad nature of the statement in Laden is demonstrated by the logical inference from it that the denial of good time credit also implicates a fundamental liberty right because such a denial also necessarily affects the length of an individual’s confinement. This court and the United States Supreme Court have declared, however, that there is no constitutional right to good time credit. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974); Frazier v. Manson, 176 Conn. 638, 646-47, 410 A.2d 475 (1979). Thus, I maintain that jail time credit is a matter of legislative grace and is not constitutionally required.
Furthermore, it must be noted that most of the cases holding that jail time credit is not constitutionally mandated recognize that under the United States Supreme Court’s holdings, such as Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S. Ct. 668,28 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1971), and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S. Ct. 2018, 26 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1970), such credit may be necessary to avoid constitutional difficulty when an indigent defendant is sentenced to the maximum allowable term for an offense. I conclude that this principle is inapposite here because the petitioner’s maximum term of commitment based on his insanity acquittal was not the maximum allowable term that the trial court could have imposed under the offense charged, i.e., manslaughter in the first degree. See