19 Utah 35 | Utah | 1899
after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
Respondent insists that the plaintiff, having voluntarily left his work and gone to the scene of the accident,
As a general rule, when the servant voluntarily leaves his post of duty, and places himself outside of the scope of his employment, and while not in the discharge of any duty he owes to the master, incurs risks and dangers that he could have avoided by remaining where the duties of his employment required him to be, and is injured while thus off duty, the master is not liable. We do not think, however, that the case at bar comes within the rule to the extent that a court would be authorized in holding as a question of law that the plaintiff when he left his work, on hearing the crash or noise, did anything more than any prudent man of ordinary caution and discretion would have done under the same or similar circumstances. Therefore, we are not prepared to say that the plaintiff, when he left his work to ascertain the locality and magnitude of the cave, violated any duty he owed to the defendant, especially in view of the fact that he was 800 feet underground at work mining, a class of work attended with many risks and dangers. And in view of the further fact that it is a matter of common knowledge that accidents resulting from the caving in of mines, or portions thereof, are not of uncommon occurrence in the mining regions. A miner’s safety, in fact his very existence, and that of his co-employees, and the safety of the mine, in case of a cave, might depend upon prompt action on his part. And for him to remain at work without investigating, after hearing or being advised of a cave of the magnitude of the one under consideration, might, as the result of the delay, permit every avenue of egress from the mine to be cut off and himself and co-employees imprisoned hundreds of feet
There is some evidence in the record which tends to prove negligence on the • part of the defendent on account of its failure to properly timber that part of the mine where plaintiff and Sullivan were at work. The record shows that the cave might have been prevented by the placing of temporary props between the top of the square sets of timbers and the roof of the stope where the cave occurred. The evidence also tends to show that this is the usual method of guarding against accidents of this character, when the permanent sets of timbers do not come in contact with and support the roof. These are questions of fact that we think should have been submitted to the jury.
The controlling question, however, in this case is, Was it contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in obeying Brant, the shift boss, when he ordered plaintiff into the place of danger where he received the injuries complained of? The plaintiff, when he arrived at the scene of the accident, found Brant giving orders and directions to the men who were endeavoring to extricate
After taking into consideration all the facts, circumstances, and appearances as they existed when plaintiff first came upon the scene of the accident, also, that the life of a co-laborer was in imminent peril, it is a fact for the jury to determine as to whether or not plaintiff, before and at the time of obeying Brant’s orders, knew or ought to have known and realized the extent of the danger.to which he was exposing himself. Bailey on Mast. Liabil., p. 172; Wilson v. Mining Co. (Utah), 52 Pac., 626.
The question of negligence on the part of the defendant and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff are questions of fact that should have been submitted to the jury. Wright v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., 14 Utah, 383; Reese v. Mining Co. (Utah), 49 Pac. Kep., 295, and cases cited.
The case is reversed, with directions to the trial court to set aside the judgment of dismissal, and to grant a new trial. The costs of this appeal to be taxed against the respondent.