The opinion of the Court was delivered by
In 1981, as part of “[a]n Act making it unlawful to refuse to rent to persons with children under certain circumstances and to refuse to rent to a person because of objections to the person’s source of income,” the New Jersey Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2A:42-100, which provides, in pertinent part:
No person, firm or corporation or any agent, officer or employee thereof shall refuse to rent or lease any house or apartment to another person because of the source of any lawful income received by the person or the source of any lawful rent payment to be paid for the house or apartment.
The purpose of the act, in part, was to “prohibit[ ] a landlord from refusing to rent to a person merely because of objections to the source of the person’s lawful income.” Assembly Commerce, Industry and Professions Committee, Statement to A. 994 (May 1, 1980). In a press release accompanying the signing of the legislation, Governor Byrne stated that its purpose was “to protect from *606 housing discrimination welfare recipients, spouses dependent on alimony and child support payments and tenants receiving governmental rental assistance.” Office of the Governor, News Release at 1 (Dec. 9,1981).
The issue presented in this appeal is whether N.J.S.A. 2A:42-100 prohibits a landlord that has never participated in the federal Section 8 rental assistance program, 42 U.S.C.A § 1437f, from refusing to accept a Section 8 voucher from one of the landlord’s existing tenants who becomes eligible for Section 8 assistance during the course of her tenancy. Specifically, we must decide whether N.J.S.A 2A:42-100 encompasses Section 8 payments and, if so, whether it is preempted by the federal legislation.
The trial court found that the state statute did not encompass Section 8 vouchers,and that, even if it did, it is preempted by the federal statute. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that
N.J.SA
2A:42-100 requires property owners to accept Section 8 vouchers, and that there is no preemption. 304
N.J.Super.
586, 589-90,
I
The essential facts are not in dispute. At the time this action was commenced, Sava Holding Corporation (Sava) owned an eighteen-unit residential building located at 211 64th Street, West New York, New Jersey. All tenants in the building were subject to oral month-to-month tenancies. N.M., a sixty-five-year-old widow who was unable to work, had been a tenant in the building since 1991. Her sole source of income was a monthly grant of Social Security in the amount of $521.80. N.M.’s monthly rent was $450, but Sava agreed to reduce it to $425 per month. The building in which N.M. resided was subject to the West New York Rent Control Ordinance.
On April 22, 1996, the West New York Housing Authority issued N.M. a Section 8 rental voucher, an authorization issued pursuant to the federal Section 8 housing program that can be *607 redeemed by. a landlord for a portion of a tenant’s monthly rent. N.M. had applied for Section 8 assistance when she first moved into the building, but she was not eligible at that time. The voucher provided that the Housing Authority would agree to make monthly payments to Sava to assist N.M. in paying the rent. On April 24, 1996, N.M. tendered the Section 8 voucher and the requisite documents to Sava to be applied to the following month’s rent. Sava refused to accept the voucher or to execute the documents because it did not want to become entangled with the “bureaucracy” of the Section 8 program. Sava had never participated in the Section 8 rental assistance program or in any other federal or state rental assistance program.
In May 1996, Sava filed a summons and complaint in tenancy against N.M. alleging non-payment of rent, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(a). The trial court held that Sava was not required to accept the Section 8 voucher. The court concluded that N.J.S.A. 2A:42-100 prohibits discrimination by landlords against people who have children or who are “on Public Assistance, or receive[ ] alimony, or child support,” but that the statute does not prohibit landlords from refusing to accept Section 8 rental vouchers. The court also held that the state statute, because it interfered with the voluntary nature of the federal Section 8 program, was preempted under the Supremacy Clause.
A judgment of possession was entered, and N.M. was ordered to pay the total rent due. N.M. filed a notice of appeal. In March 1997, Sava sold the building to Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. (Franklin Tower), the successor in interest to Sava and the named party in this appeal.
The Appellate Division reversed, holding that
N.J.S.A
2A:42-100 prohibits landlords from refusing to accept Section 8 vouchers. 304
N.J.Super.
at 589-90,
II
A
The Section 8 housing assistance program was established by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f, which amended the United States Housing Act of 1937. The Section 8 program was enacted “[f]or the purpose of aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing.” 42 U.S.C.A § 1437f(a). To that end, Section 8 authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to enter into annual contribution contracts with local public housing authorities so that they may make assistance payments to owners of existing dwelling units. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(b).
When a tenant is deemed eligible for Section 8 assistance, the housing authority issues a voucher or certificate. 24 C.F.R. § 982.302(a). 1 The tenant must then find an apartment and an owner “willing to lease the unit under the [Section 8] program.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.302(b). Once such a unit is located, the tenant executes a lease with the owner. 24 C.F.R. § 982.305. Generally, the tenant pays no more than thirty percent of her household income toward the monthly rent. 42 U.S.C.A. *609 § 1437f(o)(ll)(B)(ii). The housing authority enters into a separate Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) contract with the owner, pursuant to which the housing authority agrees to pay the balance of the fair market rent as established by HUD. 24 C.F.R. § 982.1.
The HAP contract requires the property owner to maintain the unit in accordance with HUD housing quality standards (HQSs), contained at 24 C.F.R. § 982.401. The HQSs set forth criteria for, among other things, the unit’s interior air quality, lead-based paint content, sanitary facilities, and water supply. Ibid. Section 8 units are inspected annually to assure that the HQSs are being satisfied. 24 C.F.R. § 982.405.
Some of the requirements of the Section 8 program were recently altered or eliminated by Section 545 of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, H.R. 4194 (Section 545). For example, prior to the enactment of Section 545, the term of Section 8 leases could not be less than one year. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(d)(B)(i). Now, a local housing authority may approve a shorter lease term. § 545(a). Although Section 8 landlords were previously required to use a form of lease promulgated by HUD, the new legislation permits a landlord to use the same lease form that its non-Section 8 tenants execute. Ibid.
The federal legislation and regulations explicitly contemplate that the states will work with the federal government to implement the Section 8 program. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437 (“It is the policy of the United States ... to vest in local public housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the administration of their housing programs.”); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (providing that voucher and certificate programs are administered by state or local housing agencies); see also Kargman v. Sullivan, 552 F.2d 2, 11 (1st Cir.1977) (finding federal housing legislation to be “consciously interdependent with the substructure of local law relating to housing”) (footnote omitted). In addition, a number of the Section 8 regulations defer to state or local law. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 982.308 (providing that tenant’s legal capacity to enter into lease is determined by state or local law); 24 C.F.R. § 982.313 *610 (providing that landlord’s use of security deposit at end of tenancy is subject to state or local law); 24 C.F.R. § 982.4 (providing that domicile of head of household is determined by state or local law); 24 C.F.R. § 982.451 (providing that housing authority that fails to make timely payment to landlord is subject to late fees in accordance with state or local law). The regulations also provide that landlords may be entitled to less than the fair market rent as determined by HUD if the unit is located in a municipality with a rent control ordinance. 24 C.F.R. § 982.511.
The Section 8 program provides that “the selection of tenants shall be the function of the owner.” 42
U.S.C.A.
§ 1437f(d)(l)(A);
see also
24
C.F.R.
§ 982.452(b)(1) (making landlord responsible for “selecting a certificate-holder or voucher-holder to lease the unit, and deciding if the family is suitable for tenancy of the unit”). Based on that language, several courts have found that the federal scheme does not require landlords to participate in the Section 8 program. See
Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments,
In
Hill v. Group Three Housing Development Corp.,
Similarly, the federal regulations indicate that the selection of tenants by landlords is meant to permit landlords to evaluate the fitness of Section 8 recipients as they would any other prospective tenant. Owners are encouraged to screen potential tenants on the basis of their tenancy histories, taking into account such factors as housekeeping habits and respect for the rights of other tenants. 24 C.F.R. § 982.307.
In 1987, Congress amended Section 8 to include a prohibition against discrimination in the selection of Section 8 tenants. 42
U.S.C.A
§ 1437f(t). The so-called “take-one, take-all” provision made it unlawful for an owner participating in the Section 8 program tó reject a prospective tenant because of that tenant’s status as a Section 8 recipient. Significantly, the “take-one, take-all” provision did not require an owner to accept Section 8 tenants if that owner had never participated in the Section 8 program. “In enacting [the ‘take-one, take-all’ provision], Congress intended to increase the availability of low-income housing.”
Knapp, supra,
The “take-one, take-all” provision was examined by the Second Circuit in
Salute, supra,
*613 B
That “[a] statute should be interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning if it is ‘clear and unambiguous on its face and admits of only one'interpretation’ ” is a well-established canon of statutory construction.
Board of Educ. of Neptune v. Neptune Township Educ. Ass’n,
144
N.J.
16, 25,
Apart from the decision by the Appellate Division in this case, only one published opinion in this state has addressed N.J.S.A 2A:42-100. See
Kentwood Constr., supra,
278
N.J.Super.
346,
The holding in
Kentwood Construction
was limited to existing tenants who become eligible for Section 8 vouchers during their tenancy. That court observed, however, that “a
prospective
tenant deemed eligible for Section 8 assistance has no claim of entitlement and the landlord, for a nondiscriminating and lawful reason, may reject the person as a tenant.”
Kentwood Constr., supra,
278
N.J.Super.
at 349,
New Jersey’s strong public policy of protecting tenants from unjustified evictions is reflected by the Anti-Eviction Act,
N.J.S.A
2A:18-61.1 to -61.12, which requires a showing of good cause to terminate a residential tenancy. Essentially, if a landlord is unable to demonstrate good cause as defined by the statute, it is obligated to renew the tenant’s lease. See
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson,
135
N.J.
209, 219,
“The purpose of [the Anti-Eviction Act] is to protect residential tenants from the effects of what the Legislature has deemed to be a severe shortage of rental housing in this state.”
Harden v. Pritzert,
178
N.J.Super.
237, 240,
*615 At present, there are no limitations imposed by statute upon the reasons a landlord may utilize to evict a tenant. As a result, residential tenants frequently have been unfairly and arbitrarily ousted from housing quarters in which they have been comfortable and where they have not caused any problems. This is a serious matter, particularly now that there is a critical shortage of rental housing space in New Jersey. This act shall limit the eviction of tenants by landlords to reasonable grounds and provide that suitable notice shall be given to tenants when an action for eviction is instituted by the landlord.
See also N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1a (setting forth legislative findings and intent of Anti-Eviction Act).
C
There are several theories under which federal law will preempt a state statute. We begin by noting that “pre-emption is not to be lightly presumed,”
California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra,
479
U.S.
272, 281, 107
S.Ct.
683, 689, 93
L. Ed.2d
613, 623 (1987), and that “the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by [federal law] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress,”
Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier,
501
U.S.
597, 605, 111
S.Ct.
2476, 2482, 115
L. Ed.2d
532, 543 (1991) (quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331
U.S.
218, 230, 67
S.Ct.
1146, 1152, 91
L. Ed.
1447, 1459 (1947));
see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458
U.S.
419, 440, 102
S.Ct.
3164, 3178, 73
L. Ed.2d
868, 885 (1982) (acknowledging that states traditionally have had broad power to regulate housing conditions and relationships between landlord and tenants). The party claiming preemption bears the burden of supporting that claim by “clear and manifest evidence.”
Pennsylvania Med. Soc’y v. Marconis,
Congress explicitly may express its intent to preempt state law.
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co.,
485
U.S.
293, 299, 108
S.Ct.
1145, 1150, 99
L. Ed.2d
316, 325 (1988);
Feldman v. Lederle Lab.,
125
N.J.
117, 134,
Preemption also may be found where state law actually conflicts with federal law.
Guerra, supra,
479
U.S.
at 281, 107
S. Ct.
at 689, 93
L. Ed.2d
at 623. Conflict preemption occurs in two instances: where “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,”
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373
U.S.
132, 142-43, 83
S.Ct.
1210, 1217-18, 10
L. Ed.2d
248, 257 (1963), or where a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,”
Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass’n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd.,
467
U.S.
461, 470, 104
S.Ct.
2518, 2523, 81
L. Ed.2d
399, 406 (1984) (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz,
312
U.S.
52, 67, 61
S.Ct.
399, 404, 85
L. Ed.
581, 587 (1941));
Feldman, supra,
125
N.J.
at 135,
The Massachusetts Supreme Court addressed the issue of Section 8 preemption in
Attorney General v. Brown, supra,
400
Mass.
826,
Federal courts have permitted states to impose greater restrictions than those imposed by federal law. For example, in
Guerra, supra,
479
U.S.
272, 107
S.Ct.
683, 93
L. Ed.2d
613, the Supreme Court considered whether a California statute that required employers to give pregnant women preferential treatment was preempted by the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42
U.S.C.A
§ 2000e(k), that did not require such treatment.
Id.
at 285, 107
S.Ct.
at 692, 93
L.
Ed.2d at 626. In concluding that the state law was not preempted, the Court found that the fact that Congress did not require preferential treatment does not demonstrate that Congress intended to prohibit such action. The Court stated that “[i]t is hardly conceivable that Congress would have extensively discussed only its intent not to require preferential treatment if in fact it had intended to prohibit such treatment.”
Id.
at 287, 107
S.Ct.
at 692, 93
L.
Ed.2d at 627. The preemption issue in
Guerra
is distinguishable from the question before us because two sections of the Civil Rights Act specifically provide that state laws are not preempted unless they actually conflict with the federal act.
Id.
at 281-82, 107
S.Ct.
at 689-90, 93
L.
Ed.2d at 624 (citing 42
U.S.C.A.
§§ 2000e-7, 2000h-4). The Court in
Guerra
also noted that, in the debates and reports on the bill, Congress repeatedly acknowledged that several states had laws similar to California’s law, but Congress failed to manifest its intent to supersede those laws.
Id.
at 287-88, 107
S.Ct.
at 693, 93
L. Ed.
2d at 627-28;
see also Associated Indus. of Mass. v. Snow,
*618
Similarly, this Court has held that state laws imposing stricter requirements than federal law are not necessarily preempted. In
Lederle Laboratories, supra,
125
N.J.
117,
Ill
We affirm the Appellate Division’s holding that a landlord’s refusal to accept a Section 8 voucher violates both the letter and the spirit of
N.J.S.A.
2A:42-100. 304
N.J.Super.
at 589,
*619
We are not persuaded by the contrary holding of the Seventh Circuit in
Knapp, supra,
Concerning the question of federal preemption, we find nothing in the federal statute explicitly preempting state legislation requiring landlords to honor Section 8 vouchers. HUD has explicitly preempted state law elsewhere, and could have done so here. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R § 850.158 (preempting state and local rent control laws under Housing Development Grant Program); 24 C.F.R. § 982.354(b) (preempting any state law imposing limitation on jurisdiction of local housing authority when voucher holder moves to another area under portability provision of Section 8). Nor is the federal statute so comprehensive as to create an inference that Congress intended that there be no state regulation. To the contrary, the Section 8 program contemplates substantial state participation, and we are unpersuaded that the provisions of Section 8 and those of our state statute cannot be harmonized. We turn our attention, therefore, to the question whether N.J.S.A. 2A:42-100 constitutes an obstacle to the goals and purposes of the Section 8 program.
That 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f does not mandate landlord participation in the Section 8 program is undisputed. However, the voluntary nature of the Section 8 program is not at the heart of the federal scheme. The inference that the program is voluntary derives only from one section of the statute that permits landlords to screen potential tenants, and no language in that provision implies that a landlord’s right to screen tenants includes the right to reject tenants solely on the basis that they are qualified for governmental rental assistance. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(d)(l)(A). Nothing in the statute, however, mandates that landlord partic *620 ipation in the Section 8 program be voluntary, nor is there any provision that prohibits states from mandating participation.
That conclusion is supported by the history of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(t), the “take-one, take-all” provision. That provision was enacted to increase the availability of low-income housing. It was repealed only because it was having the unintended effect of discouraging landlords from joining the Section 8 program. The goal of Congress, however, has always been to assist in providing housing to low-income families.
New Jersey shares that goal, as demonstrated by our.strong public policy of protecting low-income tenants from discrimination and unjustified eviction. The anti-discrimination provision of N.J.S.A. 2A:42-100, which prohibits discrimination against tenants based on “the source of any lawful rent payment,” is one of the legislative enactments by which New Jersey promotes its goal of providing affordable housing to its citizens. We are confident that application of the statute’s anti-discrimination provision to protect tenants who are eligible to receive Section 8 vouchers will neither conflict with nor frustrate the objectives of Congress in enacting the Section 8 program.
We also consider recent welfare reform efforts that have dedicated funds to the Section 8 program in an effort to assist people in the transition from welfare to work. See Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, at 11-12 (appropriating $238,-000,000 for Section 8 rental assistance “to help eligible families make the transition from welfare to work”); Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Welfare Reform: Is Self Sufficiency Feasible Without Affordable Housing?, 2 Mich. L. & Pol’y Rev. 43, 51 (1997) (noting that “Mousing plays a major part in any effort at becoming self-sufficient”). HUD’s own Family Self-Sufficiency program “coordinate[s] the use of ... housing assistance under the Section 8 rental certificate and rental voucher programs with public and private resources, to enable families eligible to receive assistance under these programs to achieve economic independence and self-sufficiency.” 24 C.F.R. § 984.101. Requiring landlords to accept *621 Section 8 vouchers from existing tenants will facilitate those welfare reform efforts.
We acknowledge Franklin Tower’s contention that to require landlord participation in the Section 8 program is unfair because of the substantial burdens imposed by the program’s regulatory requirements. The record does not support the assertion of Franklin Tower and related
amici
that the HQSs and other program requirements are overly burdensome. Landlords in New Jersey are already subject to numerous regulations concerning the maintenance of their properties and relations with their tenants.
See, e.g.,
Anti-Eviction Act,
N.J.S.A.
2A:18-61.1 to -61.12 (requiring “good cause” for eviction of residential tenant); Rent Security Deposit Act,
N.J.S.A.
46:8-19 to -26 (imposing limitations and requirements on security deposit collected by landlord);
N.J.S.A.
46:8-27 to -29 (requiring landlords to file certificate of registration with municipality where property is located, and to provide tenants with copy of same); Hotel and Multiple Dwelling Law,
N.J.S.A.
55:13A-1 to -28 (requiring landlord to satisfy standards concerning, among other things, structural adequacy, methods of egress, garbage collection and disposal, electrical wiring); West New York Code ch. 182 (municipal rent control ordinance). In addition, we note that some of the burdens alleged by Franklin Tower were altered or eliminated by the recent amendments to the Section 8 program.
Supra
at 609,
We note that N.J.S.A. 2A:42-100 exempts only owner-occupied houses with no more than two units, and that therefore our decision will apply to smaller residential units such as three-and four-family buildings. Nevertheless, we anticipate that the impact of our decision will not impose significantly greater burdens on owners of small buildings than on owners of larger ones. Nothing *622 in the record before us suggests that compliance with the requirements of the Section 8 program is more onerous for the owner of a three-family house than for the owner of a large apartment building. Further, we emphasize that in the case of an existing tenant, the landlord has had the opportunity to screen the tenant and has decided to accept the tenant prior to that tenant’s becoming eligible for Section 8 assistance. Similarly, although the issue is not before us, we acknowledge that a landlord approached by a prospective tenant eligible for Section 8 assistance has the full right to screen and review the tenant’s references, background, employment and rental history to verify that the tenant is otherwise qualified to reside in the landlord’s building. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(d)(l)(A); 24 C.F.R. § 982.307. Moreover, if we have misperceived the effect of the application of N.J.S.A. 2A:42-100 to owners of smaller rental housing units, the Legislature is free to reconsider the scope of the statute’s application.
The Appellate Division below relied, in part, on
Kentwood Construction, supra,
278
N.J.Super.
346,
We hold that the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:42-100 do not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the objectives of the Section 8 program, but, to the contrary, advance those goals. Therefore, the statute is not preempted by 42 U.S.C.A § 1437f. *623 Because we find that N.J.S.A. 2A:42-100 prohibits landlords from refusing to accept a Section 8 voucher from an existing tenant, we need not address whether Franklin Tower’s refusal to accept the Section 8 voucher violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in its lease with N.M.
IV
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN — 7.
Opposed — None.
Notes
N.M. received a Section 8 voucher. For purposes of this case, there are no significant differences between the issuance of a certificate, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(d), and the issuance of a voucher, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(o). The certificate and voucher programs were recently merged by Section 545 of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998. H.R. 4194.