Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance v. Piccard

Piccard Frankenmuth Ins v v PICCARD MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY FRANKENMUTH 9). (Calendar 8, Argued January Decided No. 89487. Docket No. Rehearing September 441 Mich —. 1992. denied brought Company in an action Mutual Insurance Frankenmuth Piccard, against the owner of Charles the Kent Circuit Court Center, Country under a commercial Music its insured Town & seeking liability policy, of its to defend and a declaration brought by indemnify underlying Thomas B. suit Piccard an Deane, wife, fireman, Deane, Jr., and Susan C. deliberately putting by out a fire Thomas Deane while suffered Hoifius, J., court, by R. Stuart his store. The set the insured at summary disposition insurer. The Court for the denied Foley, JJ., Gribbs, P.J., Appeals, F. affirmed and Walsh and J. curiam, holding unpublished opinion per that the insur- in an injured put- provided coverage policy fireman while to a ance (Docket intentionally ting insured No. fire set an out a 88701). Court, appeal, granting Supreme leave to in lieu of The Appeals, 433 Mich 894 to the Court of remanded the case Gribbs, P.J., remand, Appeals, D. E. and the Court of On JJ., again affirmed in an Kelly, J. Holbrook, Jr., and Michael 122173). (Docket opinion per The unpublished No. curiam appeals. insurer Brickley joined by opinion by Riley, Justices In an Justice result, concurring only in the Justice Mallett, with Levin Supreme Court held: provide policy for the does not However, bodily resulting act. from Piccard’s intentional and, unintended, accordingly, injury suffered Deane was personal injury in this suit must defend Piccard Frankenmuth brought by Deane. Brickley joined by Mallett, Justices Riley, Justice consequences hold that- the unforeseen would further preclude where will intentional criminal act insured’s person directly or the an innocent the conduct is addressed scope injury. In this constitutes conduct the risk issued commercial applies fire occurred at his because the to Piccard covers injured person, Viewed from business. unexpectedly fell from the roof when Deane accident occurred [Sept' Opinion of the Court bodily injury. Piccard’s music store and suffered of. Franken- personal muth must defend Deane’s suit suggestion because there is no that Piccard intended to inflict anyone by setting his business on fire or that bodily injury by suffered Deane was not the direct result of Piccard’s conduct. part part. Affirmed in and reversed in Boyle Cavanagh, joined by Chief Justice Justices Griffin, dissenting, stated that where a direct risk of harm is intentionally property damage personal injury created and or results, liability coverage specific there is no even if the result was unintended. It is irrelevant that the character of the harm actually results is different from the of character the harm by coverage exist, intended the insured. For occurrence, must have been caused an defined under the policy resulting as an accident in damage unexpected and unintended the insured. An acci- undesigned contingency, casualty, happening by dent is an a a chance, something things, unusual, out of the usual course of fortuitous, anticipated, naturally expected. not and not to be business, intentionally burning The act specifically of in- ‘ tending property damage, and, to cause is not an accident purposes therefore cannot be an occurrence for of the insurance contract in this case. The accidental nature of the fireman’s fall cannot convert the intentional act of the insured into an plain language contract, accident. In the of the there is no occurrence, unless the was caused and an "occurrence” must be an accident. Kreuger, (by Kreuger), Nelson & P.C. Steven L. plaintiff. for the

Dilley, Dewey (by Damon, & P.C. Jonathon S. Damon), for defendants Deane. Group Czopek, In J. Ins Co v 440 Mich Riley, (1992),

590; NW2d 444 and Auto-Owners Ins Churchman, Co v 560; 440 Mich 489 NW2d 431 (1992), companion today, cases released we aspects refined two of our decision in Allstate Ins Freeman, Co v 656; 443 NW2d 734 long First, we concluded that as as the possessed type insured the intent to inflict some v op the Court and, applies, exclusion the intentional act injury, rele- second, mental capacity the insured’s possessed determining whether insured vant third In the party. inflict on a the intent issue we consider one additional instant is, in the Allstate That decision. addressed of 'occurrence’ "whether the definition [a] consequences unforeseen of insurance includes the of the insured.”1 an intentional criminal act commercial The insured’s contract is a which, policies unlike the homeowner Czopek and Churchman provide issue those range coverage, limits broad events occurrence, arising by an out

caused ownership, maintenance or use the insured operations necessary inciden premises and all the of conducted tal to business the named insured premises . . from . at or the insured .[2] 1 437Mich 1035 provided following coverage: language the Coverage Liability ii Section Bodily Liability Injury Property Damage Liability Company pay 1. The will all sums on behalf insured obligated legally pay as which the shall become to insured damages because of bodily injury or property damage occurrence, applies, by an

to which this insurance caused arising premises ownership, or the insured out the maintenance use of incidental operations necessary or to the all at or the insured named insured conducted from business right company premises, have the and the shall seeking any against damages on ac- any defend count insured suit damage, if of such even fraudulent, allegations groundless, the suit false or are investigation any may claim and settlement of and or make such expedient, company not be shall suit as it deems but any obligated pay any judgment suit defend claim or op the Court Freeman, Allstate v supra, we set forth the analytical process to be followed by this Court construing insurance contracts. We concluded that we must first determine whether an insurance policy arguably provides coverage insured, for the then, whether the act of intentionally destroying a business "occurrence,” defined in the policy "accident,” as an and, finally, using the policy- blended subjective standard, whether to the innocent third party "expected was or intended from of the insured.”3

Having considered the facts in light of the above, we conclude although the policy issued to Piccard does provide coverage for prop- erty damage created by act, his intentional bodily injury suffered Deane was unintended. Accordingly, Frankenmuth Mutual must defend Piccard in personal suit brought by Deane.

On night 16, 1984, of February Charles Piccard, the owner of Towne & Country Music Store, went to his business to repair some musical instruments after the store had closed. In a deposi- tion taken for purposes of discovery in this case, Piccard described what happened after he arrived at the store. When I starting prepare [fixing for it

guitar], I had my soldering plugged iron in and I applicable after the company’s liability limit of the has been by payment judgments exhausted or settlements. proper requires construction [T]he of a contract that we first coverage exists, determine whether and then whether an exclu precludes coverage. [Allstate, supra (Riley, sion C.J.).] at 668 Piccard Ins v Frankenmuth Opinion of the Court instrument on getting my pad put out to was get job, to do the there it. I solder When went up been it had all used any wasn’t left because just kind of one replaced, was and extra been which my activities day. for the frustration cleaning fluid knocked some the room I had over I the instruments on pad that would set onto so top it over the object, as felt and knocked to—a that, realizing I point, didn’t have at that solder, I do the have stuff needed to any didn’t for, just soldering I iron I left the job was there room, other I knew plugged in. I went out into the soldering plugged laying iron that the there on was point just left, a I pad; just reached that and I anymore, just there didn’t want it, in. I that plugged I left I knew knew and it may a fire .... cause Deane, fighter fire on Thomas

Defendant the call to Rapids, Grand answered City neighboring roof of a out fire. While on the put smoke, store, Deane, over stepped blinded by another roof on thinking wall there was was no roof and other side. there Unfortunately, knee, ground severely injuring he fell to the un- disabled and causing permanently him to be Deane and his wife fighter. as a fire able work loss of consortium. negligence Piccard for sued stores, ap- which received neighboring The three damage, Pic- $60,000 sued worth proximately card as well. Mutual, issued a the insurer who Piccard, initiated

commercial seeking a deter- action declaratory judgment under precluded mination intentionally terms of the because trial denied damage. The court caused judgment summary motion for Frankenmuth’s prop- Piccard intended although theory so, bodily injury, did not intend damage, he erty 544 440 539 Opinion op the Court policy, coverage therefore, under the terms of the granted existed. reasoning motion, The court then Deane’s that his were caused "occurrence,” and, as defined in the there- (cid:127) fore, Frankenmuth owed a to defend Piccard. Appeals court, The Court of affirmed the trial reasoning that because Piccard did not intend to injure setting fire, Deane under granting existed.4 In lieu of leave to appeal, light we remanded this case in of our supra, Freeman, decision Allstate v and directed Appeals the Court of to discuss whether the inten- burning tional ing was an "accident” within the mean- policy’s of the insurance definition of "occur- regardless rence,” of whether expected or intended from the Appeals remand, the insured.5 On the Court of considered the issue and concluded that "an unex- pected and unintended caused an acci- arising ownership dent out of the of the insured premises policy.”6 fell within the of this granted appeal par- We leave to and directed the arguments ties to include in their the issue of pol- "whether the definition of 'occurrence’ in the icy of insurance includes the unforeseen conse- quences of an intentional criminal act of the in- sured.”7

II person injured through When an innocent negligent society another, conduct of demands reconsideration 1988 4 6 Unpublished opinion Unpublished opinion 437 Mich 1035 433 Mich 894 (Docket (Docket No. No. granted 88701). 122173). (1989), 434 Mich 902 Court of of the of the Court of clarification (1990). granted Appeals, Appeals, 434 Mich 855 decided October decided April (1990), 19, Ins v Opinion op the Court compensated for loss.8 injured person however, an individual will not allow

Society, to an insurer responsibility shift the economic discourage and deter.9 seeks conduct Indeed, himself person able insure were his inten- against consequences economic attributable the deterrence wrongdoing, tional lacking. Auto- would be responsibility financial J., Riley, p 576. Churchman, Ins vCo Owners Further, principle as matter of moral profit It wrongdoer never from crime. is should [a] person prop that a who owns insured

axiomatic is to collect to burn not entitled erty causes proceeds. v Uni insurance American [Lichon Co, 408, 413; 435 459 NW2d 288 versal (1990). Citations omitted.] argues ought first that we focus Frankenmuth or use” clause "ownership, on the maintenance attendant that arson is not and concludes because of the "ownership, maintenance or use” In mak- precluded. is insured’s business assumes, ing argument, without is element of concluding, there expressly are disagree. in this We deterrence clause. We persuaded phrase "ownership, mainte- or is insurer to define nance use” used the nature of the risk as- subject matter words, the risk covered by sumed.10 other commercial insurance issued to Piccard on limited that occurred to those events Under the terms premises of business. home example, Piccard’s is policy, Widiss, Law, 5.4(d), p & Insurance 525. § Keeton 9 Id. Co, 293; 144 v 178 Mich Patterson Standard Accident Ins ed), 15:26, Couch, Insurance, (rev p 2d § NW 491 See also 2 209. Opinion op the Court Coverage covered, nor is his health care. is limited simply operating to the risks involved in his music store. problem focusing that arises in on the sub-

ject scope matter of the rather than the its truly risk, covered in instances, some accidental incidents caused the insured will be precluded coverage. example, assuming from For for working pipe the moment that Piccard smoked a while pipe forgot store,

in his set the down and it, caught about store, left the and the store fire, analysis, under Frankenmuth’s precluded. Why? smoking would pipe Because "ownership, is not attendant to the maintenance premises. hypothesis use” of the insured’s This problem implicit focusing illustrates the on the phrase "ownership, narrow rather use,” maintenance or concentrating scope than on the covered risk afforded to the insured.

Therefore, we believe that we must consider the "ownership, maintenance or use” clause a man- scope application. consistent with its and ner recognizing duty While to coverage, that the to defend extends allegations arguably policy come within the supra Freeman, Allstate v at express the insurer’s intention to defend even scope risks,11 frivolous we conclude that the of the applies and the covers, risk that it Piccard because the fire occurred at his business. supra. Allstate, Michigan Detroit Edison Co v Mut 11Presumably, protect itself, in order to Frankenmuth Mutual has expressly provided policy in the issued to Piccard that company right

the shall have the any to defend suit against seeking damages the insured bodily on account of such property damage, any or allegations even if of the of the groundless, fraudulent, suit are may false or make such investigation expedient any and settlement of claim or suit as deems .... n [See 2.] Ins v Court App 136, 141-142; 301 NW2d Co, Mich (1980). Having conclusion, we next reached "occur- was an Piccard’s act whether consider policy. in the as defined rence”

III liability policy to Pic- issued commercial "occur- Mutual has defined card, Frankenmuth including accident, continuous or as "an rence” repeated exposure conditions, results in which expected neither standpoint insured.”12 from of the intended nor There are three parts must to this definition which under the terms exists be satisfied before policy. First, must whether the of the we consider of an suffered Deane were result "accident.” supra 668-672, Freeman, v we

In Allstate meaning "accident,” word considered which, to define the word as in this was used purposes "occurrence,” and that for the concluded law of insurance a casu- undesigned contingency, is an "an accident chance, something out of

alty, happening by fortuitous, unusual, things, course of usual expected.” anticipated, to be naturally and not Di- Liability Ins Co v [Metropolitan Property & Cicco, Allstate, p companion supra, 670.] definition, evaluated an "accident” is Under this person, injured rather from follows: in its as is defined insured "Occurrence” accident, including continuous means "[O]ccurrence” conditions, bodily repeated exposure results which expected from the nor intended neither the insured. of 548 440 539 Opinion of the Court than the insured. Industries, Guerdon Inc v Fidel ity & Casualty York, Co of 12, New 371 Mich 18- 19; (1963). 123 NW2d 143 This is in conclusion. accord with the language of the contract and the majority rule that

the time of the occurrence of an accident within meaning of an indemnity policy is not the time wrongful act was committed but the time damag when the complaining party actually Couch, (rev Insurance, ed), 44:8, ed.[13] [11 2d p § 194. See also Shelby Co, Moss v Mut Ins 105 Mich App 671, 679; (1981). 308 NW2d 428 Emphasis added.][14]

In the instant the Court of Appeals con- cluded that the "accident” occurred when Thomas Deane fell unexpectedly from the roof of Piccard’s music store and injured himself.15 agree. We In so concluding, the Court Appeals followed the principle we established in Freeman possible to have a cause of action where the inten- tional conduct will result in unintended and un- expected injury thus constituting an "accident” 13Anno: during, Occurrence of accident or as or before or after, period time liability policy, 57 ALR2d 1385. occurring Anno: and Am period Event as within of "occurrence” "discovery” liability policies, or "claims 382; made” 37 ALR4th 43 2d, Insurance, 243, pp 323-324; Jur 2d, Supp, § 43 Am Jur 1992 243, pp 65-68; CJS, Insurance, 45 seq. § 824 et § 14 Employers See also Liability Mut Michigan Ins Co of Wisconsin v Co, App 697, Mut Auto Allstate 703-704; 101 Mich (1980); 300 NW2d 682 Demps, 168, App Ins Co v 176-177; 133 Mich 348 NW2d 720 (1984), lv (1985); den 421 Mich 852 Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Eurich, App 683, 687; (1986), NW2d 70 lv den 426 Mich (1986); 881 Mich Michigan Co, Transamerica Ins Co of v Safeco Ins 55, App 59; 472 NW2d 5 15Unpublished opinion per Appeals, curiam of the Court of decided 19, (Docket 88701), October slip op, pp 2-3; remand, No. unpublished opinion per Appeals, curiam of the Court of decided (Docket April 122173), slip op, pp No. 2-3. 549 v Piccard Frankenmuth op the Court supra language. Allstate, at 670.16

under the principle foregoing for the and Thus, the under purpose case, accident occurred when of this the unexpectedly the fell from roof. Deane part of of the definition Next, the second under "occurrence,” "bodily if Deane suffered must determine we

injury.”17 not Mutual does "bodily dispute in- that Thomas Deane suffered fighting accidentally jury” the fell he while when Accordingly, this store. fire at Piccard’s music "occurrence” has been of the definition of element met. part

Finally, of the definition of the third under "bodily "occurrence,” in- must if the we consider "expected jury” [or] Deane was suffered Thomas standpoint insured,” Mr. from intended the Czopek, Churchman, DiCicco, we In and Piccard. using policy-blended that when determined subjective con- standard18 to evaluate insurance "expected language tract exclusions that have insured,” of or intended from act to will on insured’s intentional focus supra type injury. 679, DiCicco, at some of cause (opinion J., C.J., concur- 682 of Riley, Griffin, ring); (opinion J., Levin, 718, n 12 id. at Boyle, concurring); JJ., id. at Brickley, Cavanagh, J.); supra, (opinion 731, Churchman, n 11 Archer, pp Czopek, supra, Mallett, J., J., 577-578; Riley, pp applying standard, at this we look 596-597. perspective his from insured’s conduct 16 (rev 9-11; Couch, Insurance, ed), § 41:7, pp 7A 10 2d See also Practice, 4492.02, pp Appleman, 32-33. Law & § Insurance 17 Couch, 41:6, pp See, supra, generally, n 8-9. § 16 unchanged My from those set forth matter remain views DiCicco, apply my opinion supra separate would in the 676-678. although objective the insured and conclude that standard activity, consequences presumed have intended Co v Auto-Owners Ins Deane unintended. See also Churchman, J., p Riley, n 1. Opinion of the Court type evaluate his intent either to cause some party to an third or his innocent awareness likely perfor- that harm was mance of his intentional act. to follow from the On remand in the instant the Court of Appeals applied subjective the DiCicco standard expect concluded that "Piccard did setting intend that the fire result in would to Deane.”19 analysis, Appeals recognized

In its the Court of policy-blended subjective that the DiCicco standard subjective purely is not as the same the standard adopted Gallagher, as 583; 578, Morrill v 370 Mich (1963). Morrill,

122 NW2d 687 In we held that where an insurance contract excludes from cover- " age injury intentionally by or destruction 'caused ” insured,’ or at the of direction the both an inten- injury tional act and an intentional must be dem- Appeals recognized, onstrated. As Court of the the purely subjective applied standard, as in Morrill distinguishable progeny, policy- and its is from the subjective blended standard because Franken- exclusionary encompasses muth’s clause both in- expected injury, simply signifi- tended or than rather intended as in Morrill. There is a cant difference between insurance contracts that expected injuries exclude both intentional and merely injuries.20 those that exclude intentional recognizing panel distinction, of the Court of Appeals has concluded that in for an order insurer "expected” injury, to avoid for an it must op, supra, slip p See n 15 3. McCrimmon, 130, 133-134; App Yother v 147 Mich 383 NW2d 126 (1985); Jenkins, Casualty 462, App State Farm &Fire Co v 147 Mich 467-468; (1985); Casualty 382 NW2d 796 State Farm &Fire Co v Groshek, 703, 710; App (1987); 161 Mich 411 NW2d 480 Auto-Owners Churchman, Riley, J., 576, p 8; Linebaugh Berdish, Ins Co v n v 750, 755; App (1985); Maloney, 376 NW2d 400 Ins Co Allstate v 263, 266-267; (1988). App 174 Mich 435 NW2d 448 Piccard v of Court the victim suffered

be shown anticipa- expected, natural, foreseeable, the tory insured. of an intentional act result App Michigan Group Morelli, 111 Mich v Ins Co agree We with 314 NW2d 672 516; consistently applied analysis, Court Morelli language Appeals,21 of an in cases where of exclusionary precludes in- for clause bodily sured where expected. intended or

either is necessary, therefore, us to evaluate It is if Piccard case determine record in instant upon type inflict intended to some Deane, ily injury. Deane’s bod- if Piccard’s conduct caused separate inquiry is limited three

Our Piccard admitted information which sources of destroy property: his his statement his intention investigators,22 to the his statement arson entering plea guilty23 of the his court when felony property,24 preparing his to burn real depositional testimony.25 contends only his to de- these stroy indicate intent admissions property, he intended to cause never 21See n 20. 22 appendix a. See 23 dispositive plea in this In order to be convicted is not case. preparing property, that a it must be established to burn real defendant distributed; placed, Used, arranged, or 1. devised inflammable, material, liquid Any explosive or 2. combustible device; substance, any any personal property $50 the value more than 3. or about any value; property of or real maliciously wilfully fire burn the to set to or 4. With intent Practice, 750.77; Michigan property. 28.272. also 12 MSA See MCL 10.30, p 331. § uninten- intentional or an element of This crime does contain most, only plea person. that establishes to a At Piccard’s tional he destroyed intentionally store. his ante, pp 542-543. See appendix b. See Opinion of the Court anyone, and, therefore, to company

insurance has a to defend him in personal this lawsuit instituted Deane. although contends, however, The insurer he might injure anyone, not have intended to such may pre- are foreseeable because be department upon sumed that a fire will be called put fire, out a and in the course of the fire- fighting may injured. effort, a fireman be More- they argue over, bodily Piccard’s intent to cause injury need not be established because he admitted property damage, pre- his intention to cause thus cluding coverage. him from are, course,

There certain intentional acts expectation injury may presumed where the be only from the intentional act even if the insured damage. example, intended to cause For destroy building an individual who wishes to (which insured) by setting he owns and has a bomb go day people off at a time of when are building (ex- may presumed be to have known pected), very somebody might least, at the be injured. Yet, under the facts of this presumption cannot occur. We can conclude from department Piccard’s act that the fire would be fighter called and that a fire would the scene extinguish the fire. We can also conclude that property damage resulting extensive will be the effect of Piccard’s intentional and criminal act. given presented However, the facts Court, to the by intentionally destroy- we cannot conclude that ing property, expected bodily injury occur. The record reveals that the fire was set in evening adjacent after his store and the stores were closed. The record also indicates that no individual was in the area when the fire was set. simply There is conclude, no reason to from the presented, injure facts that Piccard intended to v Piccard Ins Opinion of the Court step having fighter by off a roof while him fire fighting the fire at his store. requires language us to of the exclusion expected to Piccard intended whether

consider inflict some asmuch bodily injury type In- to Deane. underlying looking only at the are as we injury, of the the nature rather than cause of supra complaint, 690, intent Allstate, Piccard’s at irrelevant. Because is cause any suggestion that Piccard is devoid of the record injure Deane, Deane’s and because intended presumed as occurred to have cannot be act, intentional result of Piccard’s direct precluded. not

IV summary, the unforeseen we conclude consequences intentional criminal of an insured’s preclude the conduct is where will act person, directly Allstate, at the innocent addressed supra 688-689, consti or the criminal conduct Gardipey, injury. vCo tutes the Auto-Owners (1988), App 715; 434 lv NW2d 173 Mich (1989). Linebaugh Berdish, 144 Mich 855 v den 433 Mich App In this 750, 762; NW2d (a) scope we conclude applies covers, to risk that and the (b) business; the fire occurred at his because injured person, from the viewed unexpectedly Deane occurred when the "accident” fell from the (c) store; music roof of Piccard’s (d) injury”; "bodily insurer but Deane suffered has the personal to defend Piccard suggest no facts there are suit because bodily injury on intended inflict that Piccard anyone setting on fire and business Deane was occasioned Piccard’s conduct. direct result of Opinion the Court JJ., Brickley Mallett, and concurred with J. Riley, only J., in concurred the result. Levin, A APPENDIX investigation After an into the cause the fire Rapids Department, the Grand Fire investigators admitted arson that he intention- ally ing signed business, set fire his and the follow- reflecting

statement his admission. I Charles Piccard 2-16-84 intentionally on poured guitar pad Brasso on a plugged and soldering in iron and it on pad. Thinking left that a workshop. small fire would start I am solely responsible as I anyone did without knowledge else’s or in[ ]. B

APPENDIX depositional testimony Piccard’s is consistent plea with an account he restated heard Judge Snow, before Roman J. Court, Kent Circuit preparation felony property. for the to burn real The Defendant: was the owner of Town and I

Country Music I gone Center and had there to pick up receipts day, for the and I had taken job working another and during elsewhere days, got there, so I when and it was a situation just where kept piling up everything bills and kept getting worse just becoming and was more and frustrating more to be involved with the mu- store, sic and I started to do the work I had to v Piccard Dissenting Cavanagh, C.J. gave up, evening just I don’t do know— —I out, guess. I way I And went for a guess. I I looked doing workshop back, and was into the into the work, some flam- I knocked over repair some mable decided just I pad, and cleaning fluid onto a work it looked like best moment that at that iron out, soldering just plugged way so pad and I left. laying left work building? you fire to the The Court: And set Yes, sir. The Defendant: intentionally? you The And did this Court: Yes, sir. Defendant: act, Cavanagh, of inten- (dissenting). The C.J. business, intending tionally burning specifically and, damage, is an accident property to cause pur- for therefore, it an "occurrence” cannot be The accidental insurance contract. poses this the the cannot convert nature fireman’s fall into an "accident.” act of the insured intentional contract, no the there is plain language In the an "oc- by the caused coverage injury was unless an acci- currence,” must be and an "occurrence” dent.

i Co v Freeman As we observed in Allstate Ins Co v & Metropolitan Property Liability (1989), DiCicco, we 656; 443 NW2d 734 432 Mich coverage whether exists. first determine or provides coverage bodily injury for policy In an occurrence.” damage by "caused property defines "occur- policy definition section rence”: accident, including means an "[0]ccurrence” conditions, repeated exposure to or

continuous damage property in results which 556 Mich Dissenting Opinion by Cavanagh, C.J. expected

neither nor intended from the [Emphasis of the insured. added.] Thus, instance, for in to exist this injuries must have been caused an occurrence.

ii remand, cited Collins v On the Court Appeals Co, Nationwide Life Ins 271; 294 NW2d 194 (1980), for proposition "if death victim, results from the act of voluntary but unexpected, result is unanticipated, and un- foreseen, is an accidental death within meaning of an accident insurance policy.” Unpub- curiam, lished opinion per decided April (Docket 122173), slip op at 3. But Collins No. easily distinguishable from case. The Collins provided bodily "accidental injuries.” language This focuses upon the resulting injury, not act that results injury.

present the language speaks of "liability . . . caused . . . which results in occurrence bodily injury.” Accordingly, to trigger coverage, the basis of the injury, the event caused the injury, must have been an accident resulting in bodily

unexpected and unintended the insured.

The complaint alleges that a fire occurred at the premises of Town & Country Music Center. It Deane, further that alleges Jr., "Thomas B. re- sponded to the alarm to the fire injured and was during battling the course of Therefore, the fire.” the event which forms "basis for the injury,” occurrence, event to be classified as an is the fire. policy defines as "occurrence” "an accident . . . which results bodily injury damage property expected neither nor intended Ins v by Dissenting Opinion Cavanagh, C.J. An accident is the insured.” of from the " casualty, hap- undesigned contingency, a a 'an something by pening chance, the usual out of things, unusual, fortuitous, not antici- of course ” expected.’ naturally pated Free- not and supra an "accident.” man, fire not at 670. This this. He intended set admitted The insured of the the contents intended to burn fire and premises. " fire was 'an It cannot be said happening casualty, undesigned contingency, a something by usual course chance, out of the anticipated, things, fortuitous, unusual, and not ” expected.’ naturally Therefore, this Id. to be bodily injury caused an occurrence was not Defining coverage precluded. fireman’s fall fire, the basis cannot convert the as "accidental” injury, an "accident.” into of harm is a direct risk hold that where would per- intentionally property created, liability injury results, no there is sonal specific It is unintended. if the result was even irrelevant of the harm the character actually from the character results is different supra Freeman, the insured. the harm intended intending to cause out 718. The insured set damage, accident, and not an his act was therefore, was, not caused an occurrence. comports interpretation with the differ-

This also compared policy question, as ent nature policy in Collins was in Collins. The to the injured policy, to insure intended accident against unexpected injury. party Here, we are liability interpreting the Court actions the insured’s the nature of should examine provide policy to function of it is the because resulting negligent acts from the insured. 558. Dissenting Cavanagh, C.J.

III Riley Justice has there concluded was an occurrence because accident occurred when the pp Ante, fireman fell from the roof. 546-547. She supports theory by her reference to this Court’s opinion supra: Allstate,

Accordingly, ascertaining we find that the in- the in- sured’s "intent” may determine sured’s actions constituted an whether "accident,” but does not necessarily follow that an insured must act unintentionally for an act be an "occur- Emphasis rence.” at 670. [Id. added.] agree required the insured is not to act unintentionally occurrence;1 for the act to be an portion quoted however, I find the first of the enlightening. Examining sentence the insured’s may intent determine whether the actions consti- hypothetical example may tute an "accident.” A help clarify what I believe be the substance quoted language. Suppose the fire had been faulty electric cord on the started insured’s Examining coffeemaker. the insured’s act for "in- purposely plugged tent,” there is no doubt that he in the coffeemaker and turned the switch. In intentionally. that sense he acted an accident The fire remains occurrence, and the act constitutes an however, because at the time of the insured’s purposeful he act had no intent to cause harm. plugging coffeepot The act of in sufficiently harm, direct cause and the fire example in this Piccard, is an accident. Mr. on the intentionally hand, other acted with the intent property damage indirectly, any poten- cause and, event, all, every along Almost after can be traced back a line act, ultimately, constructing but-for causation to some intentional building buying property. Ins v Dissenting Opinion Cavanagh, C.J. injury; resulting personal were his actions

tial per- that resulted the condition direct cause injury. cannot constitute His actions sonal occurrence. disposition summary under the motion 2.116(C)(10), contended Frankenmuth

MCR any regarding genuine material issue was no there agree. party that Mr. contends I Neither fact. music fire to his intend set did not the Court of reverse decision store. would Appeals disposition summary and direct insurer, entered favor Company. Insurance Mutual Boyle JJ., Griffin, concurred with Cavanagh, C.J.

Case Details

Case Name: Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance v. Piccard

Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court

Date Published: Sep 9, 1992

Citation: 489 N.W.2d 422

Docket Number: 89487, (Calendar No. 9)

Court Abbreviation: Mich.