Lead Opinion
Defendants
We review de novo whether a court has jurisdiction. City of Riverview v Sibley Limestone,
We initially note that the lеading case on point, and on which defendants rely, was decided before the “first-out rule,” MCR 7.215(J)(1), and cited a subsequently amended statute. We therefore take heed of plaintiffs
In Saba v Gray,
An action brought in a county not designated as a proper county may nevertheless be tried therein, unless a defendant moves for a change of venue within the time and in the manner provided by court rule, in which case the court shall transfer the action to a proper county on such conditions relative to expense and costs as may be provided by court rule. The court of the county to which the transfer is made shall thereupon have full jurisdiction of the action as though the action had been originally commenced therein.
This Court noted that although the trial court’s clerk may not have entirely complied with the relevant court rule’s procedurаl dictates concerning written objections to the proposed order, the relevant court rule’s purpose was to ensure that an order comporting with the judge’s decision was entered, and because the judge hаd executed and entered such an order, the order was valid. Saba,
Pursuant to
An action brought in a county not designated as a proper county may nevertheless be tried therein, unless a defendant moves for a change of venue within the time and in the manner provided by court rule, in which case the court shall transfer the action to a proper county on such conditions relative to expense and costs as provided by court rule and section 1653. The court for the county to which the trаnsfer is made shall have full jurisdiction of the action as though the action had been originally commenced therein.
The only change that is not obviously purely stylistic is that instead of transferring the action “on such conditions relative to expense and costs as may be provided by court rule,” the transferring court must now do so “on such conditions relative to expense and costs as provided by court rule and section 1653.”
Plaintiff argues that the new referеnce to MCL 600.1653 is significant. We disagree. Nothing in the amendment changes the fact that after the change of venue becomes effective, the transferee court has full jurisdiction of the action; consequently, the transferor court has none. Both versions of the statute explicitly reserve jurisdiction to the transferor court to impose “conditions relative to expense and costs.” Under MCL 600.1653, in relevant part, the transferor court must impose certain expenses on the party who opposed the
Under GCR 1963, 404 when Saba was decided, and presently under MCR 2.223(B), “the court” is to order the change of venue at cost to the plaintiff, “which may include reasonable compensation for the defendant’s expense, including reasonable attorney fees,” and if those expenses are not paid within a particular time, the action is to “be dismissed by the court to which it was transferred.” The court rules, therefore, have at all relevant times recognized thеre is a difference between the essentially residual jurisdiction to evaluate the costs to be imposed for the transfer — reserved to the transferor court — and the jurisdiction to take any kind of substantive action in the matter — belonging only to the transferee court.
Under MCR 2.119(F)(1), a specific period
A plain reading of MCR 2.119(F) provides a right to move for rehearing or reconsideration, but it does not reveal any requirement that orders remain pending for any period. We also find somewhat instructive this Court’s analysis of MCR 2.227(B)(1), under which after the transfer of an action for lack of jurisdiction in the original court, “[t]he action proceeds in the court to which it is transferred as if it had been originally filed there.” While applicable in a substantially different situation, this language is strikingly similar to the second sentence of MCL 600.1651. After a transfer under MCR 2.227, “ ‘the rulings of the original court become, in effect, the rulings of the new court.’ ” Brooks v Mammo,
Moreover, neither the amendment to MCL 600.1651 nor any part of MCL 600.1653 in any way suggests that the Legislature was attemрting to grant the trial court jurisdictional authority to decide substantive issues like a motion for reconsideration after a change of venue. In effect, that would be a grant of permission to one court to interfere in the rulings оf another. Rather, MCL 600.1653
We note it is рossible that the transferee court may, out of deference to the transferor court or for some other reason, simply not entertain a motion to reconsider a decision made by the transferor court. Howеver, in the event the transferee court denied a party the right to have its motion for reconsideration entertained, the transferee court would be immediately subject to superintending control by this Court. MCR 7.203(C)(1). Consequently, we arе not concerned that a party will be absolutely unable to have its motion for reconsideration entertained.
We therefore need not consider defendants’ alternative argument that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion for reconsideration.
Reversed.
Notes
Because Keith Atkinson is not participating in this appeal, by “defendants” we refer only to Detroit Medical Center, Harper-Hutzel Hospital, Randy A. Lieberman, and Heart Care, EC.
See
Twenty-one days as of the 2008 amendment of the court rule.
Generally now incorporated into MCR 2.612.
Generally now incorporated into MCR 2.611.
While lеgislative bill analyses are generally not favored as a way to gain insight into statutes, we note that
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring). I concur in the result only.