111 Ind. 132 | Ind. | 1887
In this case, the only error complained of .here by appellants, the plaintiffs below, is the ruling of the circuit court, sustaining appellee’s demurrer to the plaintiffs’ complaint. This error calls in question the sufficiency of •the facts stated in such complaint to constitute a cause of action in plaintiffs’ favor, and against the defendant below. The complaint was substantially as follows:
“Said plaintiffs complain of the defendant and say that heretofore, to 'wit, in the year 1847, one James Foster was .the‘Owner in fee of the land hereinafter described ; that after the location and construction of the canal hereinafter deiscribed, plaintiffs acquired through conveyance from said James Foster all his interest in said land, including the servient estate hereinafter set out. Said land is described as follows: * * *
“That heretofore, to wit, in the year 1847, while the said James Foster was the owner of said land, the trustees of the "Wabash and Erie Canal, under the acts of the General Assembly of the State of Indiana, by their officers, entered upon and constructed across and upon said land a canal, known and designated as the Wabash and Erie Canal, and, in so doing, erected and constructed channels and embankments, water-ways, towpaths and beds for the water therein; and for many years thereafter, to wit, until the committing of the .grievances hereinafter named, thereby and by reason
“ That the defendant is a railroad corporation organized-under and by virtue of the general laws of the State of Indiana, and as such corporation has constructed its railroad from the city of Evansville, Indiana, to the city of Terre-Haute, over and upon the towpath and embankment so constructed by said Wabash and Erie Canal; that the defendant, said railroad company, has purchased all the right, title, interest and franchises of said board of trustees of the Wabash and Erie Canal in and to the lands aforesaid, on which said canal-bed, channel, towpath and embankment were constructed, and that the same were duly conveyed to the-defendant by proper deeds of conveyance in terms purporting to convey said land in fee simple, but -without the consent and without first having caused to be assessed to plaintiffs damages therefor, or tendered to them payment of any damage whatever, it has taken possession of and constructed its railroad upon said land as aforesaid and is now operating the same thereon.
“ That, in the construction of' said railroad, the defendant dug down a portion of said embankment, and destroyed the water-ways, channel and canal-bed, and placed on the tow
“ That defendant is in possession of said real estate, and has been for three years last past, without the plaintiffs’ consent, and claiming title thereto adversely to the plaintiffs, to their damage one hundred dollars. Wherefore, unless the defendant is enjoined by this court, it will waste and destroy the plaintiffs’ rights aforesaid, and enjoyment of said land and valuable franchises aforesaid, and render it unsafe for said plaintiffs to enjoy their rights and privileges aforesaid, as the owners of the servient estate in said land, over which the said canal passes, in the same manner and to the same extent that they might, could and would do but for the construction of said railroad, whereby said lands of the plaintiffs will be depreciated in value to the amount of one hundred dollars.
We are of opinion that the court below did not err in sustaining appellee’s demurrer to the foregoing complaint. It is shown by the averments of such complaint, that the land in controversy herein is the land in Pike county whereon the canal known as the Wabash and Erie Canal, and its channels, embankments, water-ways, towpaths and beds for the water therein, were constructed under and by -the State of Indiana, and its successors, pursuant to certain acts of the General Assembly.
By section 8 of the act of January 19th, 1846, to provide for the funded debt of this State, and for the completion of the Wabash and Erie Canal to Evansville, it was made the duty of the Governor, in the name and under the seal of the State of Indiana, to execute and deliver to the board of trustees of the Wabash and Erie Canal a deed or patent for the bed of such canal and its extensions, from the Ohio State line to Evansville, including its banks, margins, towpaths, etc. In their complaint herein, the plaintiffs alleged, as we have seen, that .the defendant railroad company had purchased all the right, title, interest and franchises of the board of trustees of the Wabash and Erie Canal in and to the land in controversy herein, whereon such canal-bed, channel, towpath and embankment were constructed, and that the same were duly conveyed to such defendant by a proper deed of conveyance, in terms purporting to convey such land in fee simple.
The question is presented by appellants’ complaint, and this is the only question for our decision in this case: What estate, title or interest had the board of trustees of the Wabash and Erie Canal in the land in controversy herein prior
In City of Logansport v. Shirk, 88 Ind. 563, in speaking of the cases last cited, it was said : “We acquiesce in, rather than approve of, the doctrine of these cases upon the question first stated. This we do, not because the decision of the question, in either of the cases, meets the full approval of our judgments, but for the reason stated in the case last cited (Cromie v. Board, etc., supra), that since the decision of the Burkhart case, 41 Ind. 364, ‘ large rights may have been acquired on the faith of that decision, that would be utterly destroyed by overruling it. The case is one of the class to which the doctrine of stare decisis applies with all its force.’” Rockhill v. Nelson, 24 Ind. 422; Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 9 How. 471, 478; Schori v. Stephens, 62 Ind. 441.
Nearly fifteen years have now elapsed since this court decided, in Water Works Co. v. Burkhart, supra, where lands had been taken and used, under the laws which provided for the construction of the Wabash and Erie Canal, that the estate so taken in such lands was an estate in fee simple, and not a mere easement therein. Upon the faith of that decision, we may well suppose that, during those years, large
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.