Chаllenging a finding by the district court that he is extraditable to stand trial in Sweden for violations of that country’s criminal laws, Franklin Peroff sought habe-as corpus relief below. He appealed from the denial of his petition and we affirmed.
Peroff v. Hylton,
Peroff is charged with participation in a fraudulent scheme whereby relatively worthless shares of stock in a company called “American International Distributors, Inc.,” represented tо be stock of the “American International Development Corporation,” were furnished as collateral for loans madе to Peroff by Swedish citizens. The loans were not repaid. It was alleged that those defrauded were induced to make the loans in рart because they had viewed either a brokerage firm’s report or a newspaper’s market summary showing that “A.I. D.” was then being tradеd over-the-counter at a respectable price.
Peroff now asserts that the American International Development Corporation was no longer doing business under that name at the time of the alleged fraudulent transactions and had stopped trading as such over a month before the loans were made. This newly discovered evidence, he contends, supports his claim that the principal witness against him was in fact the perpetrator of the fraud and justifies a new inquiry into the question of whether probable cause exists to try Peroff for the offenses. We disagree. Although the facts now alleged by Peroff may tend to impeach the testimony of certain witnesses as to the specifics of the fraudulent transactions in question, it does not follow that he is entitled to a new hearing on the issue of extraditability. Even viewed in light of the appellant’s new claims, the evidence proffered by the Swedish authorities in their request for Peroff’s extradition amply supports the original finding of probable cause to believe that Peroff participated in the crimes charged.
Peroff also seeks a new hearing on the ground that his extradition was procured, in part, through misrepresentаtions by government officials that the extradition treaty between Sweden and The United States is reciprocal in nature. That Sweden’s lаws prohibit the extradition of her
*1102
own citizens
1
is of no relevance to a magistrate’s inquiry into extraditability under 18 U.S.C. § 3184. As we stated in
Peroff v. Hylton,
Peroff finally contends that he was denied due process by the Secretary of State’s refusal to conduct a hearing prior to issuing the warrant of extradition to Swedish authorities. Under Article VII of the extradition treaty,
“There is no obligation upon the rere-quested Statе to grant the extradition of a person who is a national of the requested State, but the executive authority of the requested Stаte shall, subject to the appropriate laws of that State, have the power to surrender a national of that State if, in its disсretion, it is deemed proper to do so.” Article VII, Convention of Extradition Between The United States of America and Sweden, 14 U.S.T. 1849 (1963).
Characterizing the executive’s exercise of discretion as an “administrative determination,” Peroff argues that he is entitled to a “fair hearing” before the Secretary of State on the propriety of his extradition. 2 We disagree.
Although limited judicial review is available by way of a рetition for habeas corpus relief, matters involving extradition have traditionally been entrusted to the broad discretion of the еxecutive. A person facing interstate extradition has no constitutional right to notice or a hearing before the governor whо acts upon the extradition request.
Marbles v. Creecy,
Peroff has no statutory right to the hearing he seeks; indeed, agency actions involving “the conduct of . fоreign affairs functions” are expressly exempted from the hearing requirements set out in The Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(4). In enacting lеgislation pertaining to international extradition and in approving the extradition treaty now in effect between The United States and Sweden, Congress has not sought to prescribe the procedures by which the Executive’s *1103 discretionary determination to extradite shоuld be exercised. It would be manifestly improper for this Court to do so.
The appellant was afforded an extradition hearing below and the courts have twice entertained his petitions for habeas corpus relief. He has been accorded due process and must now answer to the charges lodged against him. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Notes
. Under Article VII of the United States-Sweden Extraditiоn Treaty, the executive authority of a requested state may, subject to the laws of that state, grant the extradition of a citizen. Swеdish law proscribes the extradition of Swedish citizens. Lag om utlamning for brott, Art. 2 (Dec. 6, 1957).
. Peroff does not argue that the Secretary of State’s decision was arbitrary or based on constitutionally impermissible criteria, nor does he contend that the Executive refused to consider his objections to the extradition.