70 Pa. Super. 446 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1918
Opinion by
This is an appeal by the Peoples Natural Gas Company from an order of the Public Service Commission requiring the appellant to file its tariff and schedule of rates covering its service in supplying natural gas to the Johnstown Fuel Supply Company, a corporation engaged in the furnishing of natural gas in the City of J ohnstown. The proceeding originated in an increase of its rates of service by the latter company and the protests filed by certain of the patrons of that company against such increase. At the hearing before the commission on the proposal to increase the rates the fact was developed that the J ohnstown company received its supply of natural gas from the Peoples Natural Gas Company; whereupon, the latter company was summoned
Two objections are presented to the action of the Public Service Commission: 1. That the Peoples Natural Gas Company is not a public service company nor subject to the provisions of the Public Service Company Law with respect to the sale of natural gas to the Johns-town Fuel Supply Company; and, 2. That “what the Peoples Natural Gas Company does is interstate commerce and beyond the power of the commission.” The Peoples Natural Gas Company is a Pennsylvania corporation chartered under the Act of May 29,1885, P. L. 29. The statute authorizes the incorporation of such companies for the purpose of producing, dealing in, transporting and storing and supplying natural gas to such
The gas supplied by the Peoples Natural Gas Company was all produced from wells in Pennsylvania until that supply became insufficient for the uses of the company because of the extension of its service and the decrease in the quantity of gas produced by the wells. It, then, entered into a contract with the Hope Natural Gas Company of West Virginia for a supply of gas from that state. That contract provided that the latter company would deliver at the Pennsylvania State line a supply of natural gas which was to be there received by the Peoples Natural Gas Company in its pipe lines.' The Hope Natural Gas Company is a West Virginia corporation which does not do any business in Pennsylvania with respect to its transactions with the Peoples Natural Gas Company. The Peoples Natural Gas Company did not extend into West Virginia and has no operations therein. Its extensive pipe line system holds its supply of gas. About two-thirds of the quantity which it distributed latterly came from the Hope Gas Company. The remainder came from its wells in Westmoreland, Armstrong, Indiana and perhaps other counties in Pennsylvania. The gas from Pennsylvania wells was mingled with the West Virginia gas in the same pipe line. When' the gas was delivered by the Hope Gas Company at the
Nothing has been said thus far of that aspect of the case with respect to which it is contended that the gas obtained from West Virginia was taken out of the operation of the Federal commerce law because it became mingled with the general body of property in the State. It is .property of a peculiar character necessarily confined in tanks or pipes and distributed from place to place by pressure through diverging pipes. It was not consigned from one state to a terminus in another. It was delivered into the containers of the appellant in the State of Pennsylvania and controlled by the latter in its distribution from place to place and so mingled with the Pennsylvania gas that its identity as an imported product was entirely lost. It would seem to have as fully lost its distinctive character as an import as did the coal in the case of Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, where a flat-boat loaded with coal at Pittsburgh and floated down the river to Louisiana was held to have become merged in the property of the State although it remained in the boat in the same condition in which it was shipped from Pittsburgh and was merely moored to the river bank. A like conclusion was reached in Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577.
It does not seem to be denied that the appellant is subject to regulation as a public service company with respect to part of its business in the State' nor could this be successfully done. The authorities cited in Munn v. Ill., supra, show conclusively the authority of the State and a discussion of the subject .would be superfluous.
Since the foregoing opinion was written the learned counsel for the appellant have called our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Western. Union Telegraph Company and United Telegram Company, plaintiffs in error, v. Calvin H. Foster and Frederick J. Mcleod et ah, members of the Public Service Commission of Massachusetts, delivered May 20th, and have suggested that the opinion supports their contention. The contention there was the right of Calvin H. Foster, one of the defendants, to have furnished to him the continuous quotations of the New York Stock Exchange by means of ticker service, as furnished by the plaintiffs in error to other brokers, the Public Service Commission of Massachusetts having determined that the refusal so to supply him was an unlawful discrimination. One of the defenses presented to the action of the commission was that the transaction was interstate commerce and therefore, not subject to the control of the Public Service Commission. The quotations were sent from New York by the Western Union Telegraph Company in the name of the Gold and Stock Telegraph Company to the office of the latter in Boston and were thence transmitted by an operator to the tickers in the offices of the brokers who had subscribed therefor.. The United Telegram Company, one of the plaintiffs in error, is a New Jersey corporation which received quotations from Boston alone where it had its principal office outside of New Jersey. Its quotations were furnished by the Stock Exchange in New York, telegraphed to ihe
On a consideration of the whole subject we reach the conclusion that the order complained of was within the authority of the Public Service Commission. It follows that the appeal should be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed at the cost of the appellant.