{¶ 2} Appellee, Arthur Simon1, and Cynthia Frank wеre involved in an automobile accident on January 13, 2000. Cynthia was proceeding westbound through a major intersection in Toledo, Ohio, and appellee, facing east, attempted to turn left (north). The cars collided in the intersection, and Cynthia was cited for running the red light.
{¶ 3} On April 17, 2000, Cynthia was found guilty of the red light violation charge in Toledo Municipal Court after a full trial. On September 2, 2004, appellants filed the instant complaint, alleging appellee's negligence in failing to yield the right of way caused the collision, and seeking damages for Cynthia's injuries, lost wages and for John's loss of consortium. Appellee moved for summary judgmеnt, including in his motion the transcript of Cynthia's trial and a certified copy of the Toledo Municipal Court judgment entry. In its journal entry granting appellee's motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that appellants wеre collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of the color of the light at the time of the accident.
{¶ 4} Appellants timely appealed and now raise two assignments of error for reviеw:
{¶ 5} "I. The trial court erred in applying the doctrine of issue preclusion in this case, because appellee was not bound by the decision in appellant Cynthia Frank's criminal trial. *3
{¶ 6} "II. The trial court erred by holding that an issue determined in a criminal trial has preclusive effect in a subsequent civil action."
{¶ 7} An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as that used by the triаl court. Grafton v.Ohio Edison Co. (1996),
{¶ 8} Because appellants' assignments of error are related, we address them jointly. The rules of collateral estoppel are well-established in common law. "The doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, holds that a fact or a point that was actually and directly at issue in a previous action, and was passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, may not be drawn into question in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies, whether the cause of action in the two actions be identical or different. * * * [Collateral estoppel * * * precludes the relitigation, in a second action, of an issue that has been actually and necessarily litigated *4
and determined in a prior action that was based on a different cause of action. In short, under the rule of collateral estoppel, even where the cause of action is different in a subsequent suit, a judgment in a prior suit may nevertheless affect the outcome of the second suit." Fort FryeTeachers Ass'n, OEA/NEA v. State Employment Relations Bd. (1998),
{¶ 9} In its judgment entry, the trial court cited and applied the test for collateral estoppel from Monahan v. Eagle Picher Ind.,Inc. (1984),
{¶ 10} As a matter of law, the trial court properly found that appellee established the elements of collateral estoppel. First, the party against whom estoppel is sought, Cynthia, was a party in the prior criminal action. Second, there was a final judgment on the merits in the criminal action, and Cynthia had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of thе color of the light. She testified, was able to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and she had the opportunity to appeal the adverse judgment. Third, the issue of the color *5 of the light was actually tried аnd was necessary to finding Cynthia guilty in her criminal case. Fourth, the issue in the criminal case is identical to the issue which would be pivotal in the civil suit — whether appellee or Cynthia was at fault for the collision.
{¶ 11} Apрellants argue that appellee cannot invoke collateral estoppel because appellee was not a bound party to Cynthia's criminal trial, citing Phillips v. Rayburn (1996),
{¶ 12} Though not labeling it as such, appellants, throughout their arguments, advocate the application of strict mutuality of parties. The doctrine of mutuality required both parties tо have been bound by a prior judgment in order for either party to assert that prior judgment in a subsequent action. This doctrine was rejected in the federal courts by Parkland Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore (1979),
{¶ 13} "[Prerequisite to the application of collateral estoppel is that the party asserting the preclusion must prove that the identical issue was actually litigated, directly determined, and essential to the judgment in the prior action." Goodson v. McDonough Power Equipment,Inc. (1983),
{¶ 14} Thus, contrary to appellants' assertions, an issue conclusively determined in a criminal case may have preclusive effect in a later civil case. For example, a criminаl defendant's unsuccessful postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel may bar a subsequent civil action for legal malpractice against the attorney, despitе the fact that the attorney was not a party to the postconviction proceeding. Houser v. Pond, 9th Dist. No. 21887,
{¶ 15} The Toledo Municipal Court determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Cynthia entered the intersection in violation of the red light. Cynthia had a "full and fair" opportunity to defend the issue in the trial. Because appellee asserted collateral estoppel defensively against appellants, it is only necessary that Cynthia was a bound party to the prior action, not appellee. The trial court сorrectly allowed appellee to defensively use non-mutual collateral estoppel because the specific issue — the color the traffic light when Cynthia entered the intersectiоn — would be directly in issue in the negligence action and was already fully litigated by Cynthia.
{¶ 16} Because the trial court properly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel, summary judgment for appellee on the issue of negligence was appropriate. Appellants could not have raised a genuine issue of material fact that appellee was negligent when it had beеn conclusively determined that Cynthia entered the intersection where the accident occurred in violation of the red light. Additionally, summary judgment was appropriate for John Frank's claim for loss of cоnsortium. A claim for loss of consortium "is derivative in that the claim is dependent upon the defendant's having committed a *8
legally cognizable tort upon the spouse who suffers bodily injury."Bowen v. Kil-Kare (1992),
{¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellants are ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. Judgment for the clerk's expense incurred in preparаtion of the record, fees allowed by law, and the fee for filing the appeal is awarded to Lucas County.